Histoire(s) de JSF (F-35), donc …<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Les derni\u00e8res nouvelles sont conformes \u00e0 la \u00ab\u00a0feuille de route\u00a0\u00bb du programme … L’on vous dit que le F-35B (du Corps des Marines) est sur le point d’atteindre (en 2016, non ?) son statut op\u00e9rationnel (IOC, ou Initial Operational Capability<\/em>), mais qu’il sera incapable de remplir sa mission principale qui est le CAS (Close Air Support<\/em>, ou appui a\u00e9rien rapproch\u00e9) parce que l’arme principale de cette mission, – la SMB II (Small Diameter Bomb<\/em> II), qui permet de faire, \u00f4 miracle, de l’appui a\u00e9rien rapproch\u00e9 de loin<\/strong> [60 kilom\u00e8tres], – n’est pas encore pr\u00eate. Elle ne sera pas pr\u00eate qu’en 2017 ; bon, on attend… D’autre part, ah oui, on vient de \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9couvrir\u00a0\u00bb que la SDB II n’entre pas dans la soute \u00e0 bombes du F-35B, qu’il va falloir modifier, ce qui devrait faire un d\u00e9lai suppl\u00e9mentaire ; ah bon, on attendra un peu plus que 2017 alors … Mais oui, d’autant que le Pentagone ne se presse pas du tout pour faire les modifications n\u00e9cessaires, parce que, en fait, pour ne rien vous cacher, tout \u00e7a (la SDB II, la soute \u00e0 bombes modifi\u00e9e, les ennemis qui attendent d’\u00eatre attaqu\u00e9s) ne pourra pas fonctionner avant 2022 parce que le package<\/em> \u00e9lectronique correspondant \u00e0 cette mission ne sera pas utilisable avant cette date. (Bien sûr, 2022 si tout va bien… Sinon, les ennemis au sol seront pri\u00e9s d’attendre encore quelques ann\u00e9es.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Donc, l’IOC de 2016 pour la fameuse mission CAS signifie une entr\u00e9e en service op\u00e9rationnel en 2022 … Ca, au moins, c’est du s\u00e9rieux. Ainsi, pour qu’on sache qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un sc\u00e9nario de science-fiction sorti des entrailles sarcastiques de dedefensa.org<\/em>, nous citons Military.com<\/em> du 9 mars 2015<\/a>, avec du gras surajout\u00e9 de notre fait, pour souligner ce qui nous semble \u00eatre le plus particuli\u00e8rement significatif de la dynamique en cours, – c’est-\u00e0-dire, la capacit\u00e9 d’adaptation du Pentagone aux diverses p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties de cette aventure merveilleuse du technologisme postmoderne :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «F-35 Joint Strike Fighter pilots will have to wait until 2022 to fire the U.S. military’s top close-air-support bomb after the Small Diameter Bomb II enters service in 2017, JSF officials explained…<\/em> […] The JSF office has already discovered that the SDB II does not fit onto the F-35B – the Marine Corps variant – without modifications to the aircraft’s weapons bay. The Pentagon<\/em> is not in a rush to make those changes before the F-35B reaches initial operating capability this year because the weapon won’t work until the right software package is installed<\/em><\/strong>…»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Tout cela, c’\u00e9tait une simple introduction pour faire un tableau g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du programme JSF, qu’on commence \u00e0 d\u00e9crire un peu comme feraient les historiens du technologisme, ou simplement du Syst\u00e8me, explorant les spasmes et les enchev\u00eatrements extraordinaires du syst\u00e8me du technologisme en cours d’effondrement. Bien entendu, m\u00eame si dans le \u00ab\u00a0vrai monde\u00a0\u00bb l’on vous dit le contraire<\/a>, dans le monde-Syst\u00e8me il est moins que jamais question d’abandonner le JSF, et le JSF est plus que jamais une sorte d’op\u00e9rationnalisation quasiment parfaite du syst\u00e8me du technologisme agonisant dans la phase de son effondrement en cours.