{"id":76394,"date":"2016-02-03T12:57:00","date_gmt":"2016-02-03T12:57:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/02\/03\/autour-de-la-mort-du-directeur-du-gru\/"},"modified":"2016-02-03T12:57:00","modified_gmt":"2016-02-03T12:57:00","slug":"autour-de-la-mort-du-directeur-du-gru","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/02\/03\/autour-de-la-mort-du-directeur-du-gru\/","title":{"rendered":"Autour de la mort du directeur du GRU"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_a.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:2em\">Autour de la mort du directeur du GRU<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Le 3 janvier 2016 mourait le directeur du service de renseignement militaire russe GRU, le Colonel-General Igor Sergoun. Officiellement, la cause de la mort inattendue de cet officier g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de 58 ans, chef du GRU depuis 2011, est une attaque cardiaque. L&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e9nement a d\u00e9clench\u00e9 des sp\u00e9culations, de la part de milieux du renseignement et assimil\u00e9s du monde anglo-saxons, et d&rsquo;autre part des observations plus simples sur ce que fut cet homme et le r\u00f4le qu&rsquo;il joua. On verra que le contraste est int\u00e9ressant dans ces deux approches, surtout lorsqu&rsquo;elles viennent des m\u00eames milieux, parce qu&rsquo;il permet \u00e9galement de tirer indirectement mais d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s assur\u00e9e \u00e0 notre sens certaines remarques sur les positions respectives.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Nous allons introduire trois \u00e9l\u00e9ments \u00e9v\u00e8nementiels, de sp\u00e9culations \u00e0 partir d&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e8nements suppos\u00e9s ou simplement de montages complets, ou de simple r\u00e9flexion \u00e0 partir d&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e8nements av\u00e9r\u00e9s. Cela permettra, de d\u00e9couvrir certains myst\u00e8res, &ndash; ou absence de myst\u00e8res c&rsquo;est selon, &ndash; autour de la personnalit\u00e9 de Sergoun, et \u00e0 notre sens, en complet contraste, certaines v\u00e9rit\u00e9s-de-situation toujours concernant Sergoun ; cela permettra surtout de constater et confirmer certaines tendances subversives et d\u00e9structurantes des milieux du renseignement anglo-am\u00e9ricanistes, et certaines autres tendances, au contraire constructives et structurantes. Nous introduisons ces trois \u00e9l\u00e9ments dans l&rsquo;ordre chronologique qui correspond bien \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9volution des positions que nous avons signal\u00e9es, &ndash; la subversion primaire, la subversion sophistiqu\u00e9e et l&rsquo;anti-subversion, ou la structuration. Nous donnerons comme texte ext\u00e9rieur complet, selon la formule d&rsquo;<em>Ouverture libre<\/em>, celui qui nous para&icirc;t de tr\u00e8s loin le plus int\u00e9ressant, qui est de la troisi\u00e8me cat\u00e9gorie signal\u00e9e.   <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&bull; La premi\u00e8re cat\u00e9gorie est le \u00ab\u00a0travail\u00a0\u00bb du groupe <em>Stratfor<\/em>, qui s&rsquo;av\u00e8re de plus en plus comme l&rsquo;arch\u00e9type du groupe d&rsquo;enqu\u00eate et d&rsquo;information strat\u00e9gique, officieuse et \u00ab\u00a0confidentielle\u00a0\u00bb, le plus exemplaire du point de vue du Syst\u00e8me : des analyses convenues et faussement audacieuses, et d&rsquo;ailleurs trop prudemment d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es pour qu&rsquo;on puisse y voir plus tard une erreur si tel ou tel d\u00e9veloppement non anticip\u00e9 s&rsquo;impose, partant par cons\u00e9quent dans tous les sens pourvu qu&rsquo;elles favorisent la politique-Syst\u00e8me appliqu\u00e9e aux USA, mentionnant pompeusement des \u00ab\u00a0sources\u00a0\u00bb propres, \u00e9videmment anonymes pour leur donner plus de cr\u00e9dit, comme tout journaliste avec un peu d&rsquo;exp\u00e9rience (si possible anglosaxon, qui sont les sp\u00e9cialistes de la chose) peut faire quotidiennement. La mort de Sergoun, dans les conditions d\u00e9crites officiellement, est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e avec la plus grande suspicion sans qu&rsquo;aucune accusation directe soit formul\u00e9e ; cela permet surtout de d\u00e9crire une \u00ab\u00a0guerre des services\u00a0\u00bben Russie (ou des \u00ab\u00a0organes\u00a0\u00bb, comme l&rsquo;on dit dans ce pays), au centre de laquelle se trouve Poutine. L&rsquo;effet indirect mais assur\u00e9 de cette technique est \u00e9videmment d&rsquo;accentuer le discr\u00e9dit de Poutine, soit marionnette des \u00ab\u00a0organes\u00a0\u00bb, soit manipulateur des \u00ab\u00a0organes\u00a0\u00bb. Cela est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on qui interdit de penser que la m\u00eame chose pourrait se passer \u00e0 Londres ou \u00e0 Washington, mais qui confirme compl\u00e8tement quoiqu&rsquo;indirectement ce qu&rsquo;il