{"id":76049,"date":"2015-08-06T05:19:38","date_gmt":"2015-08-06T05:19:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/08\/06\/breedlove-loves-la-russie-indeed\/"},"modified":"2015-08-06T05:19:38","modified_gmt":"2015-08-06T05:19:38","slug":"breedlove-loves-la-russie-indeed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/08\/06\/breedlove-loves-la-russie-indeed\/","title":{"rendered":"Breedlove loves<\/em> la Russie, indeed<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Breedlove loves<\/em> la Russie, indeed<\/em><\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais qui a dit, tonnerre de Zeus, que la Russie \u00e9tait un pays-voyou, expansionniste, qu’il importait de r\u00e9duire ? Qui n’a cess\u00e9 de dire que la Russie envahissait encore et encore l’Ukraine au m\u00e9pris de toute biens\u00e9ance internationale ? Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Breedlove a \u00e9t\u00e9, depuis f\u00e9vrier 2014, un infatigable z\u00e9lateur des observations, et d\u00e9nonciateur par cons\u00e9quent d’une Russie agressive, envahissant l’Ukraine \u00e0 plusieurs dizaines de reprises, pr\u00eate \u00e0 fondre pour ne faire qu’une bouch\u00e9 de ses voisins baltes. (Voir par exemple le 19 avril 2014<\/a> ou le 9 mars 2015<\/a>). Il y a certes eu des hauts et des bas, la Russie moins coupable qu’on ne croirait, plus beaucoup plus, etc., mais toujours la Russie au banc des accus\u00e9s. Cette fois, nous dit Sputnik<\/em>-fran\u00e7ais (le 4 ao\u00fbt 2015<\/a>), c’est la main franchement et fra\u00eechement tendue…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIntervenant mardi sur PBS Newshour, le commandant supr\u00eame des forces alli\u00e9es en Europe Philip Breedlove a insist\u00e9 sur le r\u00e9tablissement de contacts permanents entre la Russie et l’Otan. La Russie peut devenir et deviendra, esp\u00e9rons-le, un excellent partenaire<\/em> […] Nous avons besoin d’un partenaire et pas d’un rival en la personne de la Russie, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral am\u00e9ricain. Et d’ajouter qu’il \u00e9tait aussi n\u00e9cessaire de r\u00e9tablir non seulement la liaison entre l’Alliance et la Russie, mais aussi entre Moscou et le secr\u00e9taire d’Etat am\u00e9ricain et ses adjoints. De tels contacts doivent devenir r\u00e9guliers, ce qui n’est malheureusement pas le cas \u00e0 pr\u00e9sent, a regrett\u00e9 M. Breedlove.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbLe g\u00e9n\u00e9ral a toutefois rappel\u00e9 que bon nombre de leaders europ\u00e9ens percevaient la menace \u00e9manant de Moscou depuis le rattachement de la Crim\u00e9e \u00e0 la Russie et l’\u00e9clatement du conflit dans l’est de l’Ukraine…<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBien entendu, on jugera les d\u00e9clarations de Breedlove remarquables par rapport \u00e0 ce qu’il n’a cess\u00e9 de r\u00e9p\u00e9ter depuis f\u00e9vrier 2014, mais on les jugera telles dans un contexte o\u00f9 cette sorte d’activit\u00e9 remarquable est le lot de tous les acteurs de la politique am\u00e9ricaniste. Par ailleurs, on se rappellera que Breedlove est aussi<\/strong> le champion des tournants en U concernant ses positions vis-\u00e0-vis de la Russie, et qu’il sait se taire jusqu’\u00e0 para\u00eetre ne plus exister lorsqu’il sent que des avertissements qu’on lui a prodigu\u00e9s sont s\u00e9rieux (voir le 12 mars 2015<\/a>). Du coup, cela nous a donn\u00e9 l’id\u00e9e de voir d’un peu plus pr\u00e8s cette interview de PBS NewsHour<\/em>, du 29 juillet 2015<\/a>, r\u00e9alis\u00e9e par l’anchorwoman<\/em> Gwen Ifgill … Assez long passage sur l’Ukraine, certes, mais qui m\u00e9rite d’\u00eatre lu pour avoir une bonne id\u00e9e de la situation existante au sein des cha\u00eenes de commandement et des milieux dirigeants du bloc BAO, section principale USA, vis-\u00e0-vis de l’Ukraine, c’est-\u00e0-dire, vis-\u00e0-vis de la Russie essentiellement, c’est-\u00e0-dire vis-\u00e0-vis des n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s de la communication dans ces domaines…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abI want to take you to Ukraine, especially Russia’s role. The new incoming nominee to be for Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joe Dunford, said at a congressional hearing last week that he saw Russia as our chief global threat. Is that something you agree with?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abI have testified to the same thing in the past.