{"id":76579,"date":"2016-05-22T05:42:35","date_gmt":"2016-05-22T05:42:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/05\/22\/linvasion-de-lukraine-est-un-fait-historique-point-final\/"},"modified":"2016-05-22T05:42:35","modified_gmt":"2016-05-22T05:42:35","slug":"linvasion-de-lukraine-est-un-fait-historique-point-final","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/05\/22\/linvasion-de-lukraine-est-un-fait-historique-point-final\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;invasion de l&rsquo;Ukraine <strong>est<\/strong> <strong>un fait historique<\/strong>, point final"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">L&rsquo;invasion de l&rsquo;Ukraine <strong>est<\/strong> <strong>un fait historique<\/strong>, point final<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>On se rappelle certainement comment nous suiv&icirc;mes tous, haletants, l&rsquo;extraordinaire \u00ab\u00a0bataille de communication\u00a0\u00bb en Ukraine, disons du printemps 2014 (un mois et demi apr\u00e8s le \u00ab\u00a0coup de Kiev\u00a0\u00bb) au d\u00e9but 2015 (accord Minsk2). Il y avait eu l&rsquo;attaque du Donbass anti-Kiev par l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e ukrainienne puis l&rsquo;esp\u00e8ce de \u00ab\u00a0guerre-civile-hybride\u00a0\u00bb, ou \u00ab\u00a0guerre-de-s\u00e9cession-hybride\u00a0\u00bb, qui s&rsquo;ensuivit, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 l&rsquo;actuelle situation de <em>no-decision-time<\/em> o&ugrave; tout semble flotter tout en restant fig\u00e9 en l&rsquo;\u00e9tat, alors que rien n&rsquo;est tout \u00e0 fait termin\u00e9 et que rien ne para&icirc;t devoir reprendre. Le pseudo paix est aussi hybride que la guerre qui l&rsquo;a pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Pendant cette \u00ab\u00a0dr\u00f4le de guerre\u00a0\u00bb qui ne fit rire personne et qui fut \u00e9galement cruelle, il fut bruyamment affirm\u00e9 que les Russes envahissaient l&rsquo;Est de l&rsquo;Ukraine. Cela fut dit, proclam\u00e9, affirm\u00e9, confirm\u00e9, prouv\u00e9, plusieurs dizaines de fois. (Par exemple, en <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/heroique-ukraine-36-invasions-russes-en-9-mois\">novembre 2014<\/a>, on comptait d\u00e9j\u00e0 36 invasions russes depuis avril de la m\u00eame ann\u00e9e.) A cette occasion, nous invent\u00e2mes une expression indiquant que la logique et la raison \u00e9taient totalement prisonni\u00e8res des <em>narrative<\/em> : <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/glossairedde-le-determinisme-narrativiste\">le d\u00e9terminisme-narrativiste<\/a>. Ce que nous observons aujourd&rsquo;hui, c&rsquo;est que le \u00ab\u00a0fait narrativiste\u00a0\u00bb de l&rsquo;invasion est devenu un enseignement conceptuel qui entre dans la documentation, l&rsquo;analyse et la doctrine des forces arm\u00e9es US, particuli\u00e8rement de l&rsquo;US Army, pour \u00e9valuer d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale la puissance militaire russe, et surtout sa peu ordinaire mont\u00e9e en puissance. <strong>Le \u00ab\u00a0fait narrativiste\u00a0\u00bb est devenu v\u00e9rit\u00e9 historique.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>(Nous mettons de c\u00f4t\u00e9 ici l&rsquo;intervention russe en Syrie, car les textes que nous allons citer n&rsquo;y font pas allusion. Cela ne signifie pas qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;en est pas tenu compte du c\u00f4t\u00e9 US, mais dans le cas qui nous occupe il n&rsquo;en est pas tenu compte. L'\u00a0\u00bbexp\u00e9rience ukrainienne\u00a0\u00bb suffit. Il va de soi, quoi qu&rsquo;il en soit, que l&rsquo;intervention russe en Syrie reste dans les esprits, &ndash; et elle est bien r\u00e9elle celle-l\u00e0, &ndash; et elle renforce avec d&rsquo;autant plus de puissance tout ce qui est construit autour de l'\u00a0\u00bbinvasion russe de l&rsquo;Ukraine\u00a0\u00bb. C&rsquo;est une situation tr\u00e8s curieuse, on va le voir, puisqu&rsquo;\u00e0 partir d&rsquo;une offensive de communication du bloc-BAO surprenante par son m\u00e9pris absolu de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 la d\u00e9sint\u00e9gration totale de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, on parvient \u00e0 des conclusions qui sont, objectivement, un tr\u00e8s grand avantage pour les Russes et correspondent \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Voici d&rsquo;abord un texte