{"id":75783,"date":"2015-02-28T11:31:50","date_gmt":"2015-02-28T11:31:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/02\/28\/2015-2025-stratforworld-a-la-sauce-disney\/"},"modified":"2015-02-28T11:31:50","modified_gmt":"2015-02-28T11:31:50","slug":"2015-2025-stratforworld-a-la-sauce-disney","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/02\/28\/2015-2025-stratforworld-a-la-sauce-disney\/","title":{"rendered":"2015-2025 : StratforWorld<\/em> \u00e0 la sauce Disney"},"content":{"rendered":"

2015-2025 : StratforWorld<\/em> \u00e0 la sauce Disney<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn sait que George Friedman, patron du groupe de renseignement priv\u00e9 Stratfor<\/em> a fait beaucoup parler de lui lors de son passage \u00e0 Moscou, en d\u00e9cembre 2014. (Voir successivement le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2014<\/a>, le 21 janvier 2015<\/a>, le 22 janvier 2015<\/a> pour son interview \u00e0 Kommersant<\/em> et le m\u00eame 22 janvier 2015<\/a> en commentaire de cette interview.) Les Russes avaient plut\u00f4t gard\u00e9 un bon souvenir de ce passage, les d\u00e9clarations de Friedman, quoique toutes empreintes d’un r\u00e9alisme cynique concernant la politique US, permettant tout de m\u00eame de r\u00e9tablir la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 de situation du putsch de f\u00e9vrier 2014 \u00e0 Kiev, avec confirmation<\/a> pour suivre de Sa Majest\u00e9 le pr\u00e9sident Obama lui-m\u00eame. Ces derniers jours, les Russes ont d\u00fb d\u00e9chanter…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl y a quelques jours (le 23 f\u00e9vrier) en effet, Stratfor<\/em> a sorti sa grande Prospective pour 2015-2025 (Forecast<\/em> 2015-2025). Ce n’est pas ici le cas de nous attarder au d\u00e9tail de ce long pensum, dont on peut trouver ici et l\u00e0 les grandes lignes (par exemple, voir 1913Intel.com<\/em> le 23 f\u00e9vrier 2015<\/a>). Ce qui nous int\u00e9resse, et qui fait d’ailleurs la grande nouvelle de la prospective, c’est l’annonce de l’effondrement in\u00e9vitable, par fragmentation, de la F\u00e9d\u00e9ration de Russie. (\u00abIt is unlikely that the Russian Federation will survive in its current form… This will create the greatest crisis of the next decade.<\/em>\u00bb) On ajoutera, autre grand titre, une prospective presque aussi catastrophique pour la Chine, un \u00e9clatement \u00e9galement de l’Europe (notre ch\u00e8re UE), et hop, passez muscade ! Qu’est-ce qu’il vous reste ? Bien s\u00fbr, vous avez gagn\u00e9 une m\u00e9daille en chocolat (type-Porochenko) et le droit de participer \u00e0 la prochaine d\u00e9cennie-Stratfor<\/em>, 2025-2035 : effectivement, il reste les \u00c9tats-Unis d’Am\u00e9rique, plus only superpower in the world<\/em> que jamais dans le StratforWorld<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe qui a peut-\u00eatre (hypoth\u00e8se) choqu\u00e9 les Russes, ce n’est pas tant l’annonce de l’effondrement de la Russie, d\u00e9j\u00e0 annonc\u00e9e en 2005, tout comme Stratfor<\/em> annonce le quasi-effondrement de la Chine depuis 1995, mais le contraste entre des d\u00e9clarations de Friedman sur la Russie lors de son passage et l’argumentation du Forecast<\/em> 2015-2025. Dans ce dernier, la Russie est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme tr\u00e8s faible et extr\u00eamement vuln\u00e9rable du point de vue \u00e9conomique, et ainsi promise \u00e0 la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration par fragmentation : \u00abThe current confrontation with Russia over Ukraine will remain a centerpiece of the international system over the next few years, but we do not think the Russian Federation can exist in its current form for the entire decade. Its overwhelming dependence on energy exports and the unreliability of expectations on pricing make it impossible for Moscow to sustain its institutional relations across the wide swathe of the Russian federation. We expect Moscow’s authority to weaken substantially, leading to the formal and informal fragmentation of Russia.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe n’est pas, mais pas du tout ce que l’obligeant et vigilant Friedman avait retir\u00e9 comme impression de sa visite en Russie. Il y avait appris des choses, et parfaitement dans le sens inverse, ce qui confirmait son impression que les USA n’avaient pas tort de craindre la r\u00e9surrection de la Russie alors que sa Prospective 2015-2025 annonce que les USA n’ont qu’\u00e0 attendre l’imminente d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration de la Russie. Voici ce qu’on en pouvait lire sur RT, le 19 d\u00e9cembre 2015<\/a> : \u00abFriedman<\/em> […] says Russia has the ability to emerge from US led sanctions and the recent drop in the ruble due to falling oil prices. Russians’ strength is that they can endure things that would break other nations. It was also pointed out that they tend to support the government regardless of its competence when Russia feels threatened.