{"id":76084,"date":"2015-08-30T03:21:51","date_gmt":"2015-08-30T03:21:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/08\/30\/lelephant-affole-et-les-souris-qui-rugissaient\/"},"modified":"2015-08-30T03:21:51","modified_gmt":"2015-08-30T03:21:51","slug":"lelephant-affole-et-les-souris-qui-rugissaient","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/08\/30\/lelephant-affole-et-les-souris-qui-rugissaient\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;\u00e9l\u00e9phant affol\u00e9 et les souris qui rugissaient"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_a.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d;font-size:2em;\">L&rsquo;\u00e9l\u00e9phant affol\u00e9 et les souris qui rugissaient<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>R\u00e9guli\u00e8rement reviennent sur la table quelques \u00e9l\u00e9phants blancs qui constituent la colonne vert\u00e9brale (en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de type-\u00e9clair au chocolat) du discours sur la strat\u00e9gie am\u00e9ricaniste depuis dix, vingt, trente, quarante, cinquante ans, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 George Kennan qui, effectivement, d\u00e9crivait cette strat\u00e9gie, ou \u00ab\u00a0politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re\u00a0\u00bb, comme celle d&rsquo;un \u00ab\u00a0\u00e9l\u00e9phant sautant de tout c\u00f4t\u00e9, effray\u00e9 par une souris\u00a0\u00bb (\u00ab\u00a0<em>to jump around like an elephant frightened by a mouse<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>C&rsquo;est Katrina Vanden Heuvel, \u00e9ditrice de <em>The Nation<\/em> et \u00e9pouse du professeur Stephen F. Cohen poursuivi en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pour trahison parce qu&rsquo;il cherche une autre issue que nucl\u00e9ariser la Russie, qui \u00e9crit l\u00e0-dessus en rappelant Kennan dans le Washington <em>Post<\/em>, le <a class=\"gen\" href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/opinions\/the-danger-of-foreign-policy-by-bumper-sticker\/2015\/08\/25\/ada44426-4a8f-11e5-846d-02792f854297_story.html\">25 ao&ucirc;t 2015<\/a>. Elle vaticine d&rsquo;une plume d\u00e9sabus\u00e9e quoique rest\u00e9e alerte, \u00e0 propos des programmes des candidats r\u00e9publicains du \u00ab\u00a0parti unique\u00a0\u00bb (ceux des candidats d\u00e9mocrates du \u00ab\u00a0parti unique\u00a0\u00bb ne valant gu\u00e8re mieux, \u00e0 part disons le projet d&rsquo;une guerre ou l&rsquo;autre en moins). Ces divers programmes consistent effectivement \u00e0 nous promettre un nombre respectable de souris, impliquant qu&rsquo;on d\u00e9clenchera autant de guerres anti-souris qu&rsquo;il faut pour que l&rsquo;\u00e9l\u00e9phant puisse sortir indemne du magasin de porcelaines. (Pour ceux qui veulent quelques indications en fran\u00e7ais sur le texte de Vanden Heuven, <em>Sputnik<\/em>-fran\u00e7ais les leur donne, le <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/fr.sputniknews.com\/presse\/20150826\/1017788286.html#ixzz3kDfjHftw\">26 ao&ucirc;t 2015<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo;<em>Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966, George F. Kennan, the legendary Cold War diplomat often called \u00ab\u00a0the father of containment,\u00a0\u00bb criticized the escalation of the war in Vietnam. The United States, he said, should not \u00ab\u00a0jump around like an elephant frightened by a mouse.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo;<em>Kennan&rsquo;s \u00ab\u00a0frightened elephant\u00a0\u00bb is a strangely apt metaphor for the situation in which we find ourselves nearly a half-century later. In the GOP primary, the candidates are calling for a foreign policy defined by fear-mongering and senseless aggression. Their agenda includes plans to reverse President Obama&rsquo;s nuclear agreement with Iran, abandon renewed diplomatic ties with Cuba, escalate tensions with Russia and deploy U.S. troops in Syria. Much like Kennan&rsquo;s agitated elephant, the Republicans candidates see threats in Iran, Vladimir Putin&rsquo;s Russia, Bashar al-Assad&rsquo;s Syria and in the Islamic State and other Islamic extremist groups that are far out of proportion to any real harm they could ever inflict on U.S. interests. They are so out of touch with reality that even admitting the folly of the Iraq war has become a sign of weakness. The far greater danger, though, is the combination of paranoia and hubris that characterizes the foreign policies of the Republican candidates leading us into yet another self-inflicted foreign policy disaster. Once again, they would have us rush to embrace unnecessarily militaristic responses to otherwise manageable foreign policy challenges, bringing yet more chaos to the Middle East and Eastern Europe while costing the nation even more in lost lives and treasure.