{"id":75842,"date":"2015-04-01T14:09:52","date_gmt":"2015-04-01T14:09:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/04\/01\/accord-avec-liran-limpuissance-us-veille\/"},"modified":"2015-04-01T14:09:52","modified_gmt":"2015-04-01T14:09:52","slug":"accord-avec-liran-limpuissance-us-veille","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/04\/01\/accord-avec-liran-limpuissance-us-veille\/","title":{"rendered":"Accord avec l’Iran ? L’impuissance US veille…"},"content":{"rendered":"

Accord avec l’Iran ? L’impuissance US veille…<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’optimisme est de plus en plus en vogue \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve (Lausanne), o\u00f9 se succ\u00e8dent les derniers jours, les derni\u00e8res heures avant un accord possible sur la question nucl\u00e9aire iranienne, entre l’Iran et le bloc BAO + la Russie et la Chine (soit les P5+1). Les Russes, particuli\u00e8rement, sont optimistes, et Lavrov le montre d’une fa\u00e7on ostensible, et Lavrov n’a pas l’habitude de se montrer irresponsable dans cette sorte de mati\u00e8re, son optimisme est donc une indication tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieuse. (Voir RT, le 1er avril 2015<\/a>.) Cela nous autorise \u00e0 envisager d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 la situation si un tel accord est sign\u00e9, essentiellement pour ce qui importe, savoir les relations de l’Iran avec les uns et les autres dans le nouveau cadre relationnel qui serait ainsi \u00e9tabli ; c’est-\u00e0-dire les nouvelles relations avec le bloc BAO, mais essentiellement avec les USA, d’une part ; les nouvelles relations avec la Russie et la Chine (deux des membres du groupe P5+1) d’autre part.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn sait que, pour Obama, un accord avec l’Iran serait un triomphe de politique ext\u00e9rieure ; c’est-\u00e0-dire son seul succ\u00e8s de politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re significatif au milieu d’un champ de catastrophe, et alors prestement transform\u00e9 en triomphe pour faire bon poids, et cela par la gr\u00e2ce du syst\u00e8me de la communication. Cette sorte de montage nous invite \u00e0 \u00e9carter les hyperboles courantes, pour mieux tenter de pr\u00e9ciser ce que serait la nouvelle v\u00e9rit\u00e9 de situation ainsi cr\u00e9\u00e9e ; cela, d’autant plus que l’opposition r\u00e9publicaine \u00e0 l’accord ne d\u00e9sarme absolument pas, comme le montre la derni\u00e8re sortie de John McCain, dans une intervention au S\u00e9nat, o\u00f9 il a plaid\u00e9 indirectement, tout de m\u00eame \u00e0 mots couverts, pour l’id\u00e9e qu’Isra\u00ebl devrait se conduire en rogue state<\/em> (\u00c9tat-voyou) pour saboter l’accord, c’est-\u00e0-dire, si l’on comprend bien sa pens\u00e9e, jusqu’\u00e0 monter une attaque contre l’Iran qui bouleverserait toutes les donn\u00e9es et ferait d\u00e9railler l’accord, m\u00eame apr\u00e8s sa signature. (Voir Sputnik.News<\/em> le 31 mars 2015<\/a> : Les Isra\u00e9liens devraient suivre leur propre politique de r\u00e9sistance [\u00e0 l’accord]… Ils devraient se conduire en voyou’. Esp\u00e9rons que leurs avertissements [de riposte brutale en cas d’accord] ne sont pas du bluff…).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTout cela implique qu’en cas d’accord, les relations entre les USA et l’Iran ne seront pas fondamentalement modifi\u00e9es. Les conditions m\u00eame de l’accord, les pressions exerc\u00e9es par l’administration Obama pour faire passer l’id\u00e9e d’un accord, etc., militent dans ce sens. Cela conduit les \u00e9poux Leverett, sp\u00e9cialistes des questions iraniennes, \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer qu’un accord avec l’Iran ne r\u00e9soudrait rien de fondamental dans les relations des USA avec l’Iran, qu’il serait en un sens le contraire de ce v\u00e9ritable triomphe de politique ext\u00e9rieure que fut le voyage de Nixon \u00e0 P\u00e9kin en 1972, qui constitua un formidable changement dans les relations internationales. Ce ne serait en rien un formidable changement dans les relations USA-Iran, mais plut\u00f4t la poursuite de la chute sans fin de la puissance US … On peut lire la chronique des Leverett sur leur site GoingToTeheran.com<\/em>, le 28 mars 2015<\/a><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abStakes in the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 couldn’t be higher for the countries involvedespecially for the United States. After nearly a decade and a half of disastrously self-damaging wars, counter-terrorism campaigns, and military occupations in the Middle East, the dysfunction and incoherence of U.S. policy is now on full display, from Iraq to Libya, Syria, and now Yemen. To recover, Washington must accept on-the-ground realities: U.S. efforts to dominate the region have failed and the Islamic Republic of Iran is now a rising power with which America must come to terms.