Cet article de Rostislav Ischenko, analyste \u00e0 RT, nous a paru particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant dans sa fa\u00e7on de nous donner un point de vue russe, synth\u00e9tis\u00e9, conservant les \u00e9l\u00e9ments essentiels de la catastrophe qui a affect\u00e9 la Russie alias-URSS au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990, jusqu’au redressement, sinon au renouveau qu’elle montre aujourd’hui. L’int\u00e9r\u00eat est effectivement dans ce point de vue russe, c’est-\u00e0-dire une perception russe de l’int\u00e9rieur, avec l’\u00e9volution de la psychologie russe et, dirait-on de fa\u00e7on plus \u00e9lev\u00e9e, l’\u00e9volution de l'\u00a0\u00bb\u00e2me russe\u00a0\u00bb confront\u00e9e \u00e0 un chapitre troubl\u00e9e de son histoire, – un de plus, d’ailleurs, tant l’histoire de cette grande nation n’est faite que de p\u00e9riodes alternant les plus grands troubles aux p\u00e9riodes de renaissance et d’affirmation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Le texte d’Ischenko est int\u00e9ressant de notre point de vue parce qu’il met en place son point de vue \u00e0 partir de la pr\u00e9misse que d\u00e8s 1989-1991, une \u00ab\u00a0guerre invisible\u00a0\u00bb a \u00e9t\u00e9 conduite contre la Russie (le titre est « Russia in an invisible war <\/em>»), alors que ce ne fut pas du tout notre propre perception<\/strong>. De m\u00eame, d’apr\u00e8s notre exp\u00e9rience dans ces milieux, ce ne fut pas du tout non plus la perception dans les milieux europ\u00e9ens au sens large du terme<\/strong>, certainement pendant la p\u00e9riode des ann\u00e9es 1990. En aucun cas l’Europe d’alors, sans les pays d’Europe de l’Est et capable encore de d\u00e9velopper une pens\u00e9e qui ne fût pas compl\u00e8tement homog\u00e9n\u00e9is\u00e9e dans un ensemble type bloc-BAO comprenant l’Europe, l’UE, l’OTAN, les USA, ne consid\u00e9rait la Russie comme l'\u00a0\u00bbennemi\u00a0\u00bb \u00e0 abattre, ni m\u00eame comme un \u00ab\u00a0ennemi\u00a0\u00bb potentiel… Cette position europ\u00e9enne \u00e9tait suffisamment \u00ab\u00a0naturelle\u00a0\u00bb dans ces ann\u00e9es-l\u00e0, – alors que la bureaucratie-Syst\u00e8me, c’est-\u00e0-dire le Syst\u00e8me, n’avait pas totalement investi le pouvoir et r\u00e9duit \u00e0 n\u00e9ant le fait politique, – pour que trois pays europ\u00e9ens de la \u00ab\u00a0vielle Europe\u00a0\u00bb, selon le motm\u00e9prisant du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9dense Rumsfeld, – la Belgique, la France et l’Allemagne, – se retrouvent d\u00e9but 2003 au c\u00f4t\u00e9 de la Russie, contre l’exp\u00e9dition anglo-saxonne contre l’Irak. (Nous reviendrons sur cette diff\u00e9rence de perception prochainement, notamment \u00e0 partir de l’exp\u00e9rience personnelle de PhG.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Nous ne tenons nullement \u00e0 trancher, — quelle perception est la bonne, laquelle est erron\u00e9e, — d’autant plus que sur ces grandes questions historiques notre conviction est qu’il existe plusieurs v\u00e9rit\u00e9s-de-situation<\/a> parall\u00e8les <\/strong>dans une \u00e9poque (d\u00e8s les ann\u00e9es 1990) où d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 tendait \u00e0 disparaître sous la puissance du syst\u00e8me de la communication et des manipulations qui lui sont appliqu\u00e9es. (Quant \u00e0 la \u00ab\u00a0v\u00e9rit\u00e9 historique\u00a0\u00bb de la p\u00e9riode, elle n’est pas encore d\u00e9terminable absolument et reste ouverte \u00e0 d\u00e9bat. Notre conviction est certainement qu’elle doit tenir compte des deux perceptions mais qu’elle ne se r\u00e9duit certainement pas \u00e0 ces deux perceptions, – sauf pour ceux qui, choisissant l’une ou l’autre perception, tiennent toute pr\u00eate l’explication de la chose sous la forme d’un \u00ab\u00a0Grand Dessein\u00a0\u00bb de quelque puissance humaine dissimul\u00e9e, qui rejoint la forme d’esprit dite du \u00ab\u00a0complotisme\u00a0\u00bb. Malheureusement pour nous, ils ne nous signal\u00e8rent absolument pas, \u00e0 l’\u00e9poque, que leur th\u00e8se \u00e9tait en cours d’application.