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Le 12 mars 2015<\/a>, sur le site POGO<\/em> dans sa section Straus Military Reform<\/em> du Center of Defense Information<\/em> (CDI) qu’il (POGO<\/em>) a int\u00e9gr\u00e9 dans ses structures, Mandy Smithberger met en ligne un article kilom\u00e9trique et \u00e9tourdissant sur le statut du programme JSF. On pourrait consid\u00e9rer ce texte comme une sorte de premi\u00e8re œuvre historique sur l’effondrement du monstre, qui est par ailleurs produit \u00e0 un rythme tr\u00e8s \u00e9lev\u00e9, plus \u00e9lev\u00e9 que jamais peut-on dire, car \u00ab\u00a0l’on ne change surtout pas un programme qui s’effondre\u00a0\u00bb, on l’acc\u00e9l\u00e8re au contraire. Smithberger d\u00e9crit cette formidable \u00ab\u00a0fuite en avant\u00a0\u00bb de la bureaucratie du Pentagone, d\u00e9cid\u00e9e \u00e0 sauver \u00e0 tout prix l’int\u00e9grit\u00e9 compl\u00e8te de la phase int\u00e9grale de l’effondrement du monstre. L’approche philosophique de la chose est plus que jamais une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au dernier film<\/a> jamais achev\u00e9 de Marilyn, Something Got to Give<\/em> (disons \u00ab\u00a0Quelque chose doit craquer\u00a0\u00bb), r\u00e9sum\u00e9e par ce constat de Smithberger : \u00ab\u00a0A un moment donn\u00e9, les imperfections inh\u00e9rentes et les coûts en augmentation d’un programme deviennent si importants que m\u00eame un syst\u00e8me d’achat massif du mod\u00e8le pour des raisons politiques atteint un point de rupture\u00a0\u00bb…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «Inside-the-Beltway wisdom holds that the $1.4 trillion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is too big to cancel and on the road to recovery. But the latest report from the Defense Department’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) provides a litany of reasons that conventional wisdom should be considered politically driven propaganda. The press has already reported flawed software that hinders the ability of the plane to employ weapons, communicate information, and detect threats; maintenance problems so severe that the F-35 has an \u00ab\u00a0overdependence\u00a0\u00bb on contractor maintainers and \u00ab\u00a0unacceptable workarounds\u00a0\u00bb (behind paywall) and is only able to fly twice a week; and a high-rate, premature production schedule that ignores whether the program has demonstrated essential combat capabilities or proven it’s safe to fly. All of these problems are increasing costs and risks to the program. Yet rather than slow down production to focus resources on fixing these critical problems, Congress used the year-end continuing resolution omnibus appropriations bill—termed the \u00ab\u00a0cromnibus\u00a0\u00bb—to add 4 additional planes to the 34 Department of Defense (DoD) budgeted for Fiscal Year 2015. The original FY2016 plan significantly increased the buy to 55, and now the program office is further accelerating its purchase of these troubled planes to buy 57 instead.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »At some point, the inherent flaws and escalating costs of a program become so great that even a system with massive political buy-in reaches a tipping point. The problems described in the DOT&E report show that the F-35 has reached a stage where it is now obvious that the never-ending stream of partial fixes, software patches, and ad hoc workarounds are inadequate to deliver combat-worthy, survivable, and readily employable aircraft. This year’s DOT&E report also demonstrates that in an effort to maintain the political momentum of the F-35, its program office is not beneath misrepresenting critically important characteristics of the system.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »In sum, the old problems are not going away, new issues are arising, and some problems may be getting worse…<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • Une partie de ce texte est consacr\u00e9 au probl\u00e8me central du monstre, puisqu’il s’agit du syst\u00e8me \u00e9lectronique central, le fameux software<\/em>, qui contr\u00f4le toutes les fonctions de la chose. On dira que c’est l\u00e0 le principal probl\u00e8me du JSF, simplement parce qu’il s’agit de son principal syst\u00e8me de fonctionnement ; bien entendu, c’est un probl\u00e8me d’une complication extraordinaire qui suit parfaitement la courbe d’effondrement du syst\u00e8me du technologisme une fois atteint et d\u00e9pass\u00e9 son pic d’efficacit\u00e9 ultime ; il en r\u00e9sulte que plus on essaie de r\u00e9soudre \u00ab\u00a0le\u00a0\u00bb probl\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, plus on ajoute des \u00e9l\u00e9ments nouveaux qui ajoutent leurs propres probl\u00e8mes et aggravent la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. Il s’agit d’une application impeccable de l’\u00e9quation surpuissance-autodestruction, quand