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBut President Obama has yet to explain why the United Statesfor its own interests, not as a favor to Iran, or simply because Americans are war-wearyneeds rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. Absent such advocacy, his administration may still reach a nuclear deal with Iran. But it will lose the political fight at home over a new Iran policy, squandering the chance for a broader strategic opening with Tehran and locking the United States into increasingly steep strategic decline in the Middle East and globally.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb…This restricted focus opens U.S. diplomacy up to three major problems. First, it conditions U.S. demands on Tehran with no grounding in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or other aspects of international law. This may seem useful to show constituencies in the United States and allied countries that the Obama administration is putting Iran’s nuclear capabilities in a very tight boxe.g., by requiring the dismantling of an arbitrarily large number of Iranian centrifuges or refusing to lift UN Security Council sanctions on Iran for years into the implementation of an agreement. But it also makes clear that America is not prepared to deal with the Islamic Republic as the legitimate representative of legitimate Iranian intereststhe only basis for real rapprochement.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSecond, a narrowly technical approach is vulnerable to criticism that it does not actually accomplish the goals its advocates set (criticism epitomized in Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s charge that diplomacy doesn’t block Iran’s path to the bomb; it paves Iran’s path to the bomb). In the 1970s, the Carter administration insisted that the SALT II agreements it had negotiated with the Soviet Union put meaningful limits on the growth of Moscow’s strategic arsenal. But this technical argument was trumped by more politically resonant claims that SALT II left an unreconstructed Soviet adversary with too much nuclear capability; ultimately, congressional opposition killed SALT II. If Obama does not make the case for a nuclear deal as a catalyst for broader (and strategically imperative) rapprochement with Tehran, he will face mounting political pushback against meeting U.S. commitments essential to implementing a deal.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbThird, Obama’s posture makes it increasingly probable that the geopolitical benefits of diplomatically resolving the nuclear issue will accrue primarily not to the United States, but to China and Russia. It seems all too likely that the Obama administration will continue to resist packaging a nuclear deal as part of comprehensive, Nixon to China rapprochement with Tehran. It seems virtually certain that, under a deal, the administration will only commit to waive America’s Iran-related sanctions, for six months at a time, through the balance of Obama’s presidency. Indeed, senior administration officials told Congress last week that current sanctions legislation should stay on the books until a deal’s end, years from now, so that Washington can continue leveraging Tehran’s actions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbBy contrast, even before a nuclear deal is concluded, Beijing and Moscow are laying the ground to deepen their already significant economic and strategic cooperation with Iran. (Both Chinese President Xi and Russian President Putin will visit Tehran this spring.) The Obama administration’s technically reductionist approach to Iran relations raises the risks that what should be the greatest triumph of American diplomacy since the U.S. opening to China in the 1970s will end up exacerbating America’s ongoing marginalization in the Middle East.