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n L’int\u00e9r\u00eat est donc ici de suivre le cheminement du point de vue russe int\u00e9rieur, selon Ischenko. Justement, Ischenko pose, d\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de son texte, une question fondamentale, \u00e0 laquelle il r\u00e9pond \u00e0 sa fa\u00e7on mais dont la r\u00e9ponse pourrait se trouver aussi, et d’une fa\u00e7on compl\u00e8tement diff\u00e9rente, dans l’autre point de vue que nous avons signal\u00e9. Cette question est celle de la chronologie qui permit \u00e0 la Russie de relever<\/strong> : pourquoi l'\u00a0\u00bbennemi\u00a0\u00bb (les USA dit Ischenko, mais on pourrait dire aussi l’UE, l’OTAN, le bloc BAO, etc.) a-t-il laiss\u00e9 le temps \u00e0 la Russie de se relever des ruines où l’avait instantan\u00e9ment plong\u00e9 l’effondrement du communise ? Voici le passage, avec l’explication d’Ischenko, qui est loin, tr\u00e8s loin de nous satisfaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n « Le facteur inconnu le plus important est celui de la chronologie<\/em> [du temps]. Pourquoi la Russie en disposa-t-elle<\/em> [pour se relever], pourquoi les USA donn\u00e8rent-ils \u00e0 la Russie du temps pour pr\u00e9parer sa r\u00e9sistance, pour retrouver et renforcer sa puissance \u00e9conomique et militaire, pour annihiler l’influence du lobby pro-am\u00e9ricain financ\u00e9 par le d\u00e9partement d’État dans la politique et dans les m\u00e9dias ? Pourquoi ne pas avoir lanc\u00e9 une confrontation ouverte comme celle d’aujourd’hui où nous tenons Washington \u00e0 distance, il y a 10 ou 15 ans, quand la Russie n’avait aucune capacit\u00e9 de r\u00e9sister aux sanctions ? En r\u00e9alit\u00e9, les USA install\u00e8rent dans les ann\u00e9es1990 et 2000 des r\u00e9gimes-marionnettes dans l’espace post-sovi\u00e9tique, y compris \u00e0 Moscou qui \u00e9tait consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme une des capitales de la Russie d\u00e9membr\u00e9e<\/em>… »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n L\u00e0-dessus, Ischenko explique le processus essentiel du rel\u00e8vement de la Russie, en faisant une place toute particuli\u00e8re \u00e0 la diplomatie russe, \u00e0 partir de 1996 avec les trois ministres successifs, Evgueni Primakov, Igor Ivanov et Sergei Lavrov \u00e0 partir de 2004. (Andrei Kozyrev, qui succ\u00e9da \u00e0 Chevardnadze en 1990 et resta ministre jusqu’en 1996 a conduit, par son action, \u00e0 forger un mot, Kozyrevtchina<\/em>, dont le traducteur donne la signification suivante : \u00ab\u00a0‘agir comme Kozyrev’, c’est-\u00e0-dire agir d’une mani\u00e8re soumise contre ses propres int\u00e9r\u00eats\u00a0\u00bb [dans ce cas, contre les int\u00e9r\u00eats de son pays]. Nous n’avons aucune connaissance du russe et nous ne pouvons donner qu’une analogie utilisant la m\u00eame terminaison, la I\u00e9jovtchina<\/em>, du nom du chef du NKVD de 1936 \u00e0 1938 qui conduisit la p\u00e9riode de la Grande Terreur stalinienne, – et le mot \u00e9tant interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 comme signifiant \u00ab\u00a0p\u00e9riode de I\u00e9jov\u00a0\u00bb. Quoi qu’il en soit, \u00ab\u00a0agir comme Kozyrev\u00a0\u00bb ou \u00ab\u00a0p\u00e9riode de Kozyrev\u00a0\u00bb, on comprend effectivement la signification du mot qui est de d\u00e9signer le temps où la diplomatie russe s’aligna compl\u00e8tement sur les lignes de la diplomatie US\/occidentaliste.) Pour Ischenko, les trois ministres successifs, Primakov-Ivanov-Lavrov, jou\u00e8rent un r\u00f4le fondamental en \u00e9tablissant une diplomatie qui prit en compte les int\u00e9r\u00eats fondamentaux de la Russie et contribua \u00e0 r\u00e9sister aux principales pressions venues de l’Ouest, pendant que la Russie se sortait de l’enfer des ann\u00e9es 1990 et entamait sa remont\u00e9e avec Poutine \u00e0 partir de 2000.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Un autre facteur avanc\u00e9 par Ischenko pour expliquer comment la Russie r\u00e9ussit \u00e0 gagner du temps pour retrouver sa puissance, et qui l\u00e0 aussi reste tr\u00e8s largement ouvert \u00e0 la discussion sinon \u00e0 la contestation<\/strong>, est celui de l’affirmation que l’Occident avait la perception que la Russie \u00e9tait d’une telle faiblesse qu’il \u00e9tait inutile de lancer un assaut contre elle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n « Les diplomates<\/em> [russes] avaient une mission quasi-impossible. Il \u00e9tait n\u00e9cessaire, sans c\u00e9der sur les points essentiels, de consolider l’influence russe dans les États de l’ancienne Union Sovi\u00e9tique, de rechercher l’alliance d’autres gouvernements qui r\u00e9sistaient aux USA, de renforcer ses alliances si possible, tout en cr\u00e9ant une illusion telle que Washington estim\u00e2t que la Russie \u00e9tait faible et pr\u00eate \u00e0 faire des concessions… Ces illusions sur la faiblesse et l’esprit de capitulation <\/em>[de la Russie] conduisant l’Ouest \u00e0 croire que la question russe \u00e9tait r\u00e9gl\u00e9e et qu’il n’\u00e9tait pas n\u00e9cessaire de lancer un assaut politique et \u00e9conomique contre elle, donn\u00e8rent \u00e0 la direction<\/em> russe un temps pr\u00e9cieux pour r\u00e9aliser les r\u00e9formes n\u00e9cessaires.