importe de penser de Poutine. Le texte a \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.stratfor.com\/geopolitical-diary\/mysterious-death-raises-questions-russia\">le 6 janvier<\/a>, trois jours apr\u00e8s la mort de Sergoun, avec ce premier paragraphe :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Intrigues within the Kremlin reignited Monday after the chief of Russia&rsquo;s military intelligence service, Igor Sergun, died unexpectedly. Sergun was a relatively unknown figure who kept a very low profile over his 30-year career, despite the fact that his position at the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces made him one of the most powerful figures in Russian security<\/em>. &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&bull; Le deuxi\u00e8me texte est plus int\u00e9ressant. Il s&rsquo;agit du texte du <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/intl\/cms\/s\/0\/735b4746-c01f-11e5-9fdb-87b8d15baec2.html#axzz3xz0VTBAP\">Financial Times <\/a><\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/intl\/cms\/s\/0\/735b4746-c01f-11e5-9fdb-87b8d15baec2.html#axzz3xz0VTBAP\">du 22 janvier<\/a>, annon\u00e7ant que la Russie avait demand\u00e9 \u00e0 Assad de quitter sa fonction de pr\u00e9sident de la r\u00e9publique syrienne. Cette affirmation a \u00e9t\u00e9 imm\u00e9diatement et cat\u00e9goriquement d\u00e9mentie par la Russie quelques heures plus tard. Outre la demande de retrait de Assad, l&rsquo;article donnait diverses indications, pr\u00e9tendument li\u00e9es \u00e0 cette demande, selon lesquelles les Russes ont d\u00e9couvert une situation pire que celle qu&rsquo;il croyait conna&icirc;tre des conditions de corruption et op\u00e9rationnelles du r\u00e9gime, tandis qu&rsquo;ils (les Russes) rencontreraient des difficult\u00e9s grandissantes dans leurs propres op\u00e9rations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Du c\u00f4t\u00e9 syrien, poursuit l&rsquo;article, on a d\u00e9couvert que les Russes jouaient vis-\u00e0-vis d&rsquo;Assad un double jeu, consistant \u00e0 envisager son retrait aussi bien qu&rsquo;\u00e0 d\u00e9fendre son r\u00e9gime. Toute l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration de demande de retrait d&rsquo;Assad est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e comme ayant \u00e9t\u00e9 men\u00e9e par Sergoun peu avant sa mort, et l&rsquo;article est tourn\u00e9 comme si le chef du GRU avait eu une grande part dans les diverses tractations et man&oelig;uvres d\u00e9crites.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Just weeks before his death on January 3, Colonel-General Igor Sergun, director of <\/em><em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/topics\/places\/Russia\">Russia<\/a><\/em><em>&lsquo;s GRU military intelligence agency, was sent to Damascus on a delicate mission. The general, who is believed to have cut his teeth as a Soviet operative in Syria, bore a message from <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/topics\/people\/Vladimir_Putin\">Vladimir Putin<\/a><\/em><em> for President <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/topics\/people\/Bashar_al-Assad\">Bashar al-Assad<\/a><\/em><em>: the Kremlin, the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/indepth\/syria-crisis\">Syrian<\/a><\/em><em> dictator&rsquo;s most powerful international protector, believed it was time for him to step aside<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Mr Assad angrily refused<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Two senior western intelligence officials have given the Financial Times details of Sergun&rsquo;s mission<\/em>. [&#8230;] <em>For the US-led coalition fighting Isis, it seemed that accommodating Moscow could break years of diplomatic deadlock over Mr Assad&rsquo;s removal &mdash; a move Washington views as a precondition to cooling the sectarian tensions in Syria and Iraq that have fed the jihadi insurgency.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Moscow&rsquo;s military intervention in the conflict in support of Damascus in late September, many in Europe and the US reasoned, had reached its limit. \u00ab\u00a0Mr Putin had taken a look under the bonnet of the Syrian regime,\u00a0\u00bb one senior European intelligence official told the FT \u00ab\u00a0and found a lot more problems than he was bargaining for.\u00a0\u00bb However, Russia overplayed its hand, the official said, and Mr Assad made clear to Sergun that there could be no future for Russia in Syria unless he remained as president<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>In his dealings with the Kremlin, Mr Assad has adopted a strategy of playing one foreign power off against another. His trump card on this occasion was <\/em><em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/world\/mideast\/iran\">Iran<\/a><\/em><em>. Russia has been nervous of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ft.com\/cms\/s\/0\/be5cad4e-bd30-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf.html#axzz3xlwPJ3IG\">Tehran&rsquo;s growing regional influence <\/a><\/em><em>at the cost of its own leverage for months. People close to the Syrian regime say suspicions about Russia&rsquo;s intentions have been growing in Damascus for some time. \u00ab\u00a0That mood of elation when Russia first got involved lasted for a while, but then people got more pessimistic,\u00a0\u00bb said one Damascus businessman. \u00ab\u00a0Assad&rsquo;s people started to realise that having the big brother defending them meant he could also demand things of them too.