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette logique \u00e9trange mais qui est pourtant si illustrative de notre temps, ou bien qui est \u00e9trange parce que si bien de notre temps, est finalement qu’un accord avec l’Iran, tant voulu par les Washington (ou plut\u00f4t Obama) depuis pr\u00e8s de deux ans, et qui devait impliquer la 0″r\u00e9cup\u00e9ration triomphale de l’Iran par le bloc BAO (le retour de l’Iran dans la communaut\u00e9 internationale), aurait toutes les chances, si cet accord est finalement sign\u00e9, de nous donner exactement le contraire<\/strong>. Dans son Weekly Comment<\/em> du 6 mars 2015<\/a>, Alastair Crooke, pr\u00e9sident de Conflict Forum<\/em> et certainement l’un des experts britanniques les plus lucides et hors du circuit-Syst\u00e8me sur les questions du Moyen-Orient, d\u00e9veloppait d\u00e9j\u00e0 cette perspective qui, finalement, donnerait deux vainqueurs assur\u00e9s, la Russie et la Chine, avec l’Iran effectivement quitte des pressions du bloc BAO mais d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 tourn\u00e9, pour son d\u00e9veloppement international, vers les diverses structures de facto<\/em> antiSyst\u00e8me qui vont de la fili\u00e8re Chine-Russie \u00e0 l’OCS (dont il sera sans doute intronis\u00e9 membre cet \u00e9t\u00e9), aux BRICS, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab… But will the US objectives be achieved through a framework agreement should such a thing transpire? In fact, the very blueprint of America’s approach to the talks paradoxically may lead, not to a tipping’ of Iran towards the West, but to the East. If sanctions are not to be lifted, but merely suspended every six months by Executive Order, for a period of several years, which western energy major will care to invest long-term against such a short-term risk window of six months and with a sword of Damocles too, hanging poised for re-imposition, for more than a decade? In fact, we already can see that the Chinese, who were temporarily pushed back (to provide some space for a mooted European return), have now begun to flood back into Iran. A decade long western freeze’ will almost certainly cook’ Iran including the new generation into its Eurasia orientation, both economically and culturally.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbWhat is even more doubtful, however, is the entire notion that the Middle East in its present condition can be played’ as a balance of power, rubic cube. The concept worked in Europe in the nineteenth century in part because there were well-defined nation states, a modicum of stability, a certain commonality of world view, and a degree of consensus about the rules of the game. None of this holds true for the Middle East today. None of the four powers pays particular deference to the US; none are particularly atuned to western interests; and some of the key actors are not nation states. But mainly there is no stability; rather we see the eroding of it everywhere. How would a balance of powers matrix help resolve Libya, for example?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbIt is fair to ask what else could America do? But to that perhaps, there is no answer. It seems more likely that these regional states will seek to make their own balance of power, irrespective of US designs.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSo what are Iran’s options? It is cut off from the western global financial system, excluded from the so-called international community, and under sanction? Well, Iran is not so isolated, far from it. Russia and China are keen to establish a strategic relationship with Iran, and much of the non-West is open to forging closer trade and political relations. Iran’s strategic situation in the region is solid, and growing stronger (in Iraq, Syria and Yemen). Domestically, Iran has emerged as a more cohesive society from the turmoil of 2009. Iran has applied for membership of the SCO, and its application may be accepted this summer.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbOf course sanctions and the drop in the oil price have had their effect, but exports (non-oil and oil) are rising well. More significantly, strategic geo-economic shifts are changing the Iranian calculus (China’s proposed Eurasian economic corridor through to Turkey offers the region a different pole of economic activity to that of Europe), and trade and commercial opportunities are being fundamentally altered by the Russo-Chinese initiative to set-up an analogue financial and trading and clearing system outside of the dollar-based sphere. Iran has already dropped the dollar as a means of trading. And as the non-dollar economic system expands with a SWIFT financial clearing system alternative already launched, with Central Bank non-dollar currency swaps in place and a putative non-dollar jurisdiction’ banking system under construction by China and Russia, Iranians are now more plainly seeing the alternative (and getting fed up with hanging on the eternal will they\/won’t they’ lift sanctions hiatus).