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abWhy?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abWell, clearly, there are lots of threats out there, for instance, ISIL. But I think what you hear from numerous leaders is that Russia is a different case. This is a nation that for 20 years we have tried to make a partner. And in the last few years, we have seen that they’re on a different path. So now we have a nation that has used force to change internationally recognized boundaries. Russia continues to occupy Crimea.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbRussian forces now are in the Donbass in Eastern Ukraine. So this nation has used force to change international boundaries. And this is a nation that possesses a pretty vast nuclear inventory, and talks about the use of that inventory very openly in the past. And so what I think you see being reflected is that we see a revanchist Russia that has taken a new path towards what the security arrangements in Europe are like and how they are employed. And they talk about using, as a matter of course, nuclear weapons. For that reason, these senior leaders, I believe, see that as a major threat.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abSecretary Kerry has not said that. And I wonder if the distinction there is between the diplomatic approach to dealing with Russia on things like Iran and the military concerns.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abSo, Russia can and we hope in the future will be a great partner. There are many places where our needs and requirements match. But, again, in Europe, they have established a pattern now, Georgia, Transnistria, Crimea, Donbass, where force is a matter of course. And that’s not what we look for in partners in Europe.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abSo NATO has talked about providing training and artillery and some sort of support against this force you describe, this Russian bear on the border. Is that enough?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abWell, NATO nations are offering some assistance to Ukraine, as is the United States. Many nations now are coming along to be a part of helping Ukraine to defend themselves. They have the right to defend themselves.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abBut is it enough?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abI think that question is yet to be determined. We believe that there is a diplomatic and a political solution. So when you ask, is it enough, the question is, is it enough to set the conditions so that we can get to a political and a diplomatic solution?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abWhat about the Baltics? There is a lot of nervousness that Russia is going to expand its view of aggression in that direction as well, and they will be entirely unable to defend themselves.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abBoth NATO, as an alliance, and the United States have come to great measures of assurance for our Baltic nations. We have U.S. soldiers alongside British and other soldiers inside of these countries now, exercising, doing training, to assure those allies that NATO is there and will be there. I was privileged to sit in the room at Wales when the leaders of 28 nations, including our president, were rock-solid on Article V, collective defense. And that includes the Baltics.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bbAnd I think that Mr. Putin understands that NATO is different.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abThere is a lot of nervousness, however, that this option, if this doesn’t take hold, is war.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abWell, the best way not to have a war is to be prepared for war. So, we’re in there now, training their soldiers. As you know, we are looking at and have decided to preposition stops forward. We have heavy equipment that we train with in these nations now. And so we need to be prepared, so that we can avoid.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abIs there a line between preparation and provocation?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abAbsolutely. I believe there is. We do defensive measures, and in, I think, very easily defined defensive stances in our forward bases. We’re not putting big forces into the Baltics. Right now, there is a company of U.S. soldiers in each of the three Baltic states. That is well below a proportional issue.