{"id":76713,"date":"2016-08-09T11:54:19","date_gmt":"2016-08-09T11:54:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/08\/09\/turquie-russie-un-scenario\/"},"modified":"2016-08-09T11:54:19","modified_gmt":"2016-08-09T11:54:19","slug":"turquie-russie-un-scenario","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/08\/09\/turquie-russie-un-scenario\/","title":{"rendered":"Turquie-Russie\u00a0: un sc\u00e9nario"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_a.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:2em\">Turquie-Russie : un sc\u00e9nario<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Parall\u00e8lement \u00e0 la rencontre Poutine-Erdogan de Saint-Petersbourg, le site <em>Katehon.com<\/em> (tendance eurasisme, domin\u00e9 par la personnalit\u00e9 et l&rsquo;influence d&rsquo;Alexandre Douguine) publie un article, <a href=\"http:\/\/katehon.com\/article\/how-could-turkeys-rapprochement-russia-materialize\">ce 9 ao&ucirc;t<\/a>, du Roumain Valentin Vasilescu, sur un \u00ab\u00a0sc\u00e9nario\u00a0\u00bb du rapprochement Russie-Turquie. L&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat de ce texte, qui fait partie de ce que nous nommions dans notre <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/veillee-darmes\">F&#038;C d&rsquo;hier<\/a><\/em> \u00ab\u00a0la possibilit\u00e9 de pr\u00e9vision\u00a0\u00bb, se trouve dans les aspects techniques d&rsquo;un tel rapprochement (aussi bien que dans certains d\u00e9tails in\u00e9dits, \u00e9galement techniques sur le putsch avort\u00e9 de Turquie).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>(<a href=\"https:\/\/fr.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Valentin_Vasilescu\">Vasilescu<\/a> fait partie du parti souverainiste roumain <a href=\"https:\/\/fr.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Parti_de_la_Grande_Roumanie\">PGR<\/a> [Parti de la Grande Roumanie], parti devnu de tr\u00e8s faible audience en Roumanie mais aux tendances tr\u00e8s marqu\u00e9es accompagn\u00e9es des soup\u00e7ons et anath\u00e8mes habituels : souverainiste \u00e9ffectivement, d\u00e9fenseur de valeurs traditionnelles qui le rapprochent n\u00e9cessairement de Douguine et de la politique dominante en Russie. [Un texte de pr\u00e9sentation d&rsquo;un des th\u00e8mes th\u00e9oriques expos\u00e9s par Douguine sur <em>Katehon.com<\/em>, \u00ab\u00a0La quatri\u00e8me th\u00e9orie politique\u00a0\u00bb, commence par <a href=\"http:\/\/4pt.su\/en\">une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence explicite<\/a> \u00e0 <a href=\"https:\/\/fr.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ren%C3%A9_Gu%C3%A9non\">Ren\u00e9<\/a> <a href=\"http:\/\/www.rene-guenon.org\">Gu\u00e9non<\/a>.] On retrouve les textes de Vasilescu dans cette fili\u00e8re antiSyst\u00e8me internationale, notamment en France sur le site <em>Voltaire.net<\/em>. L&rsquo;aspect technique que nous soulignons plus haut est substantiv\u00e9 par le fait que Vasilescu, outre d&rsquo;\u00eatre un homme politique, a \u00e9t\u00e9 un officier de l&rsquo;Arm\u00e9e de l&rsquo;Air roumaine, qu&rsquo;il a \u00e9t\u00e9 pilote de MiG-21, et qu&rsquo;il doit par cons\u00e9quent avoir gard\u00e9 des contacts avec ce monde, notamment avec le monde de l&rsquo;aviation militaire russe avec laquelle il \u00e9tait n\u00e9cessairement en contact. [N\u00e9 en 1961, Vasilescu a effectivement fait une partie de son temps comme pilote alors que la Roumanie \u00e9tait encore dans le Pacte de Varsovie et que l&rsquo;URSS existait encore.] On peut faire l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se que ces liens ont perdur\u00e9 et facilitent pour Vasilescu un acc\u00e8s int\u00e9ressant au monde militaire russe, ce qui donne effectivement du poids aux informations techniques charpentant son texte.)  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Sur le putsch avort\u00e9, Vasilescu donne donc des indications techniques tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressantes, notamment une intervention ext\u00e9rieur (\u00ab\u00a0<em>Who else ?<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0, pour ceux qui ont une hypoth\u00e8se \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit) de brouillage des satellites turcs de commandement et de contr\u00f4le. Ce type de pr\u00e9cision implique que le putsch avort\u00e9 prend de plus en plus l&rsquo;allure d&rsquo;une agression ext\u00e9rieure contre la Turquie, venue de son grand alli\u00e9 de l&rsquo;OTAN. Il s&rsquo;en d\u00e9duit, &ndash; et c&rsquo;est une pr\u00e9cision qui doit \u00eatre mise en \u00e9vidence, notamment pour appuyer notre texte r\u00e9f\u00e9renc\u00e9, &ndash; que le rapprochement de la Russie effectu\u00e9 par la Turquie est d&rsquo;abord le r\u00e9sultat d&rsquo;une n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 vitale pour Erdogan (&laquo; &#8230;<em>Erdogan <strong>was forced<\/strong> toward a rapprochement with Russia<\/em> &raquo;).