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbSo, as Iran sees it, there is an alternative. But Iran may yet agree to a political’ agreement, and one which does not resolve its conflict with the US. Why? Because Iran understands that the US (at least for now) is not seeking escalation with Iran, but rather the reverse: America needs Iran in order to help smooth its exit from Afghanistan; it needs Iran’s parallel contribution to the containing or defeating of ISIS; to finding a solution in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. In short, America will be discreetly needing Iran in many areas (and thereby anyway indirectly confirming Iran’s pivotal regional status). In brief, facts on the ground are already demonstrating the new balance of power on the Middle East ground, and a political agreement would somehow reflect this shift, and perhaps also lower the political tensions with America even if the situation in terms of US sanctions remains largely unchanged.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd if America takes a different turn with the Presidential election campaign promising to bid up the rhetoric of interventionism, or if Congress retaliates with more punitive sanctions, Iran will likely up’ its enrichment programme, and re-commence 20% enrichment.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD\u00e9cid\u00e9ment, l’on ne peut qu’en revenir \u00e0 l’un des fondamentaux, l’un des plus fondamentaux parmi les fondamentaux de notre \u00e9poque, qui est le caract\u00e8re d’impuissance-paralysie du pouvoir washingtonien, ainsi devenu absolument st\u00e9rile, puis contre-productif et destructeur, voire d\u00e9structurant et dissolvant de lui-m\u00eame ; l’on ne peut donc sortir d’une victoire que serait un accord avec l’Iran, rien qu’une perspective contre-productive qui affaiblirait encore plus la position de ce pouvoir (washingtonien) au Moyen-Orient. La d\u00e9claration de John McCain plus haut, compl\u00e8tement surr\u00e9aliste sinon tout simplement d\u00e9mente puisqu’elle plaide in fine<\/em> pour une attaque isra\u00e9lienne dont il estime qu’elle serait un bon moyen de bloquer l’accord avec l’Iran, m\u00eame sign\u00e9, nous donne une bonne r\u00e9f\u00e9rence de ce qu’est ce blocage washingtonien, en nous indiquant de quel maux souffre ce pouvoir au travers de la sorte d’oppositions extr\u00eames qui le divisent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMcCain ne parle pas sous influence, dans tous les cas sous influence humaine. Paradoxalement, m\u00eame s’il est normalement subventionn\u00e9 comme le sont l’extr\u00eame majorit\u00e9 des parlementaires US qui vivent dans un quasi-automatisme de corruption baptis\u00e9 du beau nom de lobbying, McCain n’est certainement pas la cible privil\u00e9gi\u00e9e ni la marionnette des entreprises habituelles de l’AIPAC et des relais isra\u00e9liens. McCain est r\u00e9ellement ind\u00e9pendant dans ses engagements politiques, bien plus que la plupart de ses coll\u00e8gues. Il va bien au-del\u00e0 de ce que lui demanderait un AIPAC si l’AIPAC avait barre sur lui, et m\u00eame il va parfois, sinon de plus en plus souvent, bien trop au-del\u00e0<\/strong>. C’est lui qui, derri\u00e8re le Speaker<\/em> de la Chambre John Boehner, a sugg\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 l’ambassadeur isra\u00e9lien \u00e0 Washington l’op\u00e9ration ayant abouti au discours de Netanyahou du 3 mars, lequel a \u00e9t\u00e9 jug\u00e9 d\u00e9sastreux par nombre de pro-isra\u00e9liens, y compris par l’AIPAC, \u00e0 cause de son impact catastrophique sur les relations entre Netanyahou et Obama. La seule chose qui int\u00e9ressait McCain, c’est l’impact n\u00e9gatif que ce discours pouvait avoir sur les Iraniens et les n\u00e9gociations qu’ils menaient avec les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMcCain est moins pro-Netanyahou et pro-Isra\u00ebl qu’anti-Iran (ou anti-Libye, anti-Syrie, etc.) ; de m\u00eame est-il moins pro-Kiev, ou pro-Pologne qu’anti-Russie, ou moins pro-tout-ce-qu’on veut qu’antiterroriste et anti-ISIS, etc. Ce qui l’anime et le motive au-del\u00e0 de tout, et l’essentiel de sa