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Cet article est tr\u00e8s largement per\u00e7u dans des milieux ind\u00e9pendants proches des services de renseignement comme \u00e9tant une construction compl\u00e8te et une man&oelig;uvre d&rsquo;intoxication men\u00e9e par les services de renseignement britanniques et US avant les n\u00e9gociations de Gen\u00e8ve sur la Syrie. La mention des sources (\u00ab\u00a0deux officiels de haut rang d&rsquo;un service de renseignement occidental\u00a0\u00bb) a pour objet apparent d&rsquo;accr\u00e9diter le r\u00e9cit, mais pour effet secondaire d&rsquo;indiquer les responsables si l&rsquo;information est identifi\u00e9e comme une man&oelig;uvre d&rsquo;intoxication. (Cette proc\u00e9dure fait partie <strong>des pr\u00e9cautions exig\u00e9es par le <em>FT<\/em> pour accepter de relayer des man&oelig;uvres d&rsquo;intoxication des services de renseignement occidentaux<\/strong> et prot\u00e9ger sa r\u00e9putation aupr\u00e8s de ses lecteurs et de ses annonceurs.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Comme on le lit \u00e9galement, l&rsquo;information a d&rsquo;autres buts secondaires outre celui d&rsquo;interf\u00e9rer sur les n\u00e9gociations de Gen\u00e8ve, qui sont d&rsquo;obtenir l&rsquo;effet de tendre les relations entre la Russie et la Syrie, et elles mettent en avant sans le caract\u00e9riser pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment pourtant le r\u00f4le de Sergoun dans l&rsquo;initiative russe. Il s&rsquo;agit de l&rsquo;utilisation d&rsquo;un \u00e9v\u00e9nement  officiellement confirm\u00e9 (la mort de Sergoun) pour accr\u00e9diter l&rsquo;information en m\u00eame temps que tenter de sugg\u00e9rer un climat incertain au sein des man&oelig;uvres diplomatiques et secr\u00e8tes de la Russie, avec une \u00e9ventuelle responsabilit\u00e9 de Sergoun \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&bull; Le troisi\u00e8me texte, que nous donnons ci-dessous en entier, repr\u00e9sente un complet contrepied par rapport aux pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents. Il est \u00e9crit par le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de brigade de l&rsquo;US Army (\u00e0 la retraite) Peter Zwack, actuellement <em>Senior Research Fellow<\/em> \u00e0 <em>l&rsquo;Institute of National Security Studies<\/em> de la <em>National Defense University<\/em>. Cette position dans des organismes universitaires d\u00e9pendant des forces arm\u00e9es signifie que Zwack conserve des liens \u00e9troits avec les milieux militaires US, et notamment avec la DIA, au sein de laquelle il a beaucoup travaill\u00e9, outre d&rsquo;\u00eatre de 2012 \u00e0 2014 l&rsquo;attach\u00e9 militaire en chef de l&rsquo;ambassade US \u00e0 Moscou. On consid\u00e9rera donc son texte comme refl\u00e9tant d&rsquo;une certaine fa\u00e7on les appr\u00e9ciations des services o&ugrave; il a travaill\u00e9, et particuli\u00e8rement de la DIA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Le texte constitue, avec notamment de tr\u00e8s nombreuses pr\u00e9cisions et anecdotes significatives, un salut appuy\u00e9 et tr\u00e8s laudatif \u00e0 la m\u00e9moire du chef du GRU, service avec lequel il appara&icirc;t que la DIA a entretenu des liens substantiels jusqu&rsquo;en 2014 (avant la rupture ordonn\u00e9e par les autorit\u00e9s civiles avec la crise ukrainienne). Zwack d\u00e9taille notamment une longue visite, &ndash; jusqu&rsquo;ici peu connue sinon inconnue du public, et peut-\u00eatre de certaines autorit\u00e9s civiles, &ndash; du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Flynn, directeur de la DIA (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/daesh-desordre-et-le-general-flynn-en-vedette-americaine\">devenu fameux<\/a> depuis pours ses prises de position publique apr\u00e8s son d\u00e9part \u00e0 la retraite), \u00e0 Moscou \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9t\u00e9 2013, au quartier-g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du GRU, \u00e0 l&rsquo;invitation personnelle de Sergoun. Il est \u00e9vident que les pr\u00e9cisions qui y sont donn\u00e9es, la chaleur qui transpara&icirc;t des relations entre les membres des deux services, sont pr\u00e9cis\u00e9es pour rendre un certain effet <strong>qui contrecarre absolument la politique de suspicion et d&rsquo;hostilit\u00e9 syst\u00e9matique, sinon de haine \u00e0 l&rsquo;encontre de la Russie<\/strong> qu&rsquo;on rencontre dans des milieux id\u00e9ologiques