de notre  excellent ami Daniel Gour\u00e9, que nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 plusieurs fois <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/a-chacun-sa-fin-des-temps\">cit\u00e9<\/a>, qui fait partir du Lexington Institute, largement subventionn\u00e9 par le complexe militaro-industriel (CMI). <a href=\"http:\/\/lexingtoninstitute.org\/attempts-downplay-growing-russian-military-threat-wont-wash\/\">Le 18 mai<\/a>, il d\u00e9nonce les tra&icirc;tres divers, US et en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral au Congr\u00e8s, qui mettraient en doute la parole des militaires d\u00e9peignant la puissance russe pour rogner une partie des augmentations budg\u00e9taires dont ces militaires ont un tr\u00e8s urgent besoin.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Thankfully, the Russian military is not ten feet tall. No one said it is. But that is the way some unnamed civilian Pentagon officials want to spin the legitimate concerns of senior military officers regarding the challenges posed by the improved capabilities of a rapidly modernizing Russian military. It is even worse when some in <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.politico.com\/magazine\/story\/2016\/05\/army-internal-fight-russia-defense-budget-213885\"><em>the media<\/em><\/a><em> try not only to make such a case but to demean the reputation and honesty of a military officer who is courageously attempting to get the Obama Administration and the American people to take seriously a growing threat to our national security and that of our allies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>Russian military modernization and the challenge it poses to the nation and the military has been publicly acknowledged at the most senior levels of the Department of Defense. <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/Speeches\/Speech-View\/Article\/606641\/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies\"><em>Discussing<\/em><\/a><em> the need for the so-called Third Offset Strategy, Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work explained that one of the motivations was the need to respond to the challenges posed by the Russian military. \u00ab\u00a0It&rsquo;s modernizing a military that was in steep decline throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. Its naval and air units are operating at a pace and an extent that hasn&rsquo;t been seen in quite some time, to include a large increase in trans-oceanic and global military operations.\u00a0\u00bb The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &#038; Logistics has been <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2015\/03\/us-military-losing-edge-in-space-kendall\/\"><em>telling<\/em><\/a><em> anyone who will listen that the United States is losing its technological advantage vis-\u00e0-vis China and Russia in the air and maritime domains, electronic warfare, space, reliable communications and ISR. <\/em>[&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>The Russian military is not yet ten feet tall. But it is five foot ten inches and growing. Its growth spurt since the nearly botched operation against Georgia in 2008 is impressive. The Russian defense ministry routinely demonstrates its new-found capabilities by running large-scale snap exercises with forces that number between 40-100,000 from all services. They are now even throwing in the first use of nuclear weapons. In its operations against Crimea and Ukraine, Russian forces <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/ideas\/2016\/03\/nato-russia-sof-ew-hybrid-war\/126401\/\"><em>demonstrated<\/em><\/a><em> a heretofore unrecognized capability to coordinate armored, artillery and air units along with the highly successful employment of electronic warfare, drones and long-range artillery to locate, jam and then destroy Ukrainian operational level command posts<\/em>. &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>Sputnik<\/em> reprend des \u00e9l\u00e9ments du texte de Gour\u00e9, qu&rsquo;il soumet \u00e0 la critique d&rsquo;autres textes dont les auteurs mettent en \u00e9vidence, selon leur point de vue, qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;analyses sollicit\u00e9es et rien d&rsquo;autre, pour obtenir quelques dizaines de $ milliards en plus pour le Pentagone, &ndash; disons, au moins pour les cigarettes&#8230; Le texte est <a