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFriedman believes that the implementation of sanctions will not have the desired effect the US and EU hope. He points to the fact that President Vladimir Putin is still enormously popular. Also he has learned that the Russian mindset is different to that of those in the West, partly because the population has become accustomed to political and economic upheaval over the last century. The most important lesson I might have learned in Russia might’ being the operative term is that Russians don’t respond to economic pressure as Westerners do, and that the idea made famous in a presidential campaign slogan, It’s the economy, stupid,’ may not apply the same way in Russia.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl est donc assez probable que, plac\u00e9s devant cette contradiction si flagrante d’analyse prospective, les Russes ont voulu r\u00e9agir. Sputnik.News<\/em>, notamment, s’en est charg\u00e9, en allant demander leurs avis \u00e0 quelques experts russes et de pays amis (la Chine et le Venezuela). Le r\u00e9sultat est une vol\u00e9e de bois vert pour Stratfor<\/em> ; on ne s’en \u00e9tonnera pas, vu la forme de la d\u00e9marche, o\u00f9 les Russes ont montr\u00e9 qu’ils voulaient avoir une condamnation unanime de Stratfor<\/em>… D\u00e9marche int\u00e9ress\u00e9e, propagande diront certains, mais ces criailleries de basse-cour ne peuvent dissimuler que les ripostes contre Stratfor<\/em> et Friedman sont absolument justifi\u00e9es et fond\u00e9es, lorsqu’on mesure le degr\u00e9 de cynisme dans une activit\u00e9 faussaire dont le seul but est de r\u00e9pondre aux exigences du Syst\u00e8me. Voici donc l’essentiel du texte de Sputnik.News<\/em>, le 26 f\u00e9vrier 2015<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abVladimir Kozin, the head of the Advisory Group to the Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, notes that when it comes making predictions about Russia’s disintegration, this is nothing more than wishful thinking. Let the gentlemen from Stratfor preserve this report as a souvenir for memory.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbHowever, Kozin also warns that the predictions made by the intelligence firm do reveal something about US intentions toward Russia. Commenting that Stratfor works closely with the CIA, which has always led a campaign against Russia, Kozin notes that the predictions about Russia supposedly falling apart on our own hide specific plans for actions aimed against the Russian government. As a result, Kozin believes that in order to ensure that attacks against us remain fruitless, we must consider the<\/em> [report’s<\/em>] conclusions carefully. It is worth recalling that Stratfor’s 2005 report, forecasting the period up to 2015, also predicted that Russia would slowly but surely collapse, noting that Washington would likely attempt to replace Putin with a more accommodating Russian president.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbGregory Dobromelov, Director of the Institute of Applied Political Studies, told Radio Sputnik that the US-centric Stratfor prognosis is fundamentally flawed, since it does not consider that in conditions of<\/em> [economic<\/em>] crisis and the shifting geopolitical situation Russia’s actions too will change. Dobromelov noted that this forecast considers events which take place while Russia remains inert, <\/em>[suggesting<\/em>] Russia will not take any action. But in reality is obvious that Russian authorities and think tanks are working on plans to find solutions. Dobromelov notes that the reality is that Washington is disconcerted by Russia’s restoration of geopolitical clout over the last years: Of course they are not happy about Russia’s growing geopolitical influence, reached over the last 10-15 years. Of course they are not happy about the strong ties Russia has with Europe via the system of energy deliveries, or the growing interactions with China, or with the preservation of a buffer zone among the post-Soviet republics.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAlexei Arbatov, Director of the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, voiced his view that everyone has a right to their own forecasts, but everything depends on the preconditions. If, for example, you accept the premise that Russia’s GDP will fall by 95 percent, then the other conclusions flowing from this can be justified. Projections are a tricky thing; it all depends on the preconditions, and how these preconditions are justified.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbZhang Xin, an expert at the Institute of International Relations at the East China Normal University in Shanghai believes that Stratfor’s predictions about Russia losing its clout in East Asia are simply wrong. Zhang told Sputnik China that Stratfor’s conclusions about the weakening of Russian military strength, especially its naval power in East Asia and the Asian Pacific region, are hasty and careless. We know that Russia is investing heavily into the strengthening of its defense capabilities. In subsequent years, Russia will be a dominant military force in the region. Stratfor’s forecasts that Russia’s military presence in the region will be weakened, or that Russia will lose its positions in East Asia, are absolutely unfounded.