la phase surpuissance s’est transmut\u00e9e en phase d’autodestruction. Chaque effort fait pour r\u00e9soudre la crise aggrave la crise en la compliquant par des nouveaux facteurs. On citera abondamment deux passages \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard qui, stricto sensu<\/em>, sont incompr\u00e9hensibles pour le sapiens<\/em> courant (dont nous sommes en l’occurrence) aussi bien en anglais qu’en fran\u00e7ais si on le traduisait : ces passages d\u00e9crivent justement l’incompr\u00e9hensibilit\u00e9 du probl\u00e8me pos\u00e9, et son naufrage dans une complication catastrophique toujours en d\u00e9veloppement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Il suffit donc de parcourir ce texte en observant la massivit\u00e9 technologique qu’il d\u00e9crit, la complexit\u00e9 kafka\u00efenne, bureaucratique, budg\u00e9taire, etc., autant que technologique, qui l’accompagne, pour obtenir une impression g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui permet de comprendre le diagnostic qu’on peut faire de cette catastrophe. Il suffit de savoir, pour avoir un ordre de grandeur, que le software<\/em> du JSF d\u00e9passe 30 millions de lignes de code, soit trois fois plus que pour le programme F-22 (lui-m\u00eame catastrophique), et que le volume \u00e9valu\u00e9 des probl\u00e8mes identifi\u00e9s dont on a repouss\u00e9 la r\u00e9solution (qu’on nommerait plus tard pudiquement \u00ab\u00a0modernisation\u00a0\u00bb) pour pouvoir poursuivre la production est \u00e9valu\u00e9 \u00e0 un coût total de $67 milliards, soit le coût entier du programme F-22. (Dans ce dernier cas, il s’agit d’une \u00e9valuation \u00ab\u00a0optimiste\u00a0\u00bb puisqu’elle assume que le nombre de ces probl\u00e8mes dont la r\u00e9solution est repouss\u00e9e n’est pas plus grand sur le F-35 que sur le F-22, ce qui est tout \u00e0 fait improbable dans la logique de l’augmentation g\u00e9om\u00e9trique des effets de cette phase d’autodestruction.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «The F-35’s software includes over 30 million lines of code between the F-35’s onboard computer and its ground-based Automatic Logistics Information System (ALIS) combat data and logistics system. To put this in perspective, the GAO testified in 2012 that the amount of code on the plane was approximately three times more than the F-22A and six times more than the F-18E\/F Super Hornet. DOT&E found that developing and then testing this unprecedented amount of code is discovering significant performance failures and resulting in schedule slips. These include navigation system inaccuracies and instabilities that are delaying weapon delivery accuracy testing, failures in software fusion of multiple sensor inputs that create false alarms and false target tracks, and so much growth in the size and weight of the ALIS multi-computer system that it cannot be deployed with the F-35. The size and weight of ALIS is so substantial that it necessitates the design and development of a whole new set of ALIS computers, which will require a whole new round of validation testing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Moreover, ALIS software worsens F-35 reliability and maintainability problems. DOT&E finds, \u00ab\u00a0ALIS continues to be cumbersome to use and inefficient, and requires the use of workarounds for deficiencies awaiting correction.\u00a0\u00bb Specific workarounds noted in the report include having to manually enter consumable information like oil usage and frequent submission of formal support requests to Lockheed Martin because \u00ab\u00a0troubleshooting functionality is incomplete.\u00a0\u00bb The diagnostic capability of ALIS, its fault and failure management, has \u00ab\u00a0demonstrated low detection rates, poor accuracy, and high false alarm rates.\u00a0\u00bb To compensate, \u00ab\u00a0fielded operations have had to rely on manual workarounds, such as maintainer-initiated built-in tests, extra scheduled inspections, and reliance on contractor personnel.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Like the airplane itself, its essential support component, ALIS, is not ready for operational employment.