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n » Naturellement, il n’y a jamais assez de temps disponible, et la Russie aurait pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9 retarder la confrontation avec les USA, qui commen\u00e7a en 2012-2013, de trois \u00e0 cinq ann\u00e9es suppl\u00e9mentaires, ou m\u00eame d’\u00e9viter cette confrontation, mais la diplomatie russe r\u00e9ussit \u00e0 faire un gain de 12-15 ann\u00e9es pour le pays, – un formidable capital de temps dans notre monde qui change si rapidement<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Encore une fois, nous insistons particuli\u00e8rement sur le point que cette interpr\u00e9tation d’Ischenko n’est absolument pas la n\u00f4tre<\/strong>, surtout si l’on enchaîne l’\u00e9pisode des ann\u00e9es 1990 sur la premi\u00e8re d\u00e9cennie du XXI\u00e8me si\u00e8cle commenc\u00e9e avec l’attaque 9\/11, qui concentra toute l’attention des USA sur le Moyen-Orient, qui amena rapidement une forte tension entre les USA et l’Europe, et m\u00eame, comme vu plus haut, qui suscita une r\u00e9sistance tr\u00e8s antagoniste par rapport aux USA des trois pays europ\u00e9ens cit\u00e9s avec un rapprochement des trois de la Russie pour s’opposer \u00e0 l’attaque de l’Irak. Ischenko parle des faiblesses de la Russie ; nous, nous parlons des faiblesses et des divisions du camp occidental qui \u00e9taient consid\u00e9rables contrairement \u00e0 la narrative<\/em> si sommaire qu’elle en devient complaisante, y compris et m\u00eame surtout chez les commentateurs soi-disant antiSyst\u00e8me chez nous, sur l’\u00e9crasante sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 US et la compl\u00e8te servilit\u00e9 des Europ\u00e9ens durant cette p\u00e9riode. M\u00eame la perception d’une extr\u00eame faiblesse de la Russie par l’Occident telle que la repr\u00e9sente Ischenko peut \u00eatre contest\u00e9e : c’est tout de m\u00eame tr\u00e8s vite, en janvier 2006<\/a>, qu’\u00e9clata le premi\u00e8re crise de ravitaillement en \u00e9nergie (entre la Russie et l’Ukraine, – d\u00e9j\u00e0) qui fit r\u00e9aliser \u00e0 l’Europe combien elle d\u00e9pendait strat\u00e9giquemengt de l’alimentation en gaz russe, et par cons\u00e9quent combien cette situation constituait un atout strat\u00e9gique pour la Russie. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Par contre, l\u00e0 où nous partageons compl\u00e8tement l’analyse d’Ischenko, c’est sur la p\u00e9riode pr\u00e9sente, avec notamment la crise ukrainienne qui constitua une victoire strat\u00e9gique tr\u00e8s importante de la Russie et acheva le r\u00e9tablissement de la puissance russe, aussi bien et peut-\u00eatre plus encore psychologiquement que dans les domaine habituels de la puissance. Dans ce sch\u00e9ma, l’intervention russe au Moyen-Orient prend effectivement l’aspect d’une \u00ab\u00a0perc\u00e9e russe\u00a0\u00bb mettant en place cette puissance acquise et r\u00e9alisant cette situation remarquable que nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 not\u00e9e de voir les Russes plus actifs<\/a> que dans la crise ukrainienne, plus offensifs, plus puissants, plus \u00ab\u00a0interventionnistes\u00a0\u00bb dans tous les sens du terme (c’est-\u00e0-dire non seulement g\u00e9opolitiquement, ce qui va de soi \u00e0 cause de la g\u00e9ographie, mais surtout psychologiquement encore plus que politiquement, ce qui ne va pas de soi) ; cela, alors qu’il aurait pu sembler que la menace de la crise ukrainienne affectait plus directement la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale russe que la menace de la crise syrienne. Autrement dit, la Russie a effectivement achev\u00e9, avec l’intervention en Syrie qui implique une grande audace strat\u00e9gique par rapport \u00e0 sa prudence tactique vis-\u00e0-vis de l’Ukraine, sa renaissance dans le statut de grande puissance qui avait \u00e9t\u00e9 pulv\u00e9ris\u00e9 en 1989-1991, alors qu’elle \u00e9tait encore l’URSS, ou plut\u00f4t alors qu’elle \u00e9tait encore dans l’URSS<\/strong> comme on est prisonnier d’un cadre, d’une forme, d’une dynamique de type syst\u00e9mique menant \u00e0 une d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration de toutes les fa\u00e7ons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n (Pour nous comme nous le r\u00e9p\u00e9tons souvent quand l’occasion le permet, Gorbatchev a choisi, consciemment ou pas, la voie de la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration lib\u00e9ratrice \u00e0 terme<\/strong>, tandis que la poursuite de l’URSS dans sa forme initiale aurait conduit justement, \u00e0 notre sens, \u00e0 une d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration emportant la Russie avec elle, un peu au contraire du point de vue d’Ischenko. Tout cela peut \u00eatre repr\u00e9sent\u00e9, si l’on veut, comme si le calvaire des ann\u00e9es 1990 avait \u00e9t\u00e9 le purgatoire [la \u00ab\u00a0purge\u00a0\u00bb] n\u00e9cessaire pour que la Russie se retrouv\u00e2t dans des conditions favorables pour reconstruire sa puissance. A notre sens, c’est loin de n’\u00eatre qu’une image ou une parabole symbolique. Une d\u00e9monstration concr\u00e8te de ce que nous voulons dire peut \u00eatre trouv\u00e9e dans le cas de la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration du complexe militaro-industriel sovi\u00e9tique, qui entraînait l’URSS vers les abysses par son coût colossal et son inefficacit\u00e9 grandissante, comme celui des USA toujours aujourd’hui ; c’est la politique gorbatch\u00e9vienne qui, volens nolens<\/em>, parvint \u00e0 ce r\u00e9sultat de la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration, menant \u00e0 terme \u00e0 un renouveau<\/a> de la puissance militaire russe comme on le voit en Syrie.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Encore faut-il pond\u00e9rer cet \u00e9pisode essentiel qu’est l’aventure \u00ab\u00a0de l’URSS d\u00e9sint\u00e9gr\u00e9e \u00e0 la Russie renaissante\u00a0\u00bb des conditions g\u00e9n\u00e9rales qui accompagnent cette renaissance. Le renouveau de la Russie ne pr\u00e9sage nullement un changement d’h\u00e9g\u00e9monie mais charge la Russie d’une nouvelle mission, qui est de jouer un r\u00f4le essentiel dans le processus d’effondrement du Syst\u00e8me dont elle fait elle-m\u00eame \u00ab\u00a0en partie-partie\u00a0\u00bb si l’on veut (ou \u00ab\u00a0un pied en-dedans, un pied en-dehors\u00a0\u00bb). Ce point de vue a souvent \u00e9t\u00e9 repris sur ce site et il nous semble plus valable que jamais<\/a> dans le cas de la Syrie<\/a>. A notre estime, et nous dirions intuitivement, l’intervention russe en Syrie a comme motif compl\u00e9mentaire mais que nous jugerions \u00e0 \u00e9galit\u00e9 d’importance du seul fait de la situation syrienne et de la menace terroriste, la volont\u00e9 de la direction russe de faire une d\u00e9monstration in vivo<\/em><\/a> de la puissance russe \u00e0 destination du Pentagone et de la bureaucratie du complexe militaro-industriel US. (D’où notamment les tirs de cruise missiles, l’intervention de l’aviation strat\u00e9gique, etc.) Pour nous, l’effet r\u00e9el de cette \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9monstration\u00a0\u00bb concerne moins le statut de puissance de la Russie et sa s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale (qui sont certainement les pr\u00e9occupations de Poutine) que la confusion et la perte de son contr\u00f4le de soi dans le chef du Syst\u00e8me, accroissant ainsi consid\u00e9rablement les possibilit\u00e9s de prolongements catastrophiques pour lui-m\u00eame (le Syst\u00e8me). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n … Voici donc l’article de Rostislav Ischenko, analyste de RT, texte original<\/a> en russe traduit (par Seva) et repris par le Saker<\/em>-USA<\/a>, le 10 d\u00e9cembre 2015. (L’emploi de caract\u00e8res gras est dans le texte original.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Kitchen \u00ab\u00a0strategists\u00a0\u00bb, who sincerely believe that massive nuclear strike is the universal solution to any international problem (even the hottest one, close to military confrontation), are unhappy about the moderate position of the Russian leadership in the crisis with Turkey. However, they deem insufficient even direct participation of the Russian military in the Syrian conflict. They are also dissatisfied with the Moscow’s activities on the Ukrainian front.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n However, for some reason nobody asks a simple question. How did it happen that all of a sudden Russia started not just actively stand up to the world hegemonic power, but successfully win against it on all fronts?