<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Nous sommes si compl\u00e8tement emport\u00e9s dans le flot diluvien des nouvelles, des complots, des Grands Jeux, des divers \u00ab\u00a0nouvelles cartes redessin\u00e9es\u00a0\u00bb du Moyen-Orient, des nouveaux syst\u00e8mes de champs p\u00e9troliers, des vrais et des faux <em>false flag<\/em>, des attaques de l&rsquo;Iran, et que ne sait-on encore, qu&rsquo;on oublie que l&rsquo;Histoire se fait et qu&rsquo;elle jauge \u00e0 son aune tout ce que nous croyons vivre et comprendre dans l&rsquo;instant, sans souci que cet instant contredise l&rsquo;instant pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent et nous pr\u00e9pare un nouvel instant qui dira le contraire. Nous avons v\u00e9cu cela, bien entendu, avec 9\/11 et ce qui a imm\u00e9diatement suivi, &ndash; les invasions absolument, superbement catastrophiques de l&rsquo;Afghanistan et de l&rsquo;Irak, qui nous conduisent au chaudron bouillonnant actuel que certains continuent \u00e0 juger comme une haute marque de l&rsquo;intelligence respectivement am\u00e9ricaniste, occidentaliste et du bloc BAO (au choix)&#8230; Mais il faut bien dire qu&rsquo;au d\u00e9part, l&rsquo;aventure est tr\u00e8s sp\u00e9cifiquement am\u00e9ricaniste, et d\u00e9marre comme un <em>western<\/em>, comme en a t\u00e9moign\u00e9 le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Wesley Clark quand il est exactement cit\u00e9, avec ses \u00ab\u00a07 guerres en 5 ans\u00a0\u00bb d\u00e9cid\u00e9es en septembre-octobre 2001 (voir, pour m\u00e9moire, le <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-notes_sur_les_recommandations_du_g_n_ral_clark_21_07_2015.html\">21 juillet 2015<\/a>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Monsieur Peter Frankopan, <em>senior research fellow<\/em> au Worcester College, \u00e0 Oxford, nous raconte l&rsquo;histoire de ces deux catastrophes initiales dans leur contexte le plus large, dans son livre <em>The Silk Roads: A New History of the World<\/em>, \u00e0 partir duquel il a \u00e9crit pour <em>The Independent<\/em> un texte, ce <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/middle-east\/declassified-cia-documents-reveal-how-disastrous-americas-post911-plans-really-were-10474882.html?printService=print\">27 ao&ucirc;t 2015<\/a>, qui se r\u00e9f\u00e8re \u00e0 une foule de documents officiels de source US et autres qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9cemment d\u00e9classifi\u00e9s et exploit\u00e9s&#8230; Il est en effet int\u00e9ressant de noter que les historiens et les universitaires disposent d\u00e9sormais de sources importantes sur la p\u00e9riode. Outre une masse de documents venant des \u00ab\u00a0fonds\u00a0\u00bb Snowden et <em>WikiLeaks<\/em>, &ndash; qui figurent d\u00e9sormais presque comme des \u00ab\u00a0sources officielles\u00a0\u00bb pour les susdits historiens, &ndash; concernant les processus de d\u00e9cision US durant ces conflits, il y a la mise \u00e0 la disposition du public de sources in\u00e9dites telles que des enregistrements audio couvrant des milliers d&rsquo;heures de d\u00e9lib\u00e9ration et de communication de Saddam Hussein et de ses collaborateurs les plus proches trouv\u00e9s dans la r\u00e9sidence du pr\u00e9sident irakien en 2003, ou, plus proche de nous, des cassettes r\u00e9cup\u00e9r\u00e9es lors de l&rsquo;attaque du Pakistan contre ben Laden.