{"id":76533,"date":"2016-04-21T10:06:42","date_gmt":"2016-04-21T10:06:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/04\/21\/letrange-destin-des-mistralrusso-egyptiens\/"},"modified":"2016-04-21T10:06:42","modified_gmt":"2016-04-21T10:06:42","slug":"letrange-destin-des-mistralrusso-egyptiens","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/04\/21\/letrange-destin-des-mistralrusso-egyptiens\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;\u00e9trange destin des <em>Mistral<\/em>\u00a0russo-\u00e9gyptiens"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">L&rsquo;\u00e9trange destin des <em>Mistral<\/em> russo-\u00e9gyptiens<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>On conna&icirc;t l&rsquo;aventure tr\u00e8s originale, et t\u00e9moignant des vertus de grand et ferme caract\u00e8re de la direction politique et n\u00e9anmoins direction&ndash;Syst\u00e8me de la France, des porte-h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res classe <em>Mistral<\/em> vendus \u00e0 la Russie en 2009. Les consignes washingtoniennes \u00e9tant arriv\u00e9es en 2014, les ventes furent d\u00e9nonc\u00e9es et la France chercha d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9ment une porte de \u00ab\u00a0sortie\u00a0\u00bb. Elle la trouva en \u00ab\u00a0soldant\u00a0\u00bb ses deux unit\u00e9s, entretemps baptis\u00e9es <em>Vadivostok <\/em>et<em> Sebastopol<\/em>, \u00e0 l&rsquo;&Eacute;gypte pour un prix de $950 millions, ce qui nous am\u00e8ne loin du quasi-$milliard par unit\u00e9 pr\u00e9vu pour la vente initiale \u00e0 la Russie. L&rsquo;habilet\u00e9 de Hollande est sans limites identifiables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Dans le march\u00e9-sold\u00e9 tel qu&rsquo;il fut n\u00e9goci\u00e9, les &Eacute;gyptiens choisirent un \u00e9quipement en h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res russes (notamment des Ka-52 d&rsquo;attaque), ce qui correspondait aux intentions initiales des Russes et faisait des <em>Mistral<\/em> \u00e9gyptiens une d\u00e9cision rapprochant encore plus l&rsquo;&Eacute;gypte de la Russie pour les \u00e9quipements militaires. La chose a encore \u00e9t\u00e9 prolong\u00e9e et renforc\u00e9e, peut-\u00eatre \u00e0 la confusion grandissante des Fran\u00e7ais si cela existe encore, avec la demande des &Eacute;gyptiens que l&rsquo;\u00e9quipement \u00e9lectronique de ces deux unit\u00e9s soit russe et non fran\u00e7ais. On n\u00e9gocie la chose, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rt.com\/business\/340377-egypt-equipment-mistrals-russia\/\">\u00e9crit RT<\/a> qui reprend des nouvelles de Tass.    <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Conclusion de l&rsquo;habile op\u00e9ration fran\u00e7ais, sous l&rsquo;auspice d&rsquo;une politique ext\u00e9rieure \u00e9tonnante d&rsquo;originalit\u00e9 compl\u00e8tement align\u00e9e : les <em>Mistral<\/em> promis puis interdits aux Russes, deviennent de plus en plus \u00ab\u00a0russes\u00a0\u00bb, et sans doute l&rsquo;&Eacute;gypte pourra-t-elle ainsi, \u00e9ventuellement disons, les pr\u00eater \u00e0 la marine russe. <strong>Le r\u00e9sultat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de la vente \u00e0 perte \u00e0 l&rsquo;&Eacute;gypte d&rsquo;un \u00e9quipement strat\u00e9gique fran\u00e7ais refus\u00e9 \u00e0 la Russie est donc un renforcement encore plus grand des liens strat\u00e9giques entre l&rsquo;&Eacute;gypte et la Russie et sa coordination \u00e9vidente avec la Russie, y compris par des usages op\u00e9rationnels conjoints<\/strong>. Hollande est toujours aussi haut dans les sondages.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>The Egyptian military has asked Russia to supply electronic systems for the Mistral class helicopter carriers bought from France, according to a diplomatic military source quoted by TASS.  \u00ab\u00a0After the talks with Russia&rsquo;s Rosoboronexport (the state weapons exporter), Egypt&rsquo;s military delegation has clearly said it wants to install Russian electronic equipment, including electronic warfare systems on the Mistral carriers, which it has purchased from France and are awaiting delivery,\u00a0\u00bb said the source. Examples of electronic warfare systems will be shown at the next round of negotiations with Russia&rsquo;s arms exporter. The talks might be held the next month, according to the source.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>The Presidential Chief of Staff Sergey Ivanov has said Cairo could purchase $1 billion worth of equipment and the aircraft for the new ships. Ivanov joked that without the hardware the Mistral is just a tin can<\/em>. &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 21 avril 2016 \u00e0 10H03<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;\u00e9trange destin des Mistral russo-\u00e9gyptiens On conna&icirc;t l&rsquo;aventure tr\u00e8s originale, et t\u00e9moignant des vertus de grand et ferme caract\u00e8re de la direction politique et n\u00e9anmoins direction&ndash;Syst\u00e8me de la France, des porte-h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res classe Mistral vendus \u00e0 la Russie en 2009. Les consignes washingtoniennes \u00e9tant arriv\u00e9es en 2014, les ventes furent d\u00e9nonc\u00e9es et la France chercha d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9ment&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[9550,6410,8635,2766,2730,5770],"class_list":["post-76533","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-egypte","tag-electronique","tag-mistral","tag-relations","tag-russie","tag-strategiques"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76533","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76533"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76533\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76533"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76533"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76533"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}