{"id":76156,"date":"2015-10-09T05:11:14","date_gmt":"2015-10-09T05:11:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/10\/09\/les-rapports-turquie-russie-a-la-lumiere-de-daesh\/"},"modified":"2015-10-09T05:11:14","modified_gmt":"2015-10-09T05:11:14","slug":"les-rapports-turquie-russie-a-la-lumiere-de-daesh","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2015\/10\/09\/les-rapports-turquie-russie-a-la-lumiere-de-daesh\/","title":{"rendered":"Les rapports Turquie-Russie \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de Daesh<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les rapports Turquie-Russie \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de Daesh<\/em><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

Le chroniqueur indien MK Bhadrakumar est un fin connaisseur de deux pays, où il a \u00e9t\u00e9 ambassadeur de l’Inde : la Turquie et la Russie. Son avis sur les \u00ab\u00a0tensions\u00a0\u00bb entre ces deux pays, dans le cadre de l’intervention russe en Syrie est n\u00e9cessairement int\u00e9ressant, et il donne une image pond\u00e9r\u00e9e des \u00ab\u00a0gesticulations\u00a0\u00bb qui ont accompagn\u00e9 quelques incidents \u00e0 la fin de la semaine derni\u00e8re entre avions russes et avions turcs autour de la fronti\u00e8re syrienne. Les susdites gesticulation viennent en petite partie d’une tactique propre \u00e0 Erdogan et n’engageant nullement sa strat\u00e9gie, et en tr\u00e8s grande partie de l’OTAN (dont fait partie la Turquie) qui tient un r\u00f4le confus et d\u00e9sorient\u00e9, et fort marginal, dans cette crise où elle n’a aucune strat\u00e9gie ; l’OTAN a cru, avec cette incident russo-turc, retrouver une voix au chapitre et a surtout montr\u00e9 la faiblesse d\u00e9riosoire de sa position. (L’OTAN est pouss\u00e9e dans cette voie, où elle dramatise sans grand effet ni risque un faux antagonisme turco-russe, par les USA qui sont grands adeptes de la confusion et de la d\u00e9sorientation pour eux-m\u00eames, et eux-m\u00eames rel\u00e9gu\u00e9s \u00e0 un r\u00f4le mineur dans la crise.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Dans un texte du 6 octobre sur son blog<\/em> (Indian PunchLine<\/em>), Bhadrakumar minimise la gravit\u00e9<\/a> que la communication a voulu donner \u00e0 ces incidents. Il pense que les Turcs ont un r\u00f4le important \u00e0 jouer dans la crise parce qu’ils en sont les protagonistes oblig\u00e9s ; ils auraient les moyens de transformer l’engagement russe en un bourbier type-Vietnam mais ils s’abstiendront au bout du compte \u00e0 tenter de mettre les Russes, qui d\u00e9tiennent la \u00ab\u00a0carte kurde\u00a0\u00bb, en difficult\u00e9s. Il pense que le but des Russes, avec ces incidents, est d’indiquer \u00e0 la Turquie, comme ils le font avec Isra\u00ebl avec d’autres moyens, qu’il y a d\u00e9sormais de nouvelles r\u00e8gles en Syrie<\/strong> et que les interventions turques et isra\u00e9liennes impunies en territoire syrien pour soutenir tel ou tel groupe font d\u00e9sormais partie du pass\u00e9. Pour le reste, conclut Bhadrakumar, les rapports importants entre la Russie et la Turquie, symbolis\u00e9s par les relations personnelles entre Erdogan et Poutine, ne seront pas affect\u00e9s<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

« The Turkish dictum had enabled Ankara up until now to ensure that the Syrian rebels could operate with impunity in a significant belt in northern Syria without fear of air attacks by Damascus. Russia is summarily terminating that privilege Ankara enjoyed. Russia is also simultaneously strengthening Syria’s air defence system and a point is reaching when the Turkish air force cannot any longer operate inside the Syrian airspace. In short, the weekend’s incidents have forced Ankara to contend with the new reality that its continued violations of Syria’s territorial integrity will come at a heavy price.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» By the way, Israel also is traveling in the same boat as Turkey – clandestinely supporting al-Qaeda affiliates operating in Syria, launching wanton air attacks on targets deep inside Syria, and systematically wearing down the Syrian state and its sovereignty. Israel too is livid that Russia will apply ‘red lines’ in Syria aimed at squashing Israeli interference in Syrian affairs. Israel is furious with Moscow – like Turkey – but has no option but to fall in line with the Russian ground rules<\/strong>.<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» In sum, an Afghanistan-type quagmire scenario is unlikely to develop in Syria for the Russians. During the Cold War, US brilliantly succeeded in pitting radical Islam against communism. Today, however, Russia enjoys diversified ties with the Muslim Middle East. The Russian diplomacy has been particularly active in Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Gulf region as well as in Cairo and Amman. Egypt and Jordan have distinctly edged closer to Russia on the Syrian question.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» Conversely, Moscow’s close ties with the Syrian Kurdish leadership (which supports the PKK’s separatist movement inside Turkey) will act as a deterrent against Ankara setting up a bear trap in Syria. Suffice it to say, fueling insurgency is a game that both Turkey and Russia can play<\/em>. […] Simply put, if yet another Kurdistan takes shape in Syria (alongside the one already existing in northern Iraq), it would inevitably blur the sanctity and inviolability of Turkey’s established borders to the south and make them look somewhat like the Durand Line separating Pakistan from Afghanistan – a lawless no-man’s land that is condemned to remain a dagger forever aimed at Turkey’s heart.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» Erdogan’s priority will be to ensure that Turkey regains a place at the high table if a Syrian peace process picks up. Erdogan will try its best to forestall the emergence of yet another Kurdish entity in its neighborhood, which is a fast-emerging scenario already. Ankara’s main challenge lies in persuading Russia and the US to rein in the aspirations of the Syrian Kurds for regional autonomy in northern Syria as quid pro quo for their robust participation as Washington and Moscow’s foot soldiers in the war against the IS.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» At the end of the day, therefore, Erdogan will begin talking with the Kremlin. Actually, the conversation never really ended. His equation with the Russian leader at the personal level is something he can still count on. Vladimir Putin too has taken great pains to encourage Erdogan’s ‘Look East’ policies. Unlike the western powers, Russia has never been prescriptive about Turkey’s domestic politics. If Erdogan manages to win the November election and succeeds in switching Turkey to a presidential system, Putin will only congratulate him and possibly even draw satisfaction that he has a friend in Ankara who is likely to be a life-time executive president with whom he can do business to great mutual benefit.<\/em> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Mis en ligne le 9 octobre 2015 \u00e0 06H10<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les rapports Turquie-Russie \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de Daesh Le chroniqueur indien MK Bhadrakumar est un fin connaisseur de deux pays, où il a \u00e9t\u00e9 ambassadeur de l’Inde : la Turquie et la Russie. Son avis sur les \u00ab\u00a0tensions\u00a0\u00bb entre ces deux pays, dans le cadre de l’intervention russe en Syrie est n\u00e9cessairement int\u00e9ressant, et il… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[9032,4186,5474,3737,16514,2774,4447,15316,8188,584,3521,916],"class_list":["post-76156","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-aeriens","tag-au","tag-bhadrakumar","tag-erdogan","tag-incidents","tag-israel","tag-kurdes","tag-kurdistan","tag-mise","tag-otan","tag-point","tag-poutine"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76156","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76156"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76156\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76156"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76156"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76156"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}