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il y a enfin de fa\u00e7on assez caract\u00e9ristique un \u00ab\u00a0programme sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent de d\u00e9classification de documents officiels\u00a0\u00bb (US) pour permettre aux experts-Syst\u00e8me de disposer d&rsquo;un maximum de donn\u00e9es pour comprendre et analyser les causes du tr\u00e8s grand nombre d&rsquo;erreurs qui constituent l&rsquo;essentiel sinon l&rsquo;int\u00e9gralit\u00e9 de la politique US depuis 9\/11. En effet, la chose, &ndash; notamment les d\u00e9sastres d&rsquo;Afghanistan et de l&rsquo;Irak, &ndash; semblent d\u00e9sormais \u00eatre reconnue officiellement par les bureaucraties US concern\u00e9es, selon les processus qu&rsquo;elles suscitent. Ce point appara&icirc;t alors comme paradoxal puisqu&rsquo;il am\u00e8ne comme effet que les erreurs et les \u00e9checs de politique et de strat\u00e9gie qui entra&icirc;nent en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral un resserrement de la surveillance et du secret, conduit ici au contraire \u00e0 la diffusion beaucoup plus larges de documents secrets ; bref, le pouvoir-Syst\u00e8me voudrait savoir pourquoi il fait si mauvais, si longuement mauvais et si constamment mauvais&#8230; Cette politique est ainsi pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e dans le texte de <em>The Independent<\/em> : &laquo;<em>the disastrous failures of US policy in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to an unprecedented programme of declassification of documents (some with significant redactions) as part of the cathartic process of trying to understand how so many mistakes were made before and after 9\/11.<\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>C&rsquo;est effectivement \u00e0 partir de ces documents que Frankopan a travaill\u00e9 sur son ouvrage. Ce qui est remarquable dans son texte de <em>The Independent<\/em> dont nous pr\u00e9sentons une partie ci-dessous, c&rsquo;est que les hypoth\u00e8ses les plus catastrophiques concernant la politique US qui furent faites en commentaires de ces \u00e9v\u00e8nements, se confirment en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. On y retrouve l&rsquo;extraordinaire amateurisme des m\u00e9thodes, le cloisonnement, l&rsquo;absence d&rsquo;int\u00e9gration des diff\u00e9rents acteurs, l&rsquo;absence compl\u00e8te de preuves derri\u00e8re les affirmations US alors qu&rsquo;il aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 pourtant ais\u00e9 d&rsquo;en fabriquer quelques-unes. (Par exemple, mais exemple essentiel par absence surprenante d&rsquo;une manipulation efficace, qui a constitu\u00e9 l&rsquo;erreur initiale dans la construction de la <em>narrative<\/em> pseudo-strat\u00e9gique US : \u00e0 partir du moment o&ugrave; l&rsquo;attaque de l&rsquo;Irak, <em>circa<\/em>-2003, \u00e9tait bas\u00e9e sur l&rsquo;affirmation de l&rsquo;existence d&rsquo;armes de destruction massive [ADM] dans les mains des Irakiens de Saddam, comment les planificateurs et manipulateurs US, qui contr\u00f4laient compl\u00e8tement le pays \u00e0 partir d&rsquo;avril 2003 et ont recherch\u00e9 justement ces ADM pendant plus d&rsquo;un an, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 l&rsquo;automne 2004, n&rsquo;ont-ils pas eux-m\u00eames \u00ab\u00a0plant\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb quelques s\u00e9ries d&rsquo;armes chimiques ou biologiques dans l&rsquo;une ou l&rsquo;autre cache improvis\u00e9 pour pouvoir proclamer que la guerre \u00e9tait justifi\u00e9e et donc renforcer consid\u00e9rablement leur diplomatie ? C&rsquo;est ce que craignaient ouvertement les Fran\u00e7ais en mars-avril 2003, apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;intervention de Villepin \u00e0 l&rsquo;ONU de f\u00e9vrier 2003. Le service charg\u00e9 des questions de d\u00e9sarmement au Quai d&rsquo;Orsay \u00e9tait persuad\u00e9 que les services US proc\u00e9deraient effectivement de cette fa\u00e7on pour pouvoir mettre la France et les pays r\u00e9ticents vis-\u00e0-vis de la guerre dans une tr\u00e8s mauvaise posture. Cette absence de montage quasiment enfantin pour des forces habitu\u00e9s para&icirc;t-il \u00e0 tant de manipulation est l&rsquo;un des plus grands myst\u00e8res de la guerre contre l&rsquo;Irak, et la d\u00e9monstration au moins de l&rsquo;absence de coordination du monstre am\u00e9ricaniste, et au-del\u00e0 d&rsquo;\u00e9tranges comportements psychologiques typiques de l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme [<a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-glossairedde_notre_psychologie_28_01_2013.html\">essentiellement<\/a> l&rsquo;inculpabilit\u00e9 et l&rsquo;ind\u00e9fectibilit\u00e9].)