anglo-am\u00e9ricanistes, dont nombre de centres de pouvoir et de communication. Ainsi tr\u00e8s marqu\u00e9 par la description implicite des tr\u00e8s bons rapports entre la DIA et le GRU, l&rsquo;article refl\u00e8te l&rsquo;intention commune, et notamment de Sergoun, d&rsquo;\u00e9tablir les meilleures relations possibles entre la Russie et les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>La parution de l&rsquo;article est <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/ideas\/2016\/02\/death-gru-commander\/125567\/\">du 1<sup>er<\/sup> f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, dans <em>DefenseOne.com<\/em> auquel Zwack collabore r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement, il ne r\u00e9pond \u00e0 aucune n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;actualit\u00e9 et constitue une d\u00e9marche volontaire d&rsquo;hommage \u00e0 Sergoun sans aucune obligation de circonstance ; on pr\u00e9cisera qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit <strong>d&rsquo;une d\u00e9marche publique extr\u00eamement rare, de la part d&rsquo;un ancien officier g\u00e9n\u00e9ral US et proche de la DIA, pour un personnage tel qu&rsquo;un ancien directeur du GRU<\/strong>&#8230; A la date o&ugrave; il est publi\u00e9 et dans les conditions que nous avons d\u00e9crites il est tr\u00e8s difficile de n&rsquo;y pas voir <strong>\u00e9galement une r\u00e9ponse indirecte \u00e0 ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9crit ou sugg\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 propos de Sergoun pr\u00e9c\u00e9demment<\/strong>. On doit ainsi identifier une confirmation du r\u00f4le particulier que joue la DIA, avec des hommes comme Flynn &#038; Cie, de se tenir en-dehors des man&oelig;uvres antirusses de montages de communication effectu\u00e9es par d&rsquo;autres services de renseignement plus enclins \u00e0 suivre la ligne id\u00e9ologique des directions civiles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;&ndash;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">Death of the GRU Commander<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In February 2014, contact ceased between U.S. and Russian military intelligence as part of an overall shutdown of defense relations in the wake of Russia&rsquo;s illegal annexation of Crimea. It was the right policy move at the time, but it&rsquo;s time to get U.S. and Russian military leaders, including intelligence officials, talking to each other again.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>One unlikely and subtle advocate of the value of personal communications was the chief of Russian military intelligence, Igor Sergun, who died suddenly on Jan. 3 of a probable heart attack. Recently promoted to Colonel General, Sergun was only 58 years old, young even for an overworked, highly stressed Russian male. An experienced special operations veteran who made his name in the restive Northern Caucasus, Sergun became GRU chief in 2011, later becoming one of the troublingly imaginative architects of Russia&rsquo;s hybrid, proxy aggression in Ukraine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>I&rsquo;m frankly unsure how to feel about his death. As a career U.S. Army military intelligence officer, and our senior military attach\u00e9 to Russia from 2012 to 2014, I met with General Sergun and his staff several times for extended periods. I found him soft-spoken, unassuming, complex, erudite and nuanced. And I learned that even as Sergun relentlessly directed global intelligence operations against our interests, he &mdash; paradoxically &mdash; also viewed constant confrontation with the U.S. and West as not in Russia&rsquo;s best long-term interest.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Before U.S.&ndash;Russia relations collapsed, Sergun facilitated increased contact between our countries&rsquo; military intelligence leaders. During 2012-13, I watched as U.S. and Russian intelligence chiefs from strategic regional and global commands discreetly met in cities across Russia: Khabarovsk in the east, Rostov in the south, and also Sochi, just before the 2014 Winter Olympics. These meetings &mdash; which were often the first face-to-face interactions between these senior U.S. and Russian MI officers &mdash; always entailed straightforward, cordially hardnosed discussions that intelligence officers understood from a world of black and gray, and rarely white, as traditional adversaries, often foes. Clearly, both sides entered cautiously, but increasingly saw substantive talks emerge on carefully cleared topics.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Never lost or conceded was our unwavering support for our allies, and partners such as Ukraine, who ideally should want us to engage with Russia. But such meetings were invaluable opportunities for both sides to explain why they disagreed on issues such as Syria, the Arab Spring, missile defense and Ukraine. Consequently both sides began to discover issues on which we did agree: radical Sunni Islam, the need for a stable Afghanistan and Central Asia, global terrorism, looming demographic challenges, and future global resource competition.