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n By the end of 1990s, Russia was a state that economically and financially was at the level of the third world. An anti-oligarch rebellion was brewing in the country. It was fighting an endless and hopeless war with Chechens that spilled over to Dagestan. National security was supported only by nukes, as to conduct any serious operation even within its own borders, the army did have neither trained personnel nor modern equipment, fleet could not sail, and aviation could not fly.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Sure enough, anybody can tell how the industry, including military, was gradually revived, how growing living standards stabilized the internal situation, how the army was modernized.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n But the key question is not who did more to rebuild the Russian military: Shoygu, Serdukov, or the General Staff. The key question is not who is a better economist, Glaziev or Kudrin, and whether it would have been possible to allocate even more resources to social spending.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The key unknown factor in this task is time. How did Russia have it, why did the US give Russia time to prepare resistance, to grow economic and military muscle, to annihilate State Department-funded pro-American lobby in the politics and the media?<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n Why did not the open confrontation, in which we are now getting ahead of Washington, begin earlier, 10-15 years ago, when Russia had no chance to withstand sanctions? In reality, the US in the 1990s or 2000s started installing puppet regimes on the post-Soviet space, including Moscow, which was considered as one of several capitals of dismembered Russia.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The conditions for today’s military and diplomatic successes were being built for decades on the invisible (diplomatic) front.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n It must be said that among central ministries the Foreign Ministry was the first to recover from administrative mess caused by the breakup of the early 1990s. As early as in 1996, Evgeny Primakov became the Foreign Minister, who, in addition to turning the government plane around over the Atlantic upon learning about the US aggression against Yugoslavia, turned around the Russian foreign policy, which after that never followed the US course.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Two and a half years later, he recommended Igor Ivanov as his successor, who slowly (almost imperceptibly), but surely continued to strengthen the Russian diplomacy. He was succeeded in 2004 by the current foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, under whose leadership diplomacy accumulated enough resources to switch from positional defense to decisive offence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Among these three ministers only Ivanov received The Hero Star, but I am sure that both his predecessor and successor are just as worthy of this award.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n It must be said that traditional caste closeness and healthy conservatism of the diplomatic corps contributed to rapid restoration of the work of the Foreign Ministry. That very unhurriedness and traditionalism the diplomats are accused of helped. \u00ab\u00a0Kozyrevshchina\u00a0\u00bb (the word is derived from the name of Andrei Kozyrev, the Foreign minister in 1990-1996; the word means \u00ab\u00a0acting like Kozyrev\u00a0\u00bb, i.e. in a subservient manner against one’s own interests – translator’s note<\/em>) never caught on in the Foreign Ministry because it did not fit.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Let’s return to the 1996. Russia is at the bottom of the pit economically, but the default of 1998 is still ahead. The USA totally disregards the international law replacing it with its arbitrary actions. NATO and the EU are getting ready to move to the Russian borders.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Russia has nothing to respond with. Russia (as USSR before it) can annihilate any aggressor in 20 minutes, but nobody plans to fight it. Any deviation from the Washington-approved line, any attempt to pursue an independent foreign policy would lead to economic strangulation and subsequent internal destabilization – at that time the country lives on Western credits.