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;extrait ci-dessous, qui couvre le d\u00e9clenchement des guerres contre l&rsquo;Afghanistan et l&rsquo;Irak, rend compte effectivement de la tr\u00e8s grande inorganisation d&rsquo;une politique r\u00e9duite \u00e0 une caricature de strat\u00e9gie \u00e9labor\u00e9e dans l&rsquo;improvisation ; avec l&rsquo;usage permanent de moyens inefficaces par leur poids m\u00eame dans cette sorte de conflits, le d\u00e9veloppement constant d&rsquo;arguments faussaires m\u00eame vis-\u00e0-vis d&rsquo;elle-m\u00eame ; avec comme <em>modus operandi<\/em> les obsessions (Saddam) et les r\u00e9alisations chaotiques usant de la redondance de la menace agressive (l&rsquo;Iran), enfin et par-dessus tout comme tendance irr\u00e9sistible la production \u00e9chevel\u00e9e d&rsquo;un d\u00e9sordre selon une dynamique permanente d&rsquo;amplification et de multiplication. Certains jugent cela habile ou le produit d&rsquo;un calcul machiav\u00e9lique s&rsquo;inspirant du billard \u00e0 au moins cinq bandes, ce qui montre combien la \u00ab\u00a0strat\u00e9gie\u00a0\u00bb am\u00e9ricaniste a peut-\u00eatre eu comme seule r\u00e9ussite de simuler l&rsquo;effet de se faire prendre pour une strat\u00e9gie (la strat\u00e9gie-<em>American Dream<\/em>). Le seul caract\u00e8re qu&rsquo;on puisse lui reconna&icirc;tre \u00e0 coup s&ucirc;r est d&rsquo;\u00eatre absolument conforme \u00e0 la <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-glossairedde_la_politique-syst_me__17_11_2012.html\">politique-Syst\u00e8me<\/a> dont l&rsquo;ex\u00e9cution op\u00e9rationnelle renvoie compl\u00e8tement au Syst\u00e8me et se traduit par la recherche de la d\u00e9structuration et de la dissolution, non comme moyen mais comme but en soi correspondant \u00e0 la logique et \u00e0 la mission du Syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>(Pour rappel : la \u00ab\u00a0politique-Syst\u00e8me\u00a0\u00bb, qui touche <strong>aussi bien celui qui la produit<\/strong> que celui qu&rsquo;elle touche &#8230; &laquo;<em>op\u00e9rationnalise, dans une \u00ab\u00a0politique\u00a0\u00bb qui devrait \u00eatre ainsi d\u00e9finie par inversion comme une \u00ab\u00a0antipolitique\u00a0\u00bb, l&rsquo;absolutisme et le totalitarisme du Syst\u00e8me, son homog\u00e9n\u00e9it\u00e9 qui s&rsquo;obtient par la d\u00e9composition des parties qu&rsquo;il absorbe, notamment la d\u00e9composition identitaire. Cette \u00ab\u00a0politique-Syst\u00e8me\u00a0\u00bb est d\u00e9structurante pour celui qui s&rsquo;y inscrit, de m\u00eame que la \u00ab\u00a0politique-Syst\u00e8me\u00a0\u00bb elle-m\u00eame est d\u00e9structurante pour les objectifs qu&rsquo;elle poursuit selon une course m\u00e9canique et aveugle, puisqu&rsquo;elle voit l&rsquo;ennemi dans tout ce qui est structure, et, au-del\u00e0, dans tout ce qui est principe, et qu&rsquo;elle ne voit par cons\u00e9quent comme objectif de destruction dans l&rsquo;ennemi que la structure et le principe. Par cons\u00e9quent, la \u00ab\u00a0politique-Syst\u00e8me\u00a0\u00bb ne r\u00e9pond, selon nous, \u00e0 aucun des crit\u00e8res d&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9 habituels pour une politique, elle diff\u00e8re totalement dans ses buts et ses objectifs. Elle est<\/em><strong><em> incompr\u00e9hensible<\/em><\/strong><em> selon notre logique historique habituelle, celle qui a marqu\u00e9 toutes les grandes politiques classiques dans l&rsquo;histoire, aussi bien les politiques d\u00e9s\u00e9quilibr\u00e9es de conqu\u00eate que les politiques sages d&rsquo;\u00e9quilibre&#8230;<\/em> [&#8230;] [&#8230;A<em>u plus la \u00ab\u00a0politique-Syst\u00e8me\u00a0\u00bb provoque la d\u00e9structuration-dissolution, au plus elle se d\u00e9structure et se dissout elle-m\u00eame selon sa logique, au plus elle perd la capacit\u00e9 de provoquer des effets, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 un point de basculement, ou d&rsquo;inversion vertueuse, o&ugrave; sa propre d\u00e9structuration-dissolution prend le pas sur la d\u00e9structuration-dissolution qu&rsquo;elle provoque.