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abIf it is possible for there to be a diplomatic or a political solution to head off any future conflict, what would that look like?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abWe always talk about a European land mass whole, free, and at peace. To get to that, we need to have a partner in Russia, not someone that we are competing with. The Russian energy<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abDo you see a partnership that I don’t see?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abNo, no, I’m saying we have to have one in the future.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abRight.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abIf we really believe we’re going to get to whole, free, and at peace and prosperous, then we need a partner in Russia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abWell, give me an example of one way to get there, especially if the person who has to be your partner is Vladimir Putin, who doesn’t show any indication, other than being helpful at the Iran nuclear talks, of being the partner you envision.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abSo first, it’s communication. We need to reestablish those lines of communication. You have seen our secretary of state, undersecretary of state reaching out in several forums. Mil-to-mil communications need to become routine again. They are not routine now, where they were once before, communication first.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abI guess I hear what you are saying, but I don’t see how you get there.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abIts’ not going to be an easy road. And it’s not going to happen quickly. This business with Russia is a long-term thing. I have said in testimony in other places that this is global, not regional. And it is long-term, not short-term. But we have to start down the path.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abAssuming for a moment there is a diplomatic-to-diplomatic impasse or president-to-president impasse, is there a military-to-military way of forging that kind of agreement?<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGen. Philip Breedlove<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abThere is. It is important also that, even if our countries are not getting along, when you are flying airplanes in close vicinity, when you are sailing ships in close vicinity, when you have soldiers on the ground exercising sometimes just on the other side of borders, military men and women have to be able to communicate in a very matter-of-fact way to preclude anything ugly from happening.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGwen Ifill<\/em><\/strong> : \u00abWell, and we hope nothing further ugly happens…<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl y a effectivement beaucoup de points int\u00e9ressants dans cette interview, qui montre un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Breedlove extr\u00eamement embarrass\u00e9 (la bri\u00e8vet\u00e9 des r\u00e9ponses le montre), face \u00e0 un intervieweuse qui ne prend pas de gants et se montre particuli\u00e8rement intrusive, insistante, voire agressive, avec des questions parfois plus longues que les r\u00e9ponses, parfois tr\u00e8s abruptes (J’entends bien ce que vous me dites mais je ne vois pas tr\u00e8s bien o\u00f9 \u00e7a vous m\u00e8ne). Ce dernier point n’est pas une surprise. La r\u00e9cente (10 juillet) intervention de John Kerry, contredisant abruptement le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Dunford (futur pr\u00e9sident du JCS) qui venait (le 9 juillet) d’affirmer que la Russie constitue la premi\u00e8re menace existentielle contre les USA, a jet\u00e9 le trouble dans la presse-Syst\u00e8me, d’une fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s d\u00e9favorable, dans le sens o\u00f9 cette intervention de Kerry a \u00e9t\u00e9 per\u00e7ue comme une mani\u00e8re de vouloir d\u00e9router le d\u00e9terminisme-narrativiste<\/a> proclamant la culpabilit\u00e9 et la diablerie absolues de la Russie. (Voir notre texte du 29 juillet 2015<\/a>, o\u00f9 nous parlons de la trahison de John Kerry.) Ainsi Breedlove est-il oblig\u00e9 de naviguer, non pas entre deux eaux mais bien dans deux eaux diff\u00e9rentes ; celle o\u00f9 il proclame, sous la surveillance de la presse-Syst\u00e8me et d’autres (on va le voir), la duplicit\u00e9 compl\u00e8te de la Russie, et celle o\u00f9 il doit