{"id":75905,"date":"2015-05-14T09:17:42","date_gmt":"2015-05-14T09:17:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/05\/14\/le-f-35-et-les-princes-du-desert-dont-le-roi-est-le-petrole\/"},"modified":"2015-05-14T09:17:42","modified_gmt":"2015-05-14T09:17:42","slug":"le-f-35-et-les-princes-du-desert-dont-le-roi-est-le-petrole","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/05\/14\/le-f-35-et-les-princes-du-desert-dont-le-roi-est-le-petrole\/","title":{"rendered":"Le F-35 et les princes du d\u00e9sert dont le roi est le p\u00e9trole"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h3>Le F-35 et les princes du d\u00e9sert dont le roi est le p\u00e9trole<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous nous rappelons de f\u00e9roces empoignades, \u00e0 Washington, \u00e0 propos de ventes d&rsquo;armes au Moyen-Orient. En g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, l&rsquo;affaire opposait Isra\u00ebl et ses relais et l&rsquo;Arabie et le gouvernement f\u00e9d\u00e9ral, parce que l&rsquo;Arabie r\u00e9clamait des syst\u00e8mes d&rsquo;arme avanc\u00e9s que le gouvernement f\u00e9d\u00e9ral \u00e9tait inclin\u00e9 \u00e0 lui vendre, tandis qu&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl et ses relais s&rsquo;y opposaient f\u00e9rocement. A cette \u00e9poque, l&rsquo;ennemi arabe d\u00e9clar\u00e9 d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl, c&rsquo;\u00e9tait l&rsquo;Arabie. Ainsi y eut-il, dans les ann\u00e9es 1979-1981, la question et la pol\u00e9mique des ventes \u00e0 l&rsquo;Arabie d&rsquo;AWACS et des premiers F-15, puis, quelques ann\u00e9es plus tard, la question et la pol\u00e9mique des ventes de la version d&rsquo;attaque en profondeur et \u00e0 grande autonomie du F-15 (le F-15E <em>Strike Eagle<\/em>). Aujourd&rsquo;hui, il s&rsquo;agit du F-35 (notre cher JSF), mais dans des conditions si compl\u00e8tement diff\u00e9rentes (Voir quelques d\u00e9tails pr\u00e9liminaires le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-le_jsf_commence_son_travail_de_termite_12_05_2015.html\" class=\"gen\">12 mai 2015<\/a>.)&#8230; Il semble bien qu&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl, d\u00e9sign\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;unanimit\u00e9 pour recevoir deux F-35 en 2016, se fiche compl\u00e8tement de la vente de F-35 \u00e0 d&rsquo;autres dans la r\u00e9gion, puisque exclusivement et intens\u00e9ment concentr\u00e9 sur cette question : que faire de ces deux F-35 livr\u00e9s en 2016 et comment ne pas trop montrer qu&rsquo;ils ne servent \u00e9videmment \u00e0 rien ? Quant \u00e0 l&rsquo;Arabie et aux divers \u00c9mirats et autres califats du Golfe, on se demande si vraiment ils ont demand\u00e9 \u00e0 acqu\u00e9rir des F-35.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMais qu&rsquo;importe ! A Washington, tout se passe comme si les pays du CCG (Conseil de Coop\u00e9ration du Golfe) r\u00e9clamaient \u00e0 corps et \u00e0 cri le F-35, et quelques officiels de poids jusqu&rsquo;au conseiller personnel d&rsquo;Obama en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale sont venus expliquer avec forces d\u00e9monstrations amicales pourquoi les USA ne pouvaient pour l&rsquo;instant vendre le F-35 aux princes du d\u00e9sert dont le roi est le p\u00e9trole . C&rsquo;est une \u00e9tonnante com\u00e9die, compl\u00e8tement invertie par rapport aux d\u00e9bats des ann\u00e9es 1970-1980 que nous avons \u00e9voqu\u00e9s plus haut, o\u00f9 les sollicit\u00e9s-qui-ne-le-sont-pas expliquent aux solliciteurs-qui-ne-sollicitent-pas pourquoi ils ne pourront pas,  pour l&rsquo;instant, rassurons-nous,  r\u00e9pondre positivement aux demandes pressantes qui ne leur auraient jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 faites&#8230; Une \u00e9tonnante com\u00e9die avec divers faux-nez et faux-semblants, certes, d&rsquo;autant qu&rsquo;elle met en sc\u00e8ne une occurrence politique et strat\u00e9gique fondamentales, qui concerne les rapports politiques et strat\u00e9giques tout aussi fondamentaux entre les USA d&rsquo;une part, l&rsquo;Arabie et les \u00c9mirats &#038; autres du Golfe (les pays du CCG) d&rsquo;autre part. Ainsi, cette question politique et strat\u00e9gique d&rsquo;une telle importance est-elle synth\u00e9tis\u00e9e (dira-t-on r\u00e9duite ? S&rsquo;agissant du F-35 qui est aussi le JSF, on n&rsquo;osera pas) par la question, qui semble alors devenue centrale, de la livraison ou pas du F-35. Lorsqu&rsquo;on conna\u00eet tous les composants du cas JSF, on