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWith regard to the projected surge in military rivalry between China and Japan, Zhang notes that Stratfor has ignored the factor of relations between Russia and China, which are in a state of intensive and sustained development. This applies to politics, economics, and the military sphere. Recently Russia and China, within the framework of the SCO, held a number of large-scale military exercises and have strengthened their military cooperation. Although we cannot yet determine how exactly cooperation between China and Russia will affect the balance of military power in Asia as a whole, it is nevertheless clear that this is a factor which cannot be ignored in an analysis of the geopolitical situation and military competition in this region. On this basis, I cannot agree with the conclusions and projections made by Stratfor, because, in my view, military cooperation between China and Russia will influence the geopolitical and military situation in East Asia and the Pacific over the long term.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAddressing predictions about Russia losing control over the Caucasus, Arbatov notes that in the coming years the opposite is likely to occur. Russia will not only preserve its control over northern Caucasus, but will strengthen it, turning to new forms of control, based not just on support of loyal local leaders…but on the integration of the North Caucasus into our constitutional plane.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbFernando Bossi, a Venezuelan political scientist and editor of the journal ALBA, told Sputnik Mundo that in his view, Stratfor’s report looks more like a rough draft setting out the priorities of the United States for the next decade than a forecast. Bossi notes that this analysis reflects Washington’s desires, not the objective situation. I consider the statements about the likelihood of Russia collapsing and China losing its role as the locomotive of the world economy completely unfounded. It is more logical to assume that the opposite will occur. Relations between Moscow and Beijing are at their historic peak, and in the future, the political and economic influence of these countries will only continue to grow, especially if they continue rapprochement with India, along with convergence with the countries of Africa and Latin America. This is exactly what we are seeing today, which cannot but be a cause for concern in the White House. Bossi notes that the Stratfor report is correct in saying that the world is on the verge of big changes, but that there is a large probability these changes will be diametrically different from what American analysts expect.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbStratfor’s predictions on Russia’s imminent collapse are anything but original. Former Carter-era National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in the mid-1990s in his book The Grand Chessboard’ that Russia would split into at least four parts. Mr. Brzezinski, who remains an outspoken critic of Russia, did not make such predictions in his latest book, Strategic Vision’.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl y a un double, sinon un triple langage chez Friedman, et Stratfor<\/em> suit donc cette piste avec z\u00e8le. Alors qu’il reconnaissait dans diverses interventions \u00e0 Moscou (mais aussi \u00e0 d’autres occasions [voir le 1er octobre 2014<\/a>]) que la Russie repr\u00e9sente un cas sp\u00e9cial qui ne r\u00e9pond pas aux crit\u00e8res occidentaux, et qui ne pr\u00e9sente gu\u00e8re de possibilit\u00e9s que le pays soit abattu par de simples pressions \u00e9conomiques affectant le niveau de vie, il avait \u00e9galement \u00e9tay\u00e9 le contraire de cette th\u00e8se lorsqu’il s’\u00e9tait agi de justifier la politique washingtonienne. Ainsi, dans sa longue interview \u00e0 Kommersant<\/em>, o\u00f9 il reconnaissant avec emphase et cynisme que les USA \u00e9taient les organisateurs du putsch de Kiev, en f\u00e9vrier 2014, et nous commentions \u00e0 ce propos le 22 janvier 2015<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abCe que nous apporte Friedman avec son interview, c’est la confirmation op\u00e9rationnelle, strat\u00e9gique, de l’orientation prise par Washington. La strat\u00e9gie du regime change’ est d\u00e9sormais consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme une demi-mesure insuffisante pour r\u00e9gler le sort de la Russie. Le sort de la Russie, selon la conception de Washington, est effectivement la disparition pure et simple de la Russie en tant que telle. Lorsqu’elle