<\/em>&raquo;)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;extrait du texte ci-dessous, qui couvre effectivement le d\u00e9clenchement des guerres contre l&rsquo;Afghanistan et l&rsquo;Irak, est pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9 d&rsquo;une partie mettant en place le contexte g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, notamment la politique US vis-\u00e0-vis de cet ensemble strat\u00e9gique qui va du sous-continent indien \u00e0 la p\u00e9ninsule arabique. (C&rsquo;est \u00ab\u00a0l&rsquo;arc de crise\u00a0\u00bb comme avait coutume de dire d\u00e8s 1978-1979 Brzezinski, consid\u00e9r\u00e9 souvent comme l&rsquo;inspirateur \u00e9clair\u00e9 des fondements de cette \u00ab\u00a0strat\u00e9gie\u00a0\u00bb, et qui reste effectivement par sa culture et ses jugements un parfait messager de la mise en place de la \u00ab\u00a0politique-Syst\u00e8me\u00a0\u00bb par la manipulation <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article-les_origines_du_d_sordre_pr_sent_par_brzezinski_en_janvier_1998_31_07_2005.html\">originelle<\/a> de l&rsquo;islamisme, sous l&rsquo;inspiration \u00e0 son tour d&rsquo;une psychologie absolument marqu\u00e9e par l&rsquo;antirussisme propre \u00e0 ses origines polonaises.) Le titre original de l&rsquo;article est &laquo;<em>Declassified CIA documents reveal how disastrous America&rsquo;s post-9\/11 plans really were<\/em>&raquo;.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d;font-size:1.65em;font-variant:small-caps;\">&#8230; [H]ow disastrous America&rsquo;s post-9\/11 plans really were<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&#8230; Control of the region lying between East and West was seen in the later 20th century through the prism of the Cold War and of competition with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the mineral wealth of the heart of Asia, particularly its oil and gas but also its pipeline infrastructure, made the belt commercially important as well as strategically vital. So perhaps it was not surprising that two days after the 9\/11 terrorist attacks took place, an action plan was issued that set out the importance of engaging Iran and of contacting the authorities in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and China &ndash; Afghanistan&rsquo;s neighbours and near-neighbours. A plan was set out to \u00ab\u00a0[re-]energise\u00a0\u00bb them urgently, with a view to preparing them for forthcoming military action against the Taliban. The first step of the response to 9\/11 was to line up the countries of the Silk Roads.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In fact, ambitions were soon going well beyond ensuring their co-operation. By 30 September 2001, the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, was offering President Bush his \u00ab\u00a0strategic thoughts\u00a0\u00bb about what the US could and should seek to achieve as part of its imminent \u00ab\u00a0war aim\u00a0\u00bb. \u00ab\u00a0Some air strikes against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets are planned to begin soon,\u00a0\u00bb he noted, marking the start of military action. It was important, he wrote, to \u00ab\u00a0persuade or compel states to stop supporting terrorism\u00a0\u00bb. What he proposed next, however, was dramatic and astonishingly ambitious. \u00ab\u00a0If the war does not significantly change the world&rsquo;s political map, the US will not achieve its aim.\u00a0\u00bb What this meant was then spelt out clearly. \u00ab\u00a0The [United States government] should envision a goal along these lines: new regimes in Afghanistan and another key state (or two).\u00a0\u00bb He did not need to specify which states he was talking about: Iran and Iraq.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>While Iraq had long been an American bugbear, the case of Iran was more complicated. The revolution of 1979 had produced a spectacular failure in relations between the two countries; but by the mid-1980s, there were attempts to rebuild ties &ndash; partly because of mutual interests in opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan, but also because the US concluded that keeping the Iran-Iraq war going was in their interests. The result was the shipping of armaments to the Khomeini regime, in collaboration with Israel, who saw Saddam Hussein as a direct and serious threat: ties with Tehran became so close between the two that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was able to declare: \u00ab\u00a0Israel is Iran&rsquo;s best friend, and we do not intend to change our position.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>There were signs of another thaw in relations with Iran after the terrorist attack on the Dhahran air base in Saudi Arabia in 1996 that killed 19 servicemen. An angry rebuttal was issued to President Clinton&rsquo;s missive that Tehran was complicit in the bombing; but it was followed by a clear opening. The President should rest assured, the reply stated, that Iran had \u00ab\u00a0no hostile intentions towards Americans\u00a0\u00bb. On the contrary, the \u00ab\u00a0Iranian people not only harbour no enmity but [also] have respect for the great American people\u00a0\u00bb. Including Iran within an \u00ab\u00a0axis of evil\u00a0\u00bb a few years later, amid signs of an improving relationship, was opening a dangerous can of worms.