reste ironiquement stup\u00e9faits et stup\u00e9faits avec une bienveillance ironique pour une \u00e9poque si singuli\u00e8re et si <em>fun<\/em>, o\u00f9 les torchons qui ne torchent rien et les serviettes qui n&rsquo;essuient pas sont all\u00e9grement m\u00e9lang\u00e9es pour pr\u00e9senter une question strat\u00e9gique fondamentale quasiment sous la forme d&rsquo;une superproduction hollywoodienne qui se serait mis en t\u00eate de sc\u00e9nariser les grands dilemmes et les habilet\u00e9s sans fin du pouvoir de l&rsquo;Empire. (Il faut dire&#8230; La <strong>seule<\/strong> r\u00e9ussite du JSF jusqu&rsquo;ici a \u00e9t\u00e9 de participer fort \u00e9l\u00e9gamment \u00e0 un certain nombre de <em>blockbusters<\/em> de Hollywood, sous forme virtuelle de cr\u00e9ation par imagerie informatique, si bien qu&rsquo;on se demande si cette usine \u00e0 gaz n&rsquo;est pas finalement une arme secr\u00e8te dont la <strong>vraie<\/strong> r\u00e9ussite attendue est d&rsquo;illustrer de fa\u00e7on <em>sexy<\/em> les productions hollywoodiennes. Dans ce cas, chapeau bas et <em>Mission<\/em> [d&rsquo;ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0] <em>accomplished<\/em>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Ci-dessous, nous pr\u00e9sentons un premier texte qui rapporte, sans rire ni l&rsquo;ombre de la moindre ironie, la d\u00e9marche des puissants de l&rsquo;administration, d\u00e9fenseurs bienveillants de la puissance technologique des USA, sans rivale quand il s&rsquo;agit du F-35 car vraiment, sans nul doute, personne n&rsquo;est capable de faire l&rsquo;\u00e9quivalent exceptionnaliste de cette catastrophique usine \u00e0 gaz. Le texte est de <em>Military.com<\/em>, le <a href=\"http:\/\/www.military.com\/daily-news\/2015\/05\/12\/white-house-says-f35s-not-for-sale-to-gulf-arab-states.html\" class=\"gen\">13 mai 2014<\/a>, et c&rsquo;est la Maison-Blanche elle-m\u00eame qui pr\u00e9sente cette affaire &#8230;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t &#8230; Ensuite, c&rsquo;est un second texte qui pr\u00e9sente la m\u00eame affaire, en riant un peu avec quelques rayons d&rsquo;une certaine ironie, cette m\u00eame d\u00e9marche des puissants&#8230; bla bla bla. On retrouve dans ce second texte des \u00e9l\u00e9ments du premier puisqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de m\u00eames d\u00e9clarations de m\u00eames officiels. Mais le cadre et le contexte sont trac\u00e9s diff\u00e9remment et l&rsquo;effet est int\u00e9ressant. On voit qu&rsquo;il est mis en \u00e9vidence combien l&rsquo;information peut \u00eatre pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e diff\u00e9remment selon les points de vue, sans n\u00e9cessairement que l&rsquo;une ou l&rsquo;autre version soit formellement faussaire, la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 de situation \u00e9tant laiss\u00e9e \u00e0 une appr\u00e9ciation fond\u00e9e sur l&rsquo;exp\u00e9rience et l&rsquo;intuition dans le cadre d&rsquo;un syst\u00e8me de la communication qu&rsquo;il importe de fr\u00e9quenter assid\u00fbment pour mieux en distinguer l&rsquo;essentiel qui renforce la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 distingu\u00e9e par la perception d&rsquo;une psychologie forte, de l&rsquo;accessoire qui alimente l&rsquo;imposture d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e presque comme si c&rsquo;\u00e9tait en toute innocence, celle des simples d&rsquo;esprit \u00e0 la psychologie \u00e9puis\u00e9e. (Ce second texte est du <a href=\"http:\/\/sputniknews.com\/us\/20150513\/1022114826.html#ixzz3a4dLqug3\" class=\"gen\">14 mai 2015<\/a> sur <em>Sputnik.News<\/em>.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<p class=\"signature\"><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t____________________________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"common-article2\">White House Says F-35s Not For Sale to Gulf Arab States<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab President Obama&rsquo;s Camp David summit with the Gulf Arab states on Thursday will seek to boost arms sales to the Gulf neighbors but the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has been taken off their wish list. White House officials on Monday sought to tamp down speculation that King Salman of Saudi Arabia canceled his attendance at Camp David when the U.S. made clear that his country would not be permitted to buy F-35s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb We do not and never anticipated this to