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The situation is further complicated by the fact that until 1999 the power is in the hands of the comprador elite beholden to the US (like the current Ukrainian one), and until 2004-2005 compradors are still fighting for power with patriotic Putin’s bureaucracy. The last rearguard battle given by the loosing compradors was an attempt at a revolution in 2011 at Bolotnaya square. What would have happened if they had made their move in 2000, when they had an overwhelming advantage?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The Russian leaders needed time for internal consolidation, restoration of the economic and financial systems, ensuring their self-reliance and independence from the West, and rebuilding the modern army. Finally, Russia needed allies.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n Diplomats had an almost impossible mission. It was necessary, without retreating on key issues, to consolidate the influence of Russia in post-Soviet states, ally itself with other governments resisting the US, strengthen them, if possible, all the while creating an illusion in Washington that Russia is weak and ready for strategic concessions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n One demonstration of the fact that this task was successfully achieved are the myths that are still alive among some Western analysts and pro-American Russian \u00ab\u00a0opposition\u00a0\u00bb. For example, if Russia opposes another instance of Western adventurism, it is \u00ab\u00a0bluffing to save face\u00a0\u00bb, the Russian elites are totally dependent on the West because \u00ab\u00a0their money is there\u00a0\u00bb, \u00ab\u00a0Russia sells out its allies\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n However, the myths of \u00ab\u00a0rusty rockets that do not fly\u00a0\u00bb, \u00ab\u00a0hungry solders building dachas for generals\u00a0\u00bb, and about \u00ab\u00a0economy in tatters\u00a0\u00bb are essentially gone. Only marginals believe in them, who are not really incapable, but are too afraid to acknowledge the reality.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n These very illusions of weakness and readiness to back off that fooled the West into belief that the Russian question is solved and prevented it from rapid political and economic attacks on Moscow, gave the Russian leadership the precious time for reforms.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Naturally, there is never too much time, and Russia would have preferred to postpone the direct confrontation with the US, which started in 2012-13, by another 3-5 years, or even avoid it altogether, but the diplomacy won 12-15 years for the country – a huge period of time in today’s rapidly changing world.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n To save space, I will give just one very clear example, most relevant in the current political situation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n People still blame Russia for not counteracting the US in Ukraine actively enough, for failing to create a pro-Russian \u00ab\u00a0fifth column\u00a0\u00bb to counterbalance the pro-American one, for working with elites, rather than with the people, etc. Let us evaluate the situation based on real capabilities, rather than wishful thinking.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Despite all references to the people, it is the elite that determines the state policy. The Ukrainian elite, in all its actions, has always been and still is anti-Russian. The difference is that the ideologically nationalistic (gradually becoming Nazi) elite was openly russophobic, whereas the economic (comprador, oligarchic) elite was simply pro-Western, but did not object to lucrative links with Russia.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n I would like to remind you that not somebody else but representatives of supposedly pro-Russian Party of Regions bragged that they did not allow Russian business to Donbass. They also were the once who tried to convince the world that they are better for Euro-integration than nationalists.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The regime of Yanukovich-Azarov precipitated economic confrontation with Russia in 2013, demanding that despite signing the treaty of association with the EU Russia retained and even enhanced favorable regime with Ukraine. After all, Yanukovich and his fellows in the Party of Regions, while they had absolute power (2010-2013), supported Nazis financially, informationally, and politically. They led them from marginal niche to mainstream politics in order to have a convenient opponent in the presidential elections in 2015, while suppressing any pro-Russian informational activity (not to mention a political one).