href=\"http:\/\/sputniknews.com\/politics\/20160521\/1040014863\/pentagon-russia-military.html#ixzz49Hvbd3OG\">de ce 21 mai<\/a>. Nous en extrayons la derni\u00e8re partie qui expose effectivement les doutes de certains, dont d&rsquo;ailleurs des sources honorables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Yet many, even in the <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/sputniknews.com\/tags\/tag_Pentagon\/\"><em>Pentagon<\/em><\/a><em> itself, remain unconvinced. \u00ab\u00a0The $600 billion-a-year military spend by Washington is roughly tenfold what Russia spends. And yet, inverting reality, Russia is presented as the threat,\u00a0\u00bb analyst Finian Cunningham <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.strategic-culture.org\/news\/2016\/05\/16\/peace-not-russia-is-real-threat-us-power.html\"><em>observed<\/em><\/a><em>. In his opinion, Washington has always been on a witch-hunt because the defense budget is the basis of the US economy and it would collapse should it be drastically reduced.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Former USAID project officer Josh Cohen also <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-russia-war-commentary-idUSKCN0Y82DT\"><em>pointed<\/em><\/a><em> to America&rsquo;s current defense spending. \u00ab\u00a0With a 2015 military budget of $600 billion, Washington spends approximately ten times the amount on defense as does Moscow, and while Russian combat forces are modernizing, American military technology largely outclasses the Kremlin&rsquo;s,\u00a0\u00bb he noted. The budget indeed seems to be at the heart of the Pentagon&rsquo;s strategy that has largely focused on demonizing Russia. \u00ab\u00a0This is the &lsquo;Chicken-Little, sky-is-falling&rsquo; set in the Army,\u00a0\u00bb an unnamed senior Pentagon officer told Politico recently. \u00ab\u00a0These guys want us to believe the Russians are 10 feet tall. There&rsquo;s a simpler explanation: The Army is looking for a purpose, and a bigger chunk of the budget.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Cette explication (les \u00e9valuations bureaucratiques US grandissant d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on appuy\u00e9e l&rsquo;adversaire pour obtenir des cr\u00e9dits suppl\u00e9mentaires pour les forces arm\u00e9es US) est r\u00e9currente depuis bien plus d&rsquo;un demi-si\u00e8cle (voir <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/glossairedde-le-trou-noir-du-xxeme-siecle\">le \u00ab\u00a0trou noir\u00a0\u00bb de 1945-1948<\/a>, ou la man&oelig;uvre \u00e0 l&rsquo;origine) ; elle est accomplie bureaucratiquement, sans souci de la \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9alit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb ext\u00e9rieure en un sens, donc elle peut la rencontrer par inadvertance. En l&rsquo;occurrence c&rsquo;est le cas et donc, utilis\u00e9e comme l&rsquo;est, cette explication qui d\u00e9formerait la v\u00e9rit\u00e9-de-situation ne nous satisfait pas du tout. D&rsquo;une part, les forces arm\u00e9es US sont dans un \u00e9tat <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/lusaf-ou-la-devoration-de-soi-meme\">terriblement effrayant<\/a> pour n&rsquo;importe quel g\u00e9n\u00e9ral <em>lambda<\/em> du Pentagone suivi d&rsquo;un directeur de Lockheed Martin qui lui sugg\u00e8re un nouveau JSF-qui-ne-marche pas ; d&rsquo;autre part, la mont\u00e9e <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/notes-sur-lhypothese-iskander-1\">en puissance militaire<\/a> de la Russie est pour nous une <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/glossairedde-verite-de-situation-verite\">v\u00e9rit\u00e9-de-situation<\/a> incontestable. Nous en restons donc \u00e0 notre analyse mais pour observer l&rsquo;\u00e9tonnant usage de la <em>narrative<\/em> (accumulation de m\u00e9sinformation, de contre-informations, de d\u00e9sinformations, de non-informations, au profit d&rsquo;un r\u00e9cit hollywoodien) pour mettre en \u00e9vidence cette v\u00e9rit\u00e9-de-situation, &ndash; ou la voie de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 par le mensonge&#8230; Rions, Folleville !