be a summit that only focused on one capability, like the F-35, for instance, said Ben Rhodes, the deputy National Security Advisor to Obama. What we&rsquo;re focused on is the capabilities that are most relevant to the current security challenges that the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) faces, Rhodes said in a conference call with other administration officials. So, I think it would be a mistake to say that there was some list of very finite capabilities that were the only things on the table here, Rhodes said, but discussions will continue on the Gulf states&rsquo; security needs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb Saudi Foreign Minsiter Adel al-Jubeir also denied that the F-35 or U.S. policy on Iran were factors in King Salman&rsquo;s absence. This is not related in any way, shape or form to any disagreement between the two countries, al-Jubeir said. I think this idea that this is a snub because the king did not attend is really off base.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb Rhodes said that the security of the Gulf states was a core interest of the U.S., and we are prepared to use all elements of our power to back up our commitment to that core interest. At Camp David, there will be a discussion of a range of capabilities with respect to ballistic missile defense, with respect to cyber capabilities, with respect to countering terrorism, and the types of asymmetric threats that countries in the region are facing, Rhodes said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb On the F-35s, Robert Malley, the National Security Council&rsquo;s Mideast coordinator, said the summit was never meant to present the Gulf states with a check list on weapons. I think they understood this is not a case of the GCC countries coming with a shopping list and we&rsquo;d have to tick off those of the items that they wanted that we would agree on, Malley said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tColin Kahl, the National Security Advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, noted that the U.S. has already sold vast amounts of advanced weaponry to the Gulf states, and the sale of F-35s at this time should not be a drawback. This administration has worked extraordinarily closely with the Gulf states to make sure that they had access to state-of-the-art armaments, Kahl said. The F-35 might not be on the table, but keep in mind under this administration we moved forward on a package for the Saudis that will provide them the most advanced F-15 aircraft in the region, Kahl said. The Emiratis fly the most advanced F-16s in the world. They&rsquo;re more advanced than the ones our Air Force flies. Taken as a whole, the GCC last year spent nearly $135 billion on their defense. The Saudis spent more than $80 billion. Taken in comparison, the Iranians spent something like $15 billion on their defense, Kahl said. \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<p class=\"signature\"><em>Military.com<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"common-article2\">US Refuses to Sell Scandal-Plagued F-35s to Gulf States<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab During a summit to boost arms sales between the US and Gulf Arab states, President Obama indicated that one special weapon would be off the table: the F-35 fighter jet. For Arab leaders, this was more likely a relief than a disappointment, given the well-documented fact that the jet rarely, if ever, works.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb One can imagine the scene: President Obama sitting around a picnic table with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, sipping lemonades beneath the spring blooms in Camp David Maryland. Listen fellas, in all seriousness, buy whatever else you want, but the F-35&rsquo;s aren&rsquo;t for sale, Obama might say during the meeting scheduled for Thursday. One leader stifles a laugh, another chokes on his drink, and together they shrug and nod, yeah, sure, no problem.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb Only a possible scenario, of course. Thursday&rsquo;s meeting hasn&rsquo;t happened yet. But the White House has made it clear that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will not be part of the arms negotiations. I think they understood this is not a case of the GCC countries coming with a shopping list and we&rsquo;d have to tick off those of the items that they wanted that we would agree on, said Robert Malley, the National Security Council&rsquo;s Mideast coordinator. Coincidentally, King Salman of Saudi Arabia has canceled his attendance at the Camp David summit, and the White House has been emphasizing that the king&rsquo;s decision was in no way related to the F-35.