<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n The Ukrainian communist party, while retaining pro-Russia rhetoric, never had a shot at power, and played a role of convenient loyal opposition indirectly supporting oligarchs, channeling protest activity into venues safe for any (including current) powers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Under these conditions, any Russian attempt to work with NGOs or to create pro-Russian media would be perceived as an encroachment on the rights of Ukrainian oligarchs to rob the country singlehandedly, which would cause a further drift of the Ukrainian officialdom towards the West viewed by Kiev as a counter-balance to Russia. The US would, quite naturally, see it as transition of Russia to direct confrontation, and would have redoubled its efforts to destabilize Russia and support pro-Western elites all over the post-Soviet space.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Neither in 2000, nor in 2004 Russia was ready to openly confront the US. Even when (not by Moscow’s choice) this happened 2013, Russia needed almost two years to mobilize its resources in order to give a strong response in Syria. The Syrian elite, in contrast to the Ukrainian one, from the very beginning (in 2011-2012) rejected the option of compromising with the West.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n That is why during 12 years (from \u00ab\u00a0Ukraine without Kuchma\u00a0\u00bb action, which was the first unsuccessful attempt of pro-American coup in Ukraine) the Russian diplomacy worked on two key tasks.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n First, it was keeping the situation in Ukraine in unstable equilibrium; second, convincing the Ukrainian elite that the West was a danger to their wellbeing, whereas reorientation towards Russia was the only way to stabilize the situation and save the country as well as the position of the elite itself.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n The first task was successfully achieved. The US has managed to switch Ukraine from the multi-directional mode into the mode of anti-Russian battering ram only by 2013, having spent enormous amount of time and resources and having acquired a regime with huge internal contradictions incapable of existing independently (without growing American support). Instead of using Ukrainian resources for their benefit, the US is forced to spend their own resources to prolong the agony of the Ukrainian statehood destroyed by the coup.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The second task has not been accomplished due to objective (independent of Russian efforts) reasons. The Ukrainian elite turned out to be totally inadequate, incapable of strategic thinking, of evaluating real risks and advantages, but living and acting under the influence of two myths.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n First – the West will easily win in any confrontation with Russia and share the spoils with Ukraine. Second – no effort, except the unwavering anti-Russian position, is necessary for comfortable existence (at the expense of Western financing). In the situation of choice between orientation on Russia and survival, or siding with the West and dying, the Ukrainian elite chose death.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n However, even out of negative choice of the Ukrainian elite the Russian diplomacy managed to get maximum advantage. Russia did not let itself be sucked into a confrontation with Ukrainian regime, instead forcing Kiev and the West into the grueling negotiation process on the background of a low-key civil war and excluding the USA from the Minsk format. By focusing on contradictions between Washington and the EU, Russia managed to burden the West with Ukraine financially.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n As a result, initially consolidated position of Washington and Brussels disintegrated. Counting on a politico-diplomatic blitzkrieg, the European politicians were not prepared for a prolonged confrontation. The EU economy simply could not support it. In its turn, The US was not ready to accept Kiev exclusively on its own payroll.