<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Le n&oelig;ud de l&rsquo;intrigue se nomme <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thepotomacfoundation.org\/experts\/phillip-a-karber-2\/\">Phil Karber<\/a>. Malgr\u00e9 son imposante biographie, il reste un personnage quelque peu \u00e9nigmatique. Par exemple, nous le v&icirc;mes surgir dans les ann\u00e9es 1984-1985, comme un diable d&rsquo;une boite, comme l&rsquo;expert US incontestable de l&rsquo;\u00e9valuation des forces du Pacte de Varsovie, notamment blind\u00e9es, ce qui correspond d&rsquo;ailleurs \u00e0 une mission qu&rsquo;il effectua \u00e0 cette \u00e9poque pour l&rsquo;OTAN. A cette \u00e9poque par cons\u00e9quent, il devint l&rsquo;expert-vedette d&rsquo;une revue qui dominait le monde militaro-strat\u00e9gique US et donnait le ton, <em>Armed Forces Journal International<\/em>. Selon le souvenir (qui n&rsquo;est pas imp\u00e9ratif) de PhG, c&rsquo;est lui, Karber, qui, devant parler \u00e0 un s\u00e9minaire prestigieux organis\u00e9 par le chef d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e belge \u00e0 Evere avec l&rsquo;aide de l&rsquo;OTAN, arriva au micro et, th\u00e9\u00e2tralement, jeta son texte pr\u00e9par\u00e9 en d\u00e9clarant : \u00ab\u00a0Tout cela ne vaut plus rien, les \u00e9v\u00e8nements vont trop vite\u00a0\u00bb, &ndash; ce qui, d&rsquo;ailleurs, n&rsquo;\u00e9tait pas mal vu. (C&rsquo;\u00e9tait en d\u00e9cembre 1988. La veille Gorbatchev venait d&rsquo;annoncer le retrait unilat\u00e9ral de 150.000 soldats de l&rsquo;Arm\u00e9e Rouge d&rsquo;Europe de l&rsquo;Est.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Karber dirige la Potomac Foundation, un organisme qui est semble-t-il assez myst\u00e9rieux d&rsquo;apr\u00e8s cette source (<em>AboveTopSecret<\/em>, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.abovetopsecret.com\/forum\/thread1008757\/pg1\">le 20 avril 2014<\/a>), mais dont il semble qu&rsquo;il re\u00e7oit, ou a re\u00e7u au moins une fois puisqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une d\u00e9claration de revenus de 2010, des fonds notamment de Boeing et de Soros. Mais on sait qu&rsquo;en cette occurrence, lorsque Soros, pour prendre ce cas, tient un r\u00e9cipiendaire de ses largesses, il ne l&rsquo;abandonne pas ais\u00e9ment, et pour les meilleures raisons du monde. On en tirera les conclusions qu&rsquo;on veut mais l&rsquo;on doit savoir que Karber a effectu\u00e9 plusieurs tourn\u00e9es en Ukraine du seul c\u00f4t\u00e9 du pouvoir de Kiev, dont une avec le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Wesley Clark (ancien SACEUR). Il a r\u00e9alis\u00e9, semble-t-il, un ou plusieurs rapports sur le comportement des forces russes lors de leurs multiples \u00ab\u00a0invasions\u00a0\u00bb de l&rsquo;Ukraine, et ces rapports constituent une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence centrale pour la modification doctrinale de l&rsquo;US Army devant la nouvelle puissance militaire russe. C&rsquo;est ce que dit le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral McMaster, chef du service de la doctrine de l&rsquo;US Army (TRADOC) qu&rsquo;on a <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/le-cri-dalarme-de-lus-army-la-defaite\">d\u00e9j\u00e0 rencontr\u00e9<\/a>. Dans ce texte de <em>Defense Talk<\/em> , repris par <em>Russia Insider<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/russia-insider.com\/en\/how-pentagon-preparing-tank-war-russia\/ri14464\">le 21 mai<\/a>, on lit la description de la puissance russe par McMaster et Karber, <strong>telle qu&rsquo;elle s&rsquo;est d\u00e9ploy\u00e9e en Ukraine (<em>sic<\/em>, sans aucun doute)<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>These days, the charismatic commander of the U.S. Army&rsquo;s Training and Doctrine Command is knee-deep in a project called <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.politico.com\/magazine\/story\/2016\/04\/moscow-pentagon-us-secret-study-213811?o=1\"><em>The Russia New Generation Warfare<\/em><\/a><em> study, an analysis of how Russia is re-inventing land warfare in the mud of Eastern Ukraine. Speaking recently at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., McMaster said that the two-year-old conflict had revealed that the Russians have superior artillery firepower, better combat vehicles, and have learned sophisticated use of UAVs for tactical effect. Should U.S. forces find themselves in a  land war with Russia, he said, they would be in for a rude, cold awakening<\/em>. [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>While the full report has not been made public, \u00ab\u00a0a lot of this is available open source\u00a0\u00bb said McMaster, \u00ab\u00a0in the work that Phil Karber has done, for example.