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb A new set of software problems may mean yet another series of delays for the F-35 fighter, already the most expensive and troublesome military equipment project in US history. We do not and never anticipated this to be a summit that only focused on one capability, like the F-35, for instance, deputy National Security Advisor to Obama said. While some have suggested this couldn&rsquo;t be the case, that surely King Salman&rsquo;s absence is in response to the F-35 not being part of the discussion, but the Saudi government has also emphatically denied that correlation. This is not related in any way, shape or form to any disagreement between the two countries, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir told reporters on Monday. I think this idea that this is a snub because the king did not attend is really off base.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb Two separate US government watchdogs are outlining problems with the engines used in their F-35 jet fighters  one finding the systems unreliable and another citing dozens of violations in its quality assurance inspection. In other words: Why would we be mad? We have absolutely no interest in buying those planes. And why would they? The F-35&rsquo;s track record is far from stellar. The most expensive weapons system ever developed, the F-35&rsquo;s development has so far cost a staggering $390 billion, and despite that high price tag, the jet has been plagued with problems.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb Last month, two separate reports surfaced which indicated that the jet&rsquo;s engines may be unreliable. Program data shows that the reliability of the engine is very poor (less than half of where it should be) and has limited the program&rsquo;s progress toward its overall reliability targets, reads a report from the Government Accountability Office. A software error was also revealed last month, indicating that the jet&rsquo;s primary guns would be unable to fire, and that 2019 is the earliest that glitch can be repaired. This is only one of several mechanical issues which have been reported. US officials have also expressed concern that a crucial chip used in the plane&rsquo;s hardware could contain a glitch which would allow hackers to crash any F-35 remotely.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb On Monday, Nick Harvey, a former UK defense chief, said there wasn&rsquo;t a cat in hell&rsquo;s chance of the fighter being combat-ready by 2018. You could argue it was already one of the biggest white elephants in history a long time ago, Harvey said, speaking to the Independent. Perhaps King Salman&rsquo;s absence from the arms summit isn&rsquo;t a sign of Saudi Arabia&rsquo;s frustrations with not being able to buy the F-35, but rather a sign that the king has decided his country would be better off not buying any American weapons at all. \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<p class=\"signature\"><em>Sputnik.News<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le F-35 et les princes du d\u00e9sert dont le roi est le p\u00e9trole Nous nous rappelons de f\u00e9roces empoignades, \u00e0 Washington, \u00e0 propos de ventes d&rsquo;armes au Moyen-Orient. En g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, l&rsquo;affaire opposait Isra\u00ebl et ses relais et l&rsquo;Arabie et le gouvernement f\u00e9d\u00e9ral, parce que l&rsquo;Arabie r\u00e9clamait des syst\u00e8mes d&rsquo;arme avanc\u00e9s que le gouvernement f\u00e9d\u00e9ral \u00e9tait&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3259,4892,8750,4204,3723,2774,250,5983,3600,706],"class_list":["post-75905","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-arabie","tag-camp","tag-ccg","tag-david","tag-golfe","tag-israel","tag-jsf","tag-livraison","tag-petrole","tag-rhodes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75905","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75905"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75905\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75905"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75905"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75905"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}