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n Today, after a year and a half of efforts, the \u00ab\u00a0old Europe\u00a0\u00bb, which determines the position of the EU, such as Germany and France, has abandoned Ukraine completely and is looking for a way to extend a hand to Russia over the heads of the pro-American Eastern European limitrofes (Poland and Baltics). Even Warsaw, which used to be the main \u00ab\u00a0advocate\u00a0\u00bb of Kiev in the EU, openly (although semi-officially) hints at the possibility of dividing Ukraine, having lost the faith in the ability of the Kiev authorities to keep the country together.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n In the Ukrainian political and expert community hysterics about \u00ab\u00a0the treason of Europe\u00a0\u00bb is growing. Former governor of the Donetsk region (appointed by the Nazi regime) and oligarch Sergey Taruta states that his country has eight months to exist. Oligarch Dmitry Firtash (who had a reputation of the Ukrainian \u00ab\u00a0king maker\u00a0\u00bb) predicts disintegration as early as in the spring.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n All this, quietly and imperceptibly, without using tanks and strategic aviation, was achieved by the Russian diplomacy. Achieved in a tough confrontation with the block of most powerful, militarily and economically, countries, while starting from a much weaker position and with the most peculiar allies, not all of which were or are happy about growing Russian power.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n In parallel, Russia managed to return to the Middle East, retain and develop integration within the post-Soviet space (Eurasian Economic Union), together with China roll out a Eurasian integration project (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and initiate via BRICS a global integration project.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Unfortunately, limited space does not allow us to discuss in detail all strategic actions of the Russian diplomacy for the past 20 years (from Primakov until today). A comprehensive study would take many volumes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n However, anyone who would try to answer honestly how Russia managed within 20 years, without wars or upheavals, to rise from the state of a semi-colony to the state of a recognized world leader, would have to acknowledge the contributions of many people on Smolenskaya Square (where the Foreign Ministry is located – translator’s note<\/em>). Their efforts do not tolerate fuss or publicity, but without blood and victims yield results comparable to those achieved by multi-million armies in many years.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n La Russie, de l’effondrement au renouveau Cet article de Rostislav Ischenko, analyste \u00e0 RT, nous a paru particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant dans sa fa\u00e7on de nous donner un point de vue russe, synth\u00e9tis\u00e9, conservant les \u00e9l\u00e9ments essentiels de la catastrophe qui a affect\u00e9 la Russie alias-URSS au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990, jusqu’au redressement, sinon au renouveau qu’elle… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3806,2628,3483,17202,17203,2830,3246,584,17200,17201,2884,17060,1296,963],"class_list":["post-76292","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-cmi","tag-diplomatie","tag-gorbatchev","tag-ischenko","tag-kozirev","tag-lavrov","tag-moyen-orient","tag-otan","tag-primakov","tag-rostislav","tag-russe","tag-syrie-ii","tag-ukraine","tag-urss"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76292","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76292"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76292\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76292"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76292"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76292"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
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dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Russia in an invisible war<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Why now ?<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Healthy conservatism of diplomats<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Period of internal consolidation<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
The illusion of Russia’s weakness<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Russian diplomacy in Ukraine<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Breakthrough in the Middle East<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Rostislav Ischenko<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"