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Vasilescu indique nettement qu&rsquo;\u00e0 son appr\u00e9ciation, Erdogan semble juger qu&rsquo;il doit sa propre s\u00e9curit\u00e9 (notamment la pr\u00e9vention d&rsquo;un second putsch) au soutien technique sans r\u00e9serve (renseignement, \u00e9coutes, etc.) du puissant et tr\u00e8s efficace syst\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de renseignement et d&rsquo;\u00e9coute de la Russie dans toute cette zone. Il est manifeste qu&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui, les USA <strong>sont per\u00e7us comme une colossale entreprise de \u00ab\u00a0crime organis\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb, agissant hors de toute contrainte l\u00e9gale et actant en liquidateur quand il le faut<\/strong>, exactement \u00e0 l&rsquo;image du \u00ab\u00a0crime organis\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb classique qui prolif\u00e9ra et continue \u00e0 exister avec tant d&rsquo;exub\u00e9rance sur leur propre territoire. (On pr\u00e9cisera pourtant qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit du \u00ab\u00a0crime organis\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb lorsqu&rsquo;il est devenu fou, pour expliciter l&rsquo;erratisme d\u00e9ment des buts [?] poursuivis par les USA.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong>Nous ne sommes plus au niveau des choix, \u00e9ventuellement des caprices et des lubies de tel ou tel dirigeant (Erdogan dans ce cas), mais au niveau des n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s vitales effectivement<\/strong> (cela \u00e0 prendre au pied de la lettre, m\u00eame personnellement pour un chef d&rsquo;&Eacute;tat ou de gouvernement lorsqu&rsquo;on a \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit <strong>le sort d&rsquo;un Saddam Hussein ou d&rsquo;un Kadhafi<\/strong>) ; et ces \u00ab\u00a0n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s vitales\u00a0\u00bb prenant une allure d&rsquo;une importance colossale si l&rsquo;on y ajoute les sc\u00e9narios possibles de l&rsquo;apr\u00e8s-8 novembre\/USA-2016 comme <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/veillee-darmes\">on l&rsquo;a vu hier<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Les autres indications de Vasilescu portent sur les mesures prises imm\u00e9diatement par les Russes pour un rapprochement de la Turquie, indiquant que la Russie joue \u00e0 fond la carte turque, toujours, selon nous, dans la perspective des possibles intentions US de la nouvelle administration \u00e0 venir. Vasilescu envisage \u00e9galement ce que la Russie pourrait demander en \u00e9change \u00e0 la Turquie, cela se r\u00e9sumant au respect de la r\u00e9solution 2254 de l&rsquo;ONU, ce qui conduirait la Turquie \u00e0 abandonner la \u00ab\u00a0coalition\u00a0\u00bb dite anti-terroriste organis\u00e9e par les USA, et \u00e0 r\u00e9tablir des relations avec la Syrie selon l&rsquo;accord d&rsquo;Adena de 1998 autorisant des frappes turques anti-terroristes dans l&rsquo;espace a\u00e9rien syrien jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 50 kilom\u00e8tres de profondeur. Plus encore, les Russes proposeraient aux Turcs des op\u00e9rations a\u00e9riennes conjointes, ce qui donnerait le spectacle int\u00e9ressant de voir des F-16 voler en coordination avec Su-24 plut\u00f4t que chercher \u00e0 les abattre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>S&rsquo;il ne s&rsquo;agit que d&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8ses, elles sont assez pr\u00e9cises et explicites pour faire appr\u00e9cier ce qui pourrait \u00eatre un alignement de la Turquie sur la Russie, toujours en raison des \u00e9v\u00e9nements ext\u00e9rieurs pressants qu&rsquo;on envisage avec l&rsquo;\u00e9volution des USA. Il n&rsquo;est pas du tout assur\u00e9 que de telles perspectives apparaissent publiquement en marge ou en conclusion de la rencontre Erdogan-Poutine d&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui, l&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat des deux partenaires, et certainement l&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat de Poutine, \u00e9tant d&rsquo;\u00e9viter toute attitude inutilement provocante vis-\u00e0-vis de l&rsquo;OTAN et des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il n&#8217;emp\u00eache&#8230; Si Vasilescu pr\u00e9cise que le retrait de la Turquie de l&rsquo;OTAN n&rsquo;est pas envisag\u00e9 <strong>pour l&rsquo;instant<\/strong> (&laquo; <em>This does not mean that Turkey will immediately exit from NATO<\/em>&#8230; &raquo;), la sorte de changements qu&rsquo;il sugg\u00e8re dans le rapprochement entre la Turquie et la Russie provoquera tr\u00e8s-probablement <strong>une crise majeure au sein de l&rsquo;OTAN, et particuli\u00e8rement dans le climat absolument volatile et incontr\u00f4lable qu&rsquo;on conna&icirc;t aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/strong>. Cette organisation ne pourrait accepter, comme les USA l&rsquo;ont souvent montr\u00e9, qu&rsquo;un de ses membres entretiennent de tels liens techniques avec la Russie ; de m\u00eame pour une autre hypoth\u00e8se \u00e9mise par Vasilescu, \u00e0 savoir que les bases US\/OTAN d&rsquo;Incirlink et autres soient interdites de vol sp\u00e9cifiquement au sein de la coalition (&laquo; <em>Specifically, Turkey will inform the United States of cancellation of the authorization to use Incirlik air base as the main operating base of the American anti-ISIS coalition, being able to be used by US for other purposes. The same notification will be sent to Germany<\/em> &raquo;)&#8230; Tout cela, bien entendu, sans parler de l&rsquo;ambiance au sein d&rsquo;une alliance lorsqu&rsquo;un de ses membres estime avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00ab\u00a0agress\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb par un autre de ses membres.  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Puisqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de \u00ab\u00a0possibilit\u00e9 de pr\u00e9vision\u00a0\u00bb, on ne peut tenir \u00e9videmment pour du comptant les d\u00e9tails que donne Vasilescu. Mais on doit les appr\u00e9cier, notamment dans l&rsquo;esprit qu&rsquo;ils sugg\u00e8rent, comme tr\u00e8s significatifs, notamment \u00e0 cause de leurs pr\u00e9cisions, de leur coh\u00e9rence, etc., et toujours bien s&ucirc;r en tenant compte du climat actuel et des suite du putsch avort\u00e9 dont il se confirme qu&rsquo;il pourrait tout aussi bien \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9, dans le m\u00eame esprit de la chose, comme une agression US. (Le silence de l&rsquo;OTAN lors du putsch tient-il \u00e0 la difficult\u00e9 pour cette vaste et brillante bureaucratie de d\u00e9terminer dans quel sens l&rsquo;Article 5, dont il est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral fait si grand cas, \u00e9tait applicable dans cette circonstance ? A l&rsquo;avantage de la Turquie ou \u00e0 l&rsquo;avantage des USA ?) Quoi qu&rsquo;il en soit de la justesse de ses pr\u00e9visions, <strong>l&rsquo;article de Vasulescu est un reflet tr\u00e8s acceptable du climat et de la situation de tension crisique extr\u00eame qui r\u00e8gne, non seulement dans la r\u00e9gion mais dans les relations internationales en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Voici l&rsquo;article de Valentin Vasilescu, sur <em>Karehon.com<\/em> de <a href=\"http:\/\/katehon.com\/article\/how-could-turkeys-rapprochement-russia-materialize\">ce 9 ao&ucirc;t<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4>___________________<\/h4>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">How could Turkey&rsquo;s rapprochement with Russia materialize?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Russia&rsquo;s decision to intervene with in Syria, including with tactical air support, to the legally elected government of Bashar al-Assad, is based on fighting an external invasion posed by Islamist rebels which have been selected, armed, trained and infiltrated into Syria from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the US, England, France and Turkey. The strategic goal of Russia was more far reaching, lying in restricting US domination in the Middle East and forwarding the massive return of Russia in this region, after an absence of 30 years.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The method chosen by Russia proved extremely effective, since Russian aerial bombardments have created breaches in the lines of Islamist rebels, which immediately were developed by the Syrian army land troops, releasing over 50% of the territory occupied by the rebels.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>On the other hand, the US has failed in terms of creating an army of opponents to fight against the army of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. And the change of US strategy in January 2016, when aerial bombing commenced, began to be made in favor of land-based Kurdish forces in Syria, led by groups of US special forces, marked a turning point in US relations with Turkey. Turkey is enemy no. 1 for the Kurds. The attempted military coup should be regarded only as an attempt to oust from power President Recep Erdogan, who does not agree with the creation by Americans of a Kurdish state encompassing 45% of the current territory of Turkey.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h3 class=\"subtitleset_c.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:1.25em\">What would be the consequences of the coup?