est dite par un Friedman, comme message massivement subtil \u00e0 l’intention des dirigeants russes pour qu’aucune ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 ne subsiste, cette id\u00e9e devient effectivement un v\u00e9ritable \u00e9l\u00e9ment de politique, une \u00e9norme hypoth\u00e8que poussant \u00e0 reconsid\u00e9rer tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments actuels de l’\u00e9volution de la crise ukrainienne et de la grande crise entre le bloc BAO et la Russie…<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est suivre la m\u00eame logique que Vladimir Kozine lorsqu’il observe, \u00e0 propos de la Prospective 2015-2025 de Stratfor<\/em> que Stratfor<\/em> travaillant de concert avec la CIA, qui a toujours poursuivi une campagne contre la Russie, la pr\u00e9diction selon laquelle la Russie se d\u00e9sagr\u00e9gerait d’elle-m\u00eame dissimule en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 des plans sp\u00e9cifiques pour une action [de la CIA] dirig\u00e9e contre le gouvernement de la Russie, dans ce but. Cela admis comme \u00e9tant d\u00e9sormais une \u00e9vidence, on se retrouve devant le constat de l’\u00e9volution de l’analyse de renseignement que pr\u00e9tend \u00eatre Stratfor<\/em>, \u00e0 l’image des services de renseignement tels qu’ils ont \u00e9volu\u00e9. Ce cas de la Prospective 2015-2025 sur sa partie la plus essentielle appara\u00eet \u00e9videmment comme quelque chose de compl\u00e8tement diff\u00e9rent d’une analyse \u00e0 pr\u00e9tention objective sur l’\u00e9volution des \u00e9v\u00e9nements. Il s’agit d’offrir aux autorit\u00e9s washingtoniennes, ou dans tous les cas aux groupes de pression identifi\u00e9s comme exer\u00e7ant une influence primordiale sur la dynamique de l’action ext\u00e9rieure US (la soi-disant politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re), une pr\u00e9vision qui repr\u00e9sente en fait l’habillage objectif de ce que ces groupes de pression ont eux-m\u00eames \u00e0 l’esprit. (Le V\u00e9n\u00e9zu\u00e9lien Bossi le dit \u00e9galement : Le rapport ressemble plus \u00e0 un m\u00e9morandum mettant en \u00e9vidence les priorit\u00e9s des \u00c9tats-Unis pour la d\u00e9cennie \u00e0 venir … Cette analyse refl\u00e8te les d\u00e9sirs de Washington, et non une situation objective.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’analyse et le renseignement dans le bloc BAO sont devenus l’application universelle de cette recette qu’on pouvait lire r\u00e9cemment sous la plume d’un ancien officier de la DIA du Pentagone, selon lequel ce qu’il importe pour les services de renseignement de communiquer aux dirigeants politiques, ce sont des \u00e9valuations prenant en compte des faits r\u00e9els pour d\u00e9velopper une interpr\u00e9tation qui aille dans le sens de la politique que suivent les directions politiques. Stratfor<\/em> n’est pas un service de renseignement officiel, certes, mais il offre une d\u00e9marche et une m\u00e9thodologie qui rencontrent absolument le statut actuel des agences de renseignement, ce qui fait qu’on n’a pas tort de le consid\u00e9rer comme tel. Le r\u00e9sultat, pour ce qui nous importe et pour ce qui concerne dans tous les cas les USA, est la confirmation que les directions politiques, ou dans tous les cas les groupes de pression qui comptent dans ce pays, ont effectivement comme projet de d\u00e9truire la Russie; qu’ils sont enferm\u00e9es dans une bulle, une sorte de DisneyWorld<\/em> o\u00f9 les services de renseignement les confirment constamment dans la validit\u00e9 de ce projet ; que l’on peut pr\u00e9voir enfin que le choc entre cette bulle et la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 de la situation conduira \u00e0 quelques remous d’une dimension exceptionnelle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 28 f\u00e9vrier 2015 \u00e0 11H31<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

2015-2025 : StratforWorld \u00e0 la sauce Disney On sait que George Friedman, patron du groupe de renseignement priv\u00e9 Stratfor a fait beaucoup parler de lui lors de son passage \u00e0 Moscou, en d\u00e9cembre 2014. (Voir successivement le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2014, le 21 janvier 2015, le 22 janvier 2015 pour son interview \u00e0 Kommersant et le… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2669,2803,4220,5656,16444,2807,2730,16443],"class_list":["post-75783","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bulle","tag-effondrement","tag-evaluation","tag-experts","tag-freidman","tag-renseignement","tag-russie","tag-sratfor"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75783","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75783"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75783\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75783"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75783"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75783"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}