{"id":76130,"date":"2015-09-25T11:22:21","date_gmt":"2015-09-25T11:22:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/09\/25\/des-troupes-chinoises-en-syrie-sil-le-faut\/"},"modified":"2015-09-25T11:22:21","modified_gmt":"2015-09-25T11:22:21","slug":"des-troupes-chinoises-en-syrie-sil-le-faut","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/09\/25\/des-troupes-chinoises-en-syrie-sil-le-faut\/","title":{"rendered":"Des troupes chinoises en Syrie, s&rsquo;il le faut"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955;font-size:1.65em;font-variant:small-caps;\">Des troupes chinoises en Syrie, s&rsquo;il le faut<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il y a des nouvelles selon lesquelles autour de 3.500 combattants <a href=\"https:\/\/fr.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ou%C3%AFghours\">Ou\u00efghours<\/a> (Chinois musulmans) ont \u00e9t\u00e9 rassembl\u00e9s en Syrie par le Turkistan Islamic party (TIP), pr\u00e8s de la fronti\u00e8re turque, sous l&rsquo;\u00e9gide des services de renseignement turcs, dans l&rsquo;intention de les faire participer \u00e0 la bataille des djihadistes contre Assad. C&rsquo;est un aspect de plus de la politique \u00e0 la fois erratique et extr\u00e9miste que la Turquie m\u00e8ne sous la direction d&rsquo;un Erdogan de plus en plus coup\u00e9 des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s de son pays (la Turquie) et des conditions de d\u00e9sordre qui s&rsquo;y r\u00e9pandent \u00e0 cause des remous caus\u00e9s par la politique turque en Syrie et contre les Kurdes. La pr\u00e9sence de ces Ou\u00efghours a \u00e9videmment r\u00e9sonn\u00e9 comme un tr\u00e8s grave signal d&rsquo;alerte dans la direction chinoise, <a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.timesofisrael.com\/if-assad-asks-china-can-deploy-troops-to-syria\/\">explique Christina Lin<\/a>, experts de l&rsquo;universit\u00e9 John Hopkins, sur son <em>blog<\/em> de <em>Times of Israel<\/em>, le 20 septembre 2015.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Il en r\u00e9sulte, selon Lin, que l&rsquo;on se trouve d\u00e9sormais devant la possibilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une intervention militaire chinoise en Syrie, si Assad le demandait. Les Chinois suivent en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral avec rigueur le principe de non-intervention, sauf lorsque leur s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale est en jeu. De telles actions indirectement d\u00e9stabilisantes pour les provinces musulmanes de Chine repr\u00e9sentent effectivement une menace pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale chinoise, exactement de la m\u00eame fa\u00e7on que les Tch\u00e9tch\u00e8nes pr\u00e9sents en Syrie au nom du djihadisme repr\u00e9sentent une menace similaire contre la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale de la Russie. La Syrie ne cesse de se transformer un chaudron multinational o&ugrave; la plupart des puissances vont se trouver de plus en plus impliqu\u00e9es, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 bouleverser l&rsquo;ordre international&#8230; En effet, d&rsquo;un autre c\u00f4t\u00e9, les perspectives \u00e9voqu\u00e9es par Lin peuvent se faire avec l&rsquo;habillage d&rsquo;une intervention chinoise en Syrie du l\u00e9galisme de l&rsquo;OCS (Organisation de Coop\u00e9ration de Shanghai), o&ugrave; la Syrie est observatrice et <strong>veut devenir membre,<\/strong> <strong>de m\u00eame que l&rsquo;&Eacute;gypte<\/strong>. Le conflit syrien pourrait dans les mois qui viennent, voir <strong>une transformation radicale de l&rsquo;OCS en alliance militaire<\/strong>, maintenant que la Chine et la Russie ont pris la mesure du danger djihadiste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>&laquo;&#8230; <em>Now that TIP has established a base in Syria and is expanding its presence and recruitment courtesy of its Turkish sponsors, China will have to follow through with its 2013 recommendation \u00ab\u00a0Take fight to ETIM before threat grows\u00a0\u00bb and deploy troops to Syria. Non-interference does not mean inaction on core interests<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>Some pundits may point to China&rsquo;s non-interference principle as an impasse to action. However, China&rsquo;s non-interference principle is more in reference to meddling in other countries&rsquo; domestics politics, such as US\/western penchant for intervention and violating other countries&rsquo; sovereignty to overthrow autocratic regimes they dislike. Non-interference policy does not mean inaction when China&rsquo;s security and interests are threatened. It is not difficult for China to take action when its core interests are threatened&ndash;that means violation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, economic development and regime survival.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>At the 2011 IISS Asia Security Summit, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie spelled out China&rsquo;s core interests as the following: \u00ab\u00a0The core interests include anything related to sovereignty, stability and form of government. China is now pursuing socialism. If there is any attempt to reject this path, it will touch upon China&rsquo;s core interests. Or, if there is any attempt to encourage any part of China to secede, that also touches upon China&rsquo;s core interests related to our land, sea or air. Then, anything that is related to China&rsquo;s national economic and social development also touches upon China core interests\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>If the TIP continues to gain power within the Army of Conquest that is a jihadi witches brew of various al Qaeda affiliates and salafist extremists, Xinjiang may become the next Afghanistan and follow the pattern of Afpak, Syria\/Iraq, with local militant forces\/cross border havens attracting foreign fighters, and enjoying material and diplomatic support from Turkey and other outside powers with shared ideology\/interests. Moreover, the Assad regime is currently still the legal and UN-recognized government of Syria, despite only holding 1\/3 of its territory. If Assad <strong>asks and gives permission for Russia, China and other SCO members to assist him militarily<\/strong>, that would be in accordance with international law.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>This differs from the current US-led anti-ISIS coalition airstrikes in Syria that is neither operating under a UN mandate nor permission from the sovereign government, although it enjoys implicit permission to some extent from the Assad regime to fight ISIS. In 2014 Britain&rsquo;s David Cameron hesitated to participate in Syrian airstrikes precisely due to fears of violating international law. With Erdogan waging an Islamist proxy war on China, Kurds, Assad, Sisi, Netanyahu via Al Qaeda affiliates, Army of Conquest, Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, it is no wonder <strong>Syria and Egypt both applied to join the China-led SCO in June this year<\/strong><\/em><strong>. &raquo;<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 25 septembre 2015 \u00e0 11H13<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Des troupes chinoises en Syrie, s&rsquo;il le faut Il y a des nouvelles selon lesquelles autour de 3.500 combattants Ou\u00efghours (Chinois musulmans) ont \u00e9t\u00e9 rassembl\u00e9s en Syrie par le Turkistan Islamic party (TIP), pr\u00e8s de la fronti\u00e8re turque, sous l&rsquo;\u00e9gide des services de renseignement turcs, dans l&rsquo;intention de les faire participer \u00e0 la bataille des&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[4202,3977,3737,8405,16975,2730,14662,16974,2613],"class_list":["post-76130","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-assad","tag-chine","tag-erdogan","tag-ocs","tag-ouighours","tag-russie","tag-tchetchenes","tag-tip","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76130","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76130"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76130\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76130"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76130"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76130"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}