proclamer que l’on peut et que l’on doit finalement arriver \u00e0 s’entendre avec la Russie qui n’est finalement pas si mal, selon le constat du secr\u00e9taire d’\u00c9tat John Kerry. On rel\u00e8vera quelques points \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, brillants comme des petits bijoux de dialectique concr\u00e8te et l’on imagine le pauvre Breedlove, transpirant d’autant de grosses gouttes qu’il a d’\u00e9toiles, oblig\u00e9 \u00e0 chaque instant de revenir en arri\u00e8re pour nuancer une affirmation dans un sens ou l’autre, qu’il doit att\u00e9nuer ou renforcer selon l’intervieweuse-inquisitrice et en pensant \u00e0 ceux qui l’\u00e9coutent, au d\u00e9partement d’\u00c9tat, et peut-\u00eatre bien certains \u00e0 la Maoison-Blanche…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Interrog\u00e9 sur la d\u00e9claration du G\u00e9n\u00e9ral Dunford (la Russie constitue la premi\u00e8re menace existentielle contre les USA’), Breedlove confirme qu’il a fait des d\u00e9clarations \u00e9quivalentes lui-m\u00eame, mais il explique cette analyse de sa part d’une \u00e9trange fa\u00e7on, \u00e0 deux reprises (soulign\u00e9 de gras par nous)… \u00abBut I think what you hear<\/em> from numerous leaders<\/em><\/strong> is that Russia is a different case<\/em>\u00bb… \u00abFor that reason,<\/em> these senior leaders<\/em><\/strong>, I believe, see that<\/em> [Russia<\/em>] as a major threat.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSi l’on r\u00e9fl\u00e9chit, on conclut qu’il s’agit d’un cas extraordinaire. Ce qu’avait \u00e9nonc\u00e9 Dunford, et Breedlove quasi-parall\u00e8lement un en sens (la Russie constitue la premi\u00e8re menace existentielle contre les USA’), c’est l’\u00e9valuation officielle des chefs d’\u00e9tat-major, quelque chose d’essentiel dans la planification du Pentagone et l’\u00e9tablissement de la strat\u00e9gie des USA. Entretemps, Kerry a dit que non, pas du tout, ce n’est pas la strat\u00e9gie des USA. Breedlove nous annonce qu’il a dit la m\u00eame chose (que Dunford), mais que cette \u00e9valuation est faite parce que numerous leaders<\/em>\/these senior leaders<\/em>, c’est-\u00e0-dire, pour parler clair, des gens comme les pr\u00e9sidents, Premiers ministres, etc., d’Ukraine, de Pologne, des pays baltes, le gouverneur d’Odessa Saakachvili, Pravy Sektor<\/em>, etc., jugent effectivement la Russie comme une menace \u00e0 part pareille \u00e0 nulle autre, (a different case<\/em>, a major threat<\/em>). Ainsi, l’\u00e9valuation du Pentagone est-elle d\u00e9sormais appuy\u00e9e sur les exigences des dirigeants des \u00c9tats-domestiques des USA et autres serviteurs-Syst\u00e8me, l’Empire d\u00e9pendant des foucades de ses domestiques, exemple parfait de ce qu’on pourrait nommer, apr\u00e8s tout, la doctrine Wallerstein d’apr\u00e8s la remarque d’Immanuel Wallerstein (le 24 mai 2014<\/a> : \u00abI do not think that the elites are any longer succeeding in manipulating their low-level followers. I think the low-level followers are defying the elites, doing their own thing, and trying to manipulate the elites. This is indeed something new. It is a bottom-up rather than a top-down politics…<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Le reste de la conversation est un exercice d’\u00e9quilibriste, o\u00f9 Breedlove tente \u00e0 la fois d’affirmer qu’il faut coop\u00e9rer avec les Russes, qui ne sont pas si m\u00e9chants que \u00e7a bien au contraire (Kerry), et qu’il faut \u00eatre pr\u00eats \u00e0 frapper en Europe o\u00f9 les Russes sont en effet aussi m\u00e9chants que \u00e7a sans aucun doute (d\u00e9terminisme-narrativiste\/presse-Syst\u00e8me) … \u00abSo, Russia can and we hope in the future will be a great partner. There are many places where our needs and requirements match. But, again, in Europe…<\/em> […] And that’s not what we look for in partners in Europe.<\/em>\u00bb … \u00ab[…W]e need to have a partner in Russia, not someone that we are competing with…<\/em> […] …No, no, I’m saying we have to have one in the future.