carri\u00e8re parlementaire \u00e9tant \u00e9videmment assur\u00e9 par des subventions courantes qui ne marque aucunement une corruption extraordinaire, c’est la figure de l’Ennemi qu’il importe de d\u00e9truire, et il est incapable de distinguer qu’une telle attitude conduit \u00e0 multiplier les contradictions et les impasses surr\u00e9alistes et irr\u00e9alistes \u00e0 la fois, beaucoup plus que les antagonismes, et par cons\u00e9quent qu’il en r\u00e9sulte une paralysie g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. On pourrait aussi bien en d\u00e9duire que McCain, qui n’a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 pris en d\u00e9faut de faiblesse dans cette ligne qui est \u00e0 l’extr\u00eame des plus extr\u00eames (une sorte d’extr\u00eame droite des neocons<\/em>), constitue le r\u00e9ceptacle d’une influence qui d\u00e9passe les capacit\u00e9s d’organisation et de pression humaines, et qui rel\u00e8ve directe du Syst\u00e8me lui-m\u00eame, avec sa dimension mal\u00e9fique qui renvoie aux affrontements m\u00e9tahistoriques. McCain n’est pas sous influence (humaine), il est habit\u00e9, inspir\u00e9 par quelque chose de diff\u00e9rent qui rel\u00e8ve de forces que la raison politique, y compris son double pervers de la corruption, n’a pas l’habitude de fr\u00e9quenter si seulement elle accepte d’en envisager l’existence ; McCain passe donc comme une lettre \u00e0 la poste, puisque personne n’y comprend rien et n’y veut rien comprendre, et il s’en d\u00e9duit chez lui la production d’une politique absolument d\u00e9vastatrice, dissolvante, nihiliste jusqu’\u00e0 simplisme d\u00e9cisif de l’entropisation si cela \u00e9tait possible.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQui plus est, et d’ailleurs assez logiquement si l’on consid\u00e8re ses influences, McCain est de facto<\/em>, hors de toute position institutionnelle, une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence, un point de ralliement, c’est-\u00e0-dire un inspirateur, ou plut\u00f4t le passeur et le messager d’un \u00e9tat d’esprit qui infecte absolument la repr\u00e9sentation parlementaire au Congr\u00e8s (la quasi-majorit\u00e9 des r\u00e9publicains, une partie importante des d\u00e9mocrates). C’est dire que les positions extr\u00e9mistes qu’il montre \u00e0 propos de l’Iran, comme hier \u00e0 propos de la Russie, sont la r\u00e8gle g\u00e9n\u00e9rale et l’inspiratrice de l’attitude du Congr\u00e8s vis-\u00e0-vis de l’Iran, et elles le seront plus encore<\/strong> si un accord est sign\u00e9 \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve. Ce qu’\u00e9crivent les Everett et Alastair Crooke a donc toutes les chances de se r\u00e9aliser, sinon d’\u00eatre une perspective quasiment acquise. L’accord \u00e9ventuel de Gen\u00e8ve va lib\u00e9rer l’Iran de certaines contraintes pour pouvoir mieux se tourner vers la Chine, la Russie et le reste. La pression constante du Congr\u00e8s constituera une pression constante pour que l’Iran raffermisse tr\u00e8s vite ses liens strat\u00e9giques, politiques, militaires, commerciaux, avec la ligne Moscou-P\u00e9kin et tous les relais annexes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 1er avril 2015 \u00e0 14H04<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Accord avec l’Iran ? L’impuissance US veille… L’optimisme est de plus en plus en vogue \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve (Lausanne), o\u00f9 se succ\u00e8dent les derniers jours, les derni\u00e8res heures avant un accord possible sur la question nucl\u00e9aire iranienne, entre l’Iran et le bloc BAO + la Russie et la Chine (soit les P5+1). Les Russes, particuli\u00e8rement, sont… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5267,7599,2664,12148,3858,16419,4058,3516,8364,2773,16525,4063,2790,3004,6208,4073],"class_list":["post-75842","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-accord","tag-aipac","tag-alastair","tag-conflict","tag-corruption","tag-crooked","tag-echec","tag-forum","tag-geneve","tag-iran","tag-levered","tag-mccain","tag-netanyahou","tag-nucleaire","tag-obama","tag-triomphe"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75842","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75842"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75842\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75842"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75842"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75842"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}