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «The expense of the deferred test flight hours is only the tip of the iceberg. Far more expensive are the redesign and fleetwide retrofit costs resulting from the shortcomings that inevitably emerge during those deferred flight tests. The longer those tests are deferred and the more we ramp up production now, the more expensive retrofits will be necessary for the larger fleet of flawed F-35s.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Even more expensive than the cost implications of deferred testing are the costs of achieving the capabilities being deferred to Blocks 3F, 4A, 4B, and later, including the more vaguely defined Blocks 5, 6, and 7. These deferred capabilities are major cost items, many of which fall beyond the five-year budget and are not even included in the current $400 billion acquisition cost estimate. They include B-61 nuclear bomb integration, external weapons pylons and load integration, external fuel tanks, 25mm gun pods, 25mm combat ammunition, JSOW guided weapons integration, adding long range infrared scan and track, new radio\/data links for interoperability with the F-22s, F-15s, and F-16s, integrating the six-AMRAAM load, AIM 9X integration, all-aspect passive threat detection, maritime radar mode, and more.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »The total cost of test, retrofit, and capabilities deferral can be significant. In the $67.3 billion F-22 program, the Air Force deferred so many fixes and capabilities past the end of production that the resulting F-22 \u00ab\u00a0modernization\u00a0\u00bb package added $11.3 billion of previously unacknowledged costs—a 17 percent add-on to the F-22 procurement. (This package, which largely fixed deferred shortcomings and deferred capabilities, is included in this year’s DOT&E report as a separate major acquisition program suffering additional \u00ab\u00a0stability and radar performance shortfalls.\u00a0\u00bb) Simply based on the DOT&E analysis of deferred testing and the Joint Program Office’s descriptions of Blocks 4, 5, 6, and 7 capabilities, the F-35 program appears to be deferring significantly more testing, fixes, and capabilities than the F-22 did. Assuming the proportion of F-35 deferred work to be no greater than the F-22, the F-35 program’s hidden \u00ab\u00a0bow wave\u00a0\u00bb can be calculated to amount to $67 billion, an overrun equal to the entire program cost of the F-22.<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • Ce n’est \u00e9videmment pas un hasard si l’on cite et si l’on salue ce texte de Smithberger en tant que tel, parce qu’un tel texte aurait du \u00eatre \u00e9crit par Winslow Wheeler, l’un des vieux survivants de la bande des \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9formateurs du Pentagone\u00a0\u00bb, qui fut ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es la principale plume du POGO\/CDI et le maître de l’attaque critique du JSF. La raison en est simple et m\u00e9rite d’\u00eatre salu\u00e9e par un commentaire : Wheeler, l’ennemi intime du JSF, vient de quitter le \u00ab\u00a0service actif\u00a0\u00bb…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Ainsi, un texte de Politico<\/em>, du 5 f\u00e9vrier 2015<\/a>, \u00e0 l’occasion du \u00ab\u00a0pot d’adieu\u00a0\u00bbde Winslow Wheeler, salue le d\u00e9part du vieux guerrier, – apr\u00e8s tout encore jeune (68 ans) selon nos crit\u00e8res. Wheeler \u00e9tait connu \u00e9galement sous sa signature patronymique de Spartacus<\/em>. Le texte mentionne la pr\u00e9sence des autres \u00ab\u00a0vieux\u00a0\u00bb survivants de la bande des \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9formateurs du Pentagone\u00a0\u00bb (Spinney, Sprey) qui se battirent contre le monstre tentaculaire que Rumsfeld d\u00e9non\u00e7ait fameusement (pour nous) le 10 septembre 2001<\/a>. (Cela vous dit quelque chose, – \u00e0 nous aussi, \u00ab\u00a0la veille du 11″…).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n «Spartacus was getting a little choked up.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »For 30 years he had battled the profligate spending of the military colossus across the river. He had tried with limited success to shame legislators over their pork-barrel ways. He had taken on the F-35 fighter, the Pentagon’s costliest weapons program, and fought to save the A-10 Warthog attack jet, which was relatively cheap but Air Force brass wanted to retire. When he couldn’t put his own name on his blistering reports, he wrote under the pen name of the famed leader of the Roman slave rebellion. Everyone knew it was him anyway.