\u00a0\u00bb Karber, the president of the <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.thepotomacfoundation.org\/\"><em>Potomac Foundation<\/em><\/a><em>, went on a fact-finding mission to Ukraine last year, and returned with the conclusion that the United States had long overemphasized precision artillery on the battlefield at the expense of mass fires. Since the 1980s, he said last October, at an Association for the United States Army event, the U.S. has given up its qualitative edge, mostly by getting <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/fas.org\/man\/dod-101\/sys\/land\/fascam.htm\"><em>rid of cluster munitions.<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Munitions have advanced incredibly since then. One of the most terrifying weapons that the Russians are using on the battlefield are thermobaric warheads, weapons that are composed almost entirely of fuel and burn longer and with more intensity than other types of munitions. \u00ab\u00a0In a 3-minute period&hellip;a Russian fire strike wiped out two mechanized battalions [with] a combination of top-attack munitions and thermobaric warheads,\u00a0\u00bb said Karber. \u00ab\u00a0If you have not experienced or seen the effects of thermobaric warheads, start taking a hard look. They might soon be coming to a theater near you.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Karber also noted that Russian forces made heavy and integrated use of electronic warfare. It&rsquo;s used to identify fire sources and command posts and to shut down voice and data communications. In the northern section, he said, \u00ab\u00a0every single tactical radio [the Ukrainian forces] had was taken out by heavy Russian sector-wide EW.\u00a0\u00bb Other EW efforts had taken down Ukrainian quadcopters. Another system was being used to mess with the electrical fuses on Ukrainian artillery shells, \u00ab\u00a0so when they hit, they&rsquo;re duds,\u00a0\u00bb he said.<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>The problems aren&rsquo;t just with rockets and shells, McMaster said. Even American combat vehicles have lost their edge. \u00ab\u00a0The Bradley<\/em> [<em>Fighting Vehicle<\/em>] <em>is great,\u00a0\u00bb he said, but \u00ab\u00a0what we see now is that our enemies have caught up to us. They&rsquo;ve invested in combat vehicles. They&rsquo;ve invested in advanced protective systems and active protective systems. We&rsquo;ve got to get back ahead on combat vehicle development.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>If the war in Eastern Ukraine were a real-world test, the Russian T-90 tank passed with flying colors. The tank had seen action in <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Invasion_of_Dagestan\"><em>Dagestan<\/em><\/a><em> and Syria, but has been particularly decisive in Ukraine. The Ukrainians, Karber said, \u00ab\u00a0have not been able to record one single kill on a T-90. They have the new French optics on them. The Russians actually designed them to take advantage of low light, foggy, winter conditions.\u00a0\u00bb What makes the T-90 so tough ? For starters, explosive reactive armor. When you fire a missile at the tank, its skin of metal plates and explosives reacts. The explosive charge clamps the plates together so the rocket can&rsquo;t pierce the hull<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>But that&rsquo;s only if the missile gets close enough. The latest thing in vehicle defense is active protection systems, or APS, which automatically spot incoming shells and target them with electronic jammers or just shoot them down. \u00ab\u00a0It might use electronics to &lsquo;confuse&rsquo; an incoming round, or it might use mass (outgoing bullets, rockets) to destroy the incoming round before it gets too close,\u00a0\u00bb Army director for basic research Jeff Singleton told Defense One in an email. The T-90&rsquo;s active protective system is the Shtora-1 countermeasures suite. \u00ab\u00a0I&rsquo;ve interviewed Ukrainian tank gunners,\u00a0\u00bb said Karber. \u00ab\u00a0They&rsquo;ll say &lsquo;I had my [anti-tank weapon] right on it, it got right up to it and then they had this miraculous shield. An invisible shield. Suddenly, my anti-tank missile just went up to the sky.'