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Perhaps the highest-profile visit came in June 2013, when Sergun invited Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, for a three-day visit to Moscow. Following a trail carefully blazed by several predecessors, Flynn laid a wreath at Russia&rsquo;s Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and visited the GRU&rsquo;s ultra-modern headquarters outside Moscow. There he gave a unique hour-long address on leadership and intelligence to a conference room full of young GRU officers who, judging by their questions, clearly had never before encountered an American intelligence general.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Finally, Flynn hosted an unprecedented dinner for his counterpart in my residence at the U.S. Embassy. The GRU director arrived with two generals and an interpreter. It must have been bemusing for them to go through U.S. Embassy security onto U.S. soil for the first time. Always inquisitive, Sergun showed particular interest in a colorful Leroy Neiman print titled \u00ab\u00a0Red Square.\u00a0\u00bb The customary toasts were hoisted, though Sergun himself was a modest drinker. The last toast called for making \u00ab\u00a0the airlocks fit,\u00a0\u00bb an allusion to the extraordinary Apollo&ndash;Soyuz link-up in 1975 during the heart of the Cold War, and an allegory for improving relations. He liked that. All departed with U.S. Embassy baseball caps for their children. The following night Sergun hosted our U.S. delegation at the venerable Sovietsky Hotel, where he gave us a personal tour of Stalin&rsquo;s time-warped suite upstairs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>General Sergun clearly placed a high value on these exchanges, which showed his desire to do more than simply learn about our military capabilities and intent. If I were Russian, obsessed by real and perceived existential threat, uneasy about the viability of my vast northern nation of demographically challenged citizens, I would be seriously worried. I believe these next-generation geostrategic concerns helped drive Sergun and other senior leaders toward these engagements with us.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>My last contact with Sergun occurred in late 2013, just months before relations broke. I requested a meeting to deliver a message, and this powerful intelligence general arrived in short notice in modest street clothes. He took my message and we talked briefly about a planned visit to the United States with some of his senior GRU officers. That idea, of course, went stillborn when Russia invaded Crimea.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>So where do we go from here? The status quo, despite some minor improvement, remains quite negative. We must find meaningful ways to talk and work with Russian military counterparts on geo-strategic concerns of mutual interest, of which there are plenty. Despite disagreements and frustrating disinformation, we must persist in this. Nations, especially ones that are traditional confrontational competitors that can existentially threaten each other, must constantly and intensively communicate via different channels and echelons, including sensitive military and intelligence conduits. This is hardly weakness or supplication; rather it displays strength, confidence and prudence, and it shows we are comfortable in our own skin.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Certainly we collectively can learn that much from the complex Colonel General Sergun.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4>Peter Zwack<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Autour de la mort du directeur du GRU Le 3 janvier 2016 mourait le directeur du service de renseignement militaire russe GRU, le Colonel-General Igor Sergoun. Officiellement, la cause de la mort inattendue de cet officier g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de 58 ans, chef du GRU depuis 2011, est une attaque cardiaque. L&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e9nement a d\u00e9clench\u00e9 des sp\u00e9culations, de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[4202,3032,2851,2926,3283,15865,4173,2693,17322,3160,3867,2852,17321],"class_list":["post-76394","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-assad","tag-dia","tag-financial","tag-flynn","tag-general","tag-gru","tag-montage","tag-peter","tag-sergoun","tag-stratfor","tag-syrie","tag-times","tag-zwack"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76394","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76394"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76394\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76394"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76394"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76394"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}