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t La direction civile des USA a bien des pr\u00e9occupations avec ses g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, essentiellement au niveau de la communication, mais on pourrait dire exactement l’inverse, que les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US ont bien des pr\u00e9occupations avec leur direction civile, essentiellement au niveau de la communication. Ces pr\u00e9occupations peuvent aussi bien concerner des actes autres que de pure communication d’ailleurs, mais d\u00e9bouchant le plus souvent sur un d\u00e9sordre complet… Dans le plus r\u00e9cent texte de Thierry Meyssan (Voltaire.net<\/em>, le 3 ao\u00fbt 2015<\/a>) sur la situation de la politique maximaliste actuelle au Moyen-Orient, o\u00f9 Jupp\u00e9 est impliqu\u00e9 comme un des instigateurs originels, du temps o\u00f9 il \u00e9tait ministre de Sarko, on peut suivre le r\u00e9cit du surprenant jeu du chat et de la souris que, selon Meyssan, le Turc Erdogan et le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Allen qui commande le US Central Command, jouent avec le pr\u00e9sident Obama \u00e0 propos des engagements turcs contre ISIS, ou plut\u00f4t contre le PKK, on ne sait plus tr\u00e8s bien… On ne sait plus tr\u00e8s bien non plus o\u00f9 exactement r\u00e9side l’autorit\u00e9, mais \u00e9galement o\u00f9 exactement r\u00e9side l’insubordination ! Il y aurait bien une sorte de complot Erdogan-Allen, mais avec Obama parfaitement au courant, et contrant r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement chaque initiative du tandem, rempla\u00e7ant tel ou tel envoy\u00e9 sp\u00e9cial (Daniel Rubinstein remplac\u00e9 par Michael Ratney comme envoy\u00e9 sp\u00e9cial du Pr\u00e9sident pour la Syrie<\/strong>, dont la mission<\/strong> sera \u00abprioritairement<\/em> […] de surveiller les agissements du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Allen<\/em>\u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAinsi ne peut-on vous promettre, pour \u00e9clairer la situation du monde, notamment de sa portion des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US, de l’Ukraine, de l’Europe et de la Russie, \u00e9ventuellement aussi d’une autre poign\u00e9e des m\u00eames (des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US) autour de la Turquie, de la Syrie et de Daesh<\/em>, ainsi ne peut-on vous offrir que l’explication du d\u00e9sordre dans le d\u00e9sordre, ou du tourbillon crisique<\/a> (\u00abun ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne pour l’instant fait de d\u00e9sordre pur, d’\u00e9nergie tournante en constante acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration<\/em>\u00bb). La situation au sein des hi\u00e9rarchies diverses de Washington, entre les divers pouvoirs, s’apparente toujours plus \u00e0 un tourbillon qui acc\u00e9l\u00e8re, \u00e0 un formidable d\u00e9sordre qui ne tente m\u00eame plus de dissimuler, qui se trouve enferm\u00e9 en m\u00eame temps dans les pressions et contraintes des repr\u00e9sentations de communication, et notamment de ce que nous nommons le d\u00e9terminisme-narrativiste. M\u00eame les arrangements en forme de pseudo-complots sont conduits dans des situations de quasi-d\u00e9couvert, sans pourtant qu’aucun protagoniste ne soit inqui\u00e9t\u00e9, mais aussi sans qu’aucune de ces manuvres n’aboutisse \u00e0 rien sinon \u00e0 un peu plus de d\u00e9sordre encore. Nul doute qu’\u00e0 ce rythme et dans ce sens (!), cette accentuation tourbillonnante du d\u00e9sordre produit ce que nous nommons hyperd\u00e9sordre<\/a> dont la vertu antiSyst\u00e8me est \u00e9vidente.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 6 ao\u00fbt 2015 \u00e0 05H25<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Breedlove loves la Russie, indeed Mais qui a dit, tonnerre de Zeus, que la Russie \u00e9tait un pays-voyou, expansionniste, qu’il importait de r\u00e9duire ? Qui n’a cess\u00e9 de dire que la Russie envahissait encore et encore l’Ukraine au m\u00e9pris de toute biens\u00e9ance internationale ? Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Breedlove a \u00e9t\u00e9, depuis f\u00e9vrier 2014, un infatigable z\u00e9lateur… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3365,2862,12797,10831,855,3679,3448,584,2730,3312,3867,1296],"class_list":["post-76049","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-allen","tag-determinisme-narrativiste","tag-dunford","tag-existentielle","tag-kerry","tag-menace","tag-meyssan","tag-otan","tag-russie","tag-saceur","tag-syrie","tag-ukraine"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76049","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76049"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76049\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76049"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76049"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76049"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}