\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Tout cela fait diablement s\u00e9rieux et nos sarcasmes ont un petit peu l&rsquo;allure des r\u00e9actions poussives d&rsquo;un plaideur d\u00e9pit\u00e9, \u00e0 force d&rsquo;accueillir avec scepticisme les nombreuses descriptions d&rsquo;invasions successives de l&rsquo;Ukraine orientale par les Russes. Peut-on mettre en question la qualit\u00e9 d&rsquo;un expert tel que Karber, qui s&rsquo;y conna&icirc;t diablement en munitions et en chars, et ne refuse pas le soutien d\u00e9sint\u00e9ress\u00e9 de Soros ? Apr\u00e8s nous avoir instruit de toutes ces excellentes choses et avant d&rsquo;encha&icirc;ner sur le m\u00eame ton, donc au milieu de son texte qui semble d\u00e9crire l&rsquo;autorit\u00e9 imp\u00e9rative de Karber, <em>Defense Talk <\/em>nous pr\u00e9cise tout de m\u00eame que le dit-Karber est l&rsquo;homme qui, \u00e0 la fin de 2014, fournit \u00e0 la Commission des forces armes du S\u00e9nat des photos de chars en Ukraine, prouvant ainsi la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 des 39-et-plus invasions russes de l&rsquo;Ukraine&#8230; Et l&rsquo;on d\u00e9couvrit assez vite, sinon aussit\u00f4t, que ces photos repr\u00e9sentaient des vieux T-72  russes en G\u00e9orgie en 2008, et nullement des superbes tout nouveau-tout beau T-90 en Ukraine, et, bon d&rsquo;accord, Karber s&rsquo;en explique sans v\u00e9ritable embarras ni m\u00eame d\u00e9plaisir. (Nous parlions de cette ukraino-g\u00e9orgienne \u00e9pop\u00e9e <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/la-narrative-regne-en-despote\">en f\u00e9vrier 2015<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Karber&rsquo;s track record for accuracy is less than perfect, as writer Jeffrey Lewis has <\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2015\/02\/19\/say-it-aint-so-phil-ukraine-russia-open-source-analysis\/\"><em>pointed out<\/em><\/a><em> in Foreign Policy. At various points, he has inflated estimates of China&rsquo;s nuclear arsenal from some 300 weapons (based on declassified estimates) to 3,000 squirreled away in mysterious tunnels, a claim that many were able to quickly debunk. In 2014, he helped pass photos to Sen. James Inhofe of the Senate Armed Services Committee that purported to be recent images of Russian forces inside Ukraine. It turned out they were AP photographs from 2008. \u00ab\u00a0In the haste of running for the airport and trying to respond to a last-minute request with short time fuse,\u00a0\u00bb Karber said by way of explanation, \u00ab\u00a0I made the mistake of believing we were talking about the same photos &hellip; and it never occurred to me that the three photos of Russian armor were part of that package or being considered.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>L\u00e0-dessus, comme indiqu\u00e9 plus haut, <em>Defense Talk <\/em>continue son <em>talk-show<\/em> : &laquo; <em>All of these technologies could shape the future battlefield.<\/em>.. &raquo;, etc., etc., passant sur ce d\u00e9tails exotique et sans importance des photos G\u00e9orgie-2008\/Ukraine-2014. Faut-il s&rsquo;arr\u00eater \u00e0 ces d\u00e9tails ? Faut-il revenir \u00e0 l&rsquo;interrogation fondamentale ? (Invasion russe ou pas ?) TRADOC travaille-t-il sur des rapports et des documents amass\u00e9s apr\u00e8s interviews et longues discussions avec les  prestigieux officiels, t\u00e9moins, experts, etc., de \u00ab\u00a0Kiev-la-folle\u00a0\u00bb dont on conna&icirc;t le s\u00e9rieux et la probit\u00e9 quasi-l\u00e9gendaires ? Qu&rsquo;importent ces questions puisqu&rsquo;une autre \u00e9tude du m\u00eame <em>Defense Talk<\/em>, sur l&rsquo;\u00e9tat catastrophique des forces arm\u00e9es US (<a href=\"http:\/\/dailysignal.com\/2016\/05\/17\/6-facts-highlight-why-we-need-to-rebuild-our-military\/\">le 18 mai <\/a>: &laquo; <em>6 Facts Highlight Why We Need to Rebuild Our Military<\/em> &raquo;) conclut simplement : &laquo; <em>At the same time, threats are growing. <strong>Russia has invaded Ukraine<\/strong> and threatens more<\/em>&#8230; &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Ainsi la l\u00e9gende narrativiste entre-t-elle dans l&rsquo;histoire bureaucratique, la plus solide et la plus incontestable pour ces mati\u00e8res surtout lorsqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de la bureaucratie du CMI. Le d\u00e9terminisme-narrativiste r\u00e8gne sans partage <strong>et c&rsquo;est d\u00e9sormais un fait historique que la Russie a r\u00e9ellement envahi l&rsquo;Ukraine<\/strong> (l&rsquo;on ne prend m\u00eame plus la peine de distinguer le Donbass, ou <em>NovoRussia<\/em>, ou l&rsquo;Ukraine orientale, mais c&rsquo;est \u00ab\u00a0a envahi l&rsquo;Ukraine\u00a0\u00bb tout simplement). <strong>La m\u00e9moire historique a act\u00e9 le fait et rencontr\u00e9 par anticipation notre vertu principale qu&rsquo;on qualifie de \u00ab\u00a0m\u00e9morielle\u00a0\u00bb et dont la t\u00e2che est la destruction du pass\u00e9, qui rythme et alimente la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 du Syst\u00e8me&#8230;<\/strong> L\u00e0-dessus, passons \u00e0 autre chose.