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n »Winslow Wheeler, 68, was a legend, and now he was retiring. One evening recently he stood in a small conference room in downtown Washington, surrounded by gray-haired comrades from long-ago campaigns. It was a party fit for the frugal registered Republican, nothing ostentatious…<\/em> […] There was Chuck Spinney, who graced the cover of Time magazine in 1983 sitting at a congressional witness table under the headline, \u00ab\u00a0Are billions being wasted?\u00a0\u00bb Spinney, now 69 and slightly hunched, sipped a Diet Coke as he chatted with 30 other defense budget mavericks. There was Pierre Sprey, 76, a member of the 1970s \u00ab\u00a0Fighter Mafia\u00a0\u00bb inside the Air Force that eschewed whiz-bang technology in favor of lightweight and highly maneuverable jets…<\/em>»<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Comme disait fameusement le General of the Army<\/em> (\u00e9quivalent US du mar\u00e9chal) Douglas MacArthur devant le Congr\u00e8s en pr\u00e9sentant ses adieux \u00e0 une carri\u00e8re tumultueuse, \u00ab\u00a0les vieux soldats ne meurent pas, ils s’effacent…\u00a0\u00bb Wheeler s’efface donc… Il n’a pas eu le scalp du JSF, parce que cela est une tache surhumaine, et qu’il n’y a en fait qu’\u00e0 attendre que le monstre se scalpe lui-m\u00eame, en l’accablant de sarcasmes, de critiques, de fureurs vengeresses et joyeuses, de r\u00e9criminations, d’accusations, etc. et encore plus, pour attiser sa nervosit\u00e9 de masse informe qui ne cesse de se charger et de surcharger de syst\u00e8mes \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du syst\u00e8me, pour cr\u00e9er des sous-syst\u00e8mes ou des sur-syst\u00e8mes charg\u00e9s de r\u00e9soudre les probl\u00e8mes nouveaux cr\u00e9\u00e9s par les syst\u00e8mes qu’ils redoublent, eux-m\u00eames d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s pour r\u00e9soudre les pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents probl\u00e8mes nouveaux engendr\u00e9s par les pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents nouveaux syst\u00e8mes install\u00e9s \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du syst\u00e8me. L’usine \u00e0 gaz aura raison d’elle-m\u00eame, et plus elle grossira pour tenter de survivre plus l’effondrement sera important et cons\u00e9quent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Le programme JSF ressemble de plus en plus, il se confirme en fait comme une op\u00e9rationnalisation \u00ab\u00a0en grandeur r\u00e9elle\u00a0\u00bb du Syst\u00e8me lui-m\u00eame ; son effondrement est donc, logiquement, une sorte de r\u00e9p\u00e9tition de l’effondrement du Syst\u00e8me. Il faut l’observer comme l’un des signes massifs des grands \u00e9v\u00e9nements prometteurs \u00e0 venir tr\u00e8s rapidement. Wheeler a fait sa part de travail de mise \u00e0 nu de l’image du monstre, pour faire prendre conscience de l’horreur technologique ; il peut s’effacer avec les honneurs…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mis en ligne le 13 mars 2015 \u00e0 08H48<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" De la folie-JSF au d\u00e9part de Wheeler Histoire(s) de JSF (F-35), donc … Les derni\u00e8res nouvelles sont conformes \u00e0 la \u00ab\u00a0feuille de route\u00a0\u00bb du programme … L’on vous dit que le F-35B (du Corps des Marines) est sur le point d’atteindre (en 2016, non ?) son statut op\u00e9rationnel (IOC, ou Initial Operational Capability), mais qu’il… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[831,5801,3127,7095,4136,2803,249,9295,3572,5319,16473,16471,16474,8482,16472,4995],"class_list":["post-75806","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-a","tag-bombes","tag-budget","tag-cas","tag-corps","tag-effondrement","tag-f-22","tag-ioc","tag-marine","tag-pogo","tag-sdb","tag-sf","tag-smithberger","tag-software","tag-soute","tag-wheeler"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75806","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75806"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75806\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75806"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75806"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75806"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}