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Then again, opening cans of worms seemed not to worry many of those taking decisions in the weeks and months after 9\/11. Despite there being no evidence to link the hijackers to Iraq, attention was focused on a major invasion and on regime change. The question was simple, as planning notes for a meeting between Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks, the chief of Central Command, make clear: \u00ab\u00a0How [to] start?\u00a0\u00bb Three possible triggers were envisaged &ndash; all of which could justify military action. Perhaps Saddam \u00ab\u00a0moves against the Kurds in [the] north?\u00a0\u00bb wondered Rumsfeld in November 2001; maybe a \u00ab\u00a0connection to Sept 11 attack or to anthrax attacks\u00a0\u00bb (following mailings to several media outlets and to two US senators in September 2001); or what if there were a \u00ab\u00a0dispute over WMD inspections?\u00a0\u00bb This seemed a promising line &ndash; as revealed by the comment that follows: \u00ab\u00a0Start now thinking about inspection demands.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Over the course of 2002 and at the start of 2003, pressure was ramped up on Iraq, with the issue of chemical and biological weapons and that of weapons of mass destruction taking centre stage. The US pursued this with an almost evangelical zeal. In the absence of \u00ab\u00a0incontrovertible evidence\u00a0\u00bb of a link between 9\/11 and Baghdad, one report noted, only Tony Blair could be relied on to support war, while another underlined the fact that \u00ab\u00a0many, if not most, countries allied with or friendly towards the United States &ndash; especially in Europe &ndash; harbour grave doubts about&hellip; an all-out attack on Iraq\u00a0\u00bb. Work therefore went into establishing a legal framework for full-scale war in anticipation of the likelihood that the United Nations would not give a clear mandate for action.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Jose Bustani, was ousted in a special closed session, pushed out for being uncooperative and unhelpful. Statements issued by weapons inspectors, meanwhile, were ignored. In January 2003, it was declared that \u00ab\u00a0we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the 1990s\u00a0\u00bb &ndash; which chimed with an update the same day by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission that although inspectors occasionally faced incidents of harassment, \u00ab\u00a0Iraq has on the whole co-operated rather well so far\u00a0\u00bb with the demands of inspectors.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>This was rubbished by Colin Powell when he addressed the UN on 5 February 2003, and claimed that \u00ab\u00a0every statement I make today&hellip; is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we&rsquo;re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.\u00a0\u00bb They were nothing of the sort: trailers that were described as mobile biological weapons facilities \u00ab\u00a0hidden in large groves of palm trees and&hellip; moved every one to four weeks to avoid detection\u00a0\u00bb turned out to be weather balloons &ndash; just as the Iraqis had said they were. There was no nuclear weapons programme, just as the Iraqis had said. No support had been given to al-Qaeda or terrorists, either &ndash; as documents and audio tapes from Baghdad reveal: in fact, Saddam Hussein had reined in all those suspected or implicated in terrorism, in order to avoid punitive action.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>It was not just the decision to invade Iraq that was spectacular for its idiocy; so too was the execution of the invasion plan. It was naively assumed that removing Saddam would turn Iraq into a land of milk and honey. There was no need to worry, insisted Paul Wolfowitz, the former president of the World Bank, who was then serving as Deputy Secretary of Defence, eight days after the invasion began in 2003. \u00ab\u00a0We&rsquo;re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.