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>&#8230; C&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire, passons \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tude alarmante de la puissance russe renouvel\u00e9e ainsi d\u00e9montr\u00e9e par l&rsquo;affirmation op\u00e9rationnelle. Le sel de la situation, le paradoxe complet de cette \u00e9poque o&ugrave; la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 est pulv\u00e9ris\u00e9e et o&ugrave; r\u00e8gne un relativisme absolu, c&rsquo;est qu&rsquo;alors, en revenant \u00e0 ce sujet essentiel, nous revenons \u00e0 une v\u00e9rit\u00e9-de-situation en apportant une pierre \u00e0 l&rsquo;effondrement du Syst\u00e8me, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire en en \u00f4tant une de plus \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9difice en cours de dissolution. Le chemin est tortueux, celui du d\u00e9ni de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, qui nous m\u00e8ne \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9. Certes, on pourrait croire que ce n&rsquo;est pas le cas pour tous les domaines, &ndash; quoiqu&rsquo;il faudrait y voir de plus pr\u00e8s et l&rsquo;on aurait des surprises devant l&rsquo;exclusivit\u00e9 du proc\u00e9d\u00e9 et de ses r\u00e9sultats, &ndash; mais l&rsquo;on conviendra ici que c&rsquo;est un domaine essentiel. On ajoutera que la conclusion de tous ces historiens-bureaucrates charg\u00e9s de pr\u00e9parer la restauration de la puissance US n&rsquo;ont en v\u00e9rit\u00e9, &ndash; le mot a sa place, &ndash; d&rsquo;autres arguments que d&rsquo;envisager plus de programmes, plus de quincaillerie (plus de JSF, si vous voulez), plus d&rsquo;argent, comme ils l&rsquo;ont fait dix fois avant pour aboutir au catastrophique \u00e9tat des choses aujourd&rsquo;hui. <strong>Il n&rsquo;y a donc aucune raison pour qu&rsquo;ils ne d\u00e9veloppent, une fois de plus et d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on encore plus catastrophique puisque la surpuissance r\u00e8gne et qu&rsquo;elle nourrit l&rsquo;autodestruction, l&rsquo;\u00e9volution  vers un \u00e9tat des choses encore plus catastrophique. Ainsi avons-nous d\u00e9taill\u00e9, avec minutie et sans n\u00e9gliger l&rsquo;apport de la psychologie et de l&rsquo;<em>hybris<\/em> du <em>sapiens<\/em>, un \u00e9pisode significatif parce qu&rsquo;exemplaire de l&rsquo;effondrement du Syst\u00e8me<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 22 mai 2016 \u00e0 05H42<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;invasion de l&rsquo;Ukraine est un fait historique, point final On se rappelle certainement comment nous suiv&icirc;mes tous, haletants, l&rsquo;extraordinaire \u00ab\u00a0bataille de communication\u00a0\u00bb en Ukraine, disons du printemps 2014 (un mois et demi apr\u00e8s le \u00ab\u00a0coup de Kiev\u00a0\u00bb) au d\u00e9but 2015 (accord Minsk2). Il y avait eu l&rsquo;attaque du Donbass anti-Kiev par l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e ukrainienne puis l&rsquo;esp\u00e8ce&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3917,3168,2862,17512,17299,6751,11883,13216,12918,11623,17511,2779,2884,4163,17192,16608],"class_list":["post-76579","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chars","tag-clark","tag-determinisme-narrativiste","tag-fait","tag-fondation","tag-historique","tag-karber","tag-kiev-la-folle","tag-mcmaster","tag-phil","tag-potomac","tag-puissance","tag-russe","tag-soros","tag-t-90","tag-tradoc"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76579","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76579"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76579\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76579"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76579"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76579"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}