\u00a0\u00bb Oil revenues, he breezily predicted, would bring in $50bn to $100bn over the next \u00ab\u00a0two or three years\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Expectations for the involvement in Iraq were as foolish as they had been in Afghanistan, where it was assumed there would be \u00ab\u00a0no military involvement after the Taliban were defeated\u00a0\u00bb. In Iraq, 270,000 troops would be needed to start with, according to plans drawn up by US Central Command; but three and a half years later, there would be no need for more than 5,000 ground troops. This all looked plausible when presented on PowerPoint slides to those who saw what they wanted to see. These were to be light wars, quick strikes that would enable a new balance to be established across a pivotal region of Asia &ndash; all to the advantage of the West.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Few today believe we did the right thing in supporting the attack on Iraq. Even Jeb Bush recently declared that he would not have supported it had he known then what he knows now. The cost and consequences of the military intervention have been catastrophic. The disruption in the Middle East has caused a fracture of Iraq and the rise of Isis if not in its place (yet), then as a new power to be reckoned with; the Taliban has regrouped and eats into the weak structures left behind by coalition forces on a daily basis; reputational damage to the West in the eyes not only of the Arabic-speaking world but beyond has been substantial too; then there is the credibility of the intelligence agencies who allowed reports to be \u00ab\u00a0sexed up\u00a0\u00bb by political masters to suit their own ends.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>And there is the cost: not only the lives lost by servicemen, the value of which cannot even be estimated, not the tens of billions spent on the war. The biggest cost of the war, as new research from Harvard suggests, is the cost of looking after the 170,000 veterans who are 70 per cent or more disabled as a result of their injuries. The long-term cost to the US economy is estimated to be $6 trillion (&pound;3.9trn) &ndash; or $75,000 for every single household in the United States.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>If there is a silver lining, it is &ndash; perhaps &ndash; the shuffling of decks that brings Iran back to the table as a mainstream player within the region. The West finds itself short of friends in a region it has interfered in for too long with disastrous effects. The same mistakes have been made in the same region for too long.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4>Peter Frankopan<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;\u00e9l\u00e9phant affol\u00e9 et les souris qui rugissaient R\u00e9guli\u00e8rement reviennent sur la table quelques \u00e9l\u00e9phants blancs qui constituent la colonne vert\u00e9brale (en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de type-\u00e9clair au chocolat) du discours sur la strat\u00e9gie am\u00e9ricaniste depuis dix, vingt, trente, quarante, cinquante ans, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 George Kennan qui, effectivement, d\u00e9crivait cette strat\u00e9gie, ou \u00ab\u00a0politique \u00e9trang\u00e8re\u00a0\u00bb, comme celle d&rsquo;un \u00ab\u00a0\u00e9l\u00e9phant sautant&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3860,3236,1006,868,3089,2631,8711,14319,5626,16905,3198,16904,3634,4735,857,2773,3947,4306,2622,4102,7799,569,981,14755,16906,8166,16903],"class_list":["post-76084","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-adm","tag-afghanistan","tag-brzezinski","tag-bush","tag-cohen","tag-de","tag-declassification","tag-documents","tag-echecs","tag-frankopan","tag-gw","tag-heuvel","tag-inculpabilite","tag-indefectibilite","tag-irak","tag-iran","tag-islamisme","tag-kennan","tag-la","tag-politique-systeme","tag-route","tag-rumsfeld","tag-saddam","tag-secrets","tag-soie","tag-stephen","tag-vanden"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76084","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76084"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76084\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76084"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76084"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76084"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}