<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>It becomes increasingly clear that the US has dramatically blundered in relation to Turkey, and to avoid repeating the events of July 15, 2016, Erdogan was forced toward a rapprochement with Russia. This does not mean that Turkey will immediately exit from NATO, but that Erdogan will benefit from the information offered by the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR) and the military intelligence GRU, to annihilate any attempted coup planned by the US and its allies. During the military coup in Turkey, a Turkish satellite center was hit by attack pro-coup helicopters, simultaneously a major world power jammed Turkish satellites. Turkish sources say that Russia would immediately  offer to Erdogan, unlimited access to its network of military satellites to be able to command troops, while remaining faithful to exchange information within the MIT (Turkish intelligence service).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>As a confirmation of this hypothesis, Russia has decided to resume construction of four nuclear reactors of 1,200 megawatts in the province of Mersin on the Mediterranean coast, and the Turkish Stream pipeline, under the Black Sea. Russia will allow resumption of imports Turkey, which amounted to 30 billion annually, halted due to downing of Su-24 bomber on November 24th, 2015, in Syria.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h3 class=\"subtitleset_c.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:1.25em\">What could Russia ask for in return from Turkey?<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Firstly, Foreign Minister of Turkey Mevlut Cavusoglu can summon Syrian Aleppo region rebel groups to cease fighting (if Russia and Damascus give them &#8211; especially to Turkoman militia &#8211; specific guarantees &#8211; Katehon). It confirms the alignment of Turkey&rsquo;s policy to comply with the UN resolution 2254, that the legitimate government of Syria, represented by Bashar al-Assad, remain in power. If this plan succeeds it means that most likely Turkey will secure the whole borders with Syria and give up supporting the opponents of Bashar Al Assad, and will not allow the flow of recruits, weapons and ammunition to Islamic terrorist groups supported by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, USA, United Kingdom and France.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>As a consequence of compliance with UN Resolution 2254 by Turkey, this country may leave the US anti-Islamic State coalition, which means the removal of any unauthorized flight in the Syrian airspace from the Turkish air bases. Specifically, Turkey will inform the United States of cancellation of the authorization to use Incirlik air base as the main operating base of the American anti-ISIS coalition, being able to be used by US for other purposes. The same notification will be sent to Germany. Incirlik is just 180 km from Manbij, surrounded by a Kurdish city and 400 kilometers of Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State jihadist group. In order to bomb Islamic State targets in Syria and Iraq, the US, Germany and Saudi Arabia will have to move their bombers elsewhere if participating in the anti-Islamic State coalition.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The most convenient base for this coalition seems to be Al Azraq in Jordan, the headquarters of two squadrons of Jordanian F-16&rsquo;s, where 20 F-16&rsquo;s are also deployed from Bahrain and 8 F-16&rsquo;s of the Netherlands and Belgium, French Mirage 2000 jets, and  R-9 MQ unmanned planes\/drones of the Americans. The dislocation of planes at Al Azraq, and bringing in ground equipment maintenance would take several months, during which the coalition will execute fewer missions. Al Azraq is over 700-800 km from Islamic State targets in Syria and Iraq and coalition airplanes hitting the Islamic State will need to be fueled in the air.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Also as a result of compliance with UN Resolution 2254 by Turkey, the Pentagon could not, via land, supply the Kurds of weapons, ammunition, and instructors from US special operations forces through Turkey. Rmeilane American base in the Syrian province of Hassake in Kurdish-controlled area, where the Pentagon receives reinforcements, can remain isolated.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The third step, which Putin might agree with Erdogan, would be hiring a part of the fleet of 196  Turkish F-16C, to act alongside with Russian bombers in Syria. For the beginning, joint missions could be run from the Russian command center in Latakia, Syria. Turkish aviation would receive additional missions to bomb Islamic State targets, allowing the Syrian army to move forward from Palmyra until Raqqa, liberating central, eastern and north-eastern Syria.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Simultaneously with this, Bashar al-Assad will be persuaded by Russians to resume cooperation with Turkey in terms of the Treaty of Adana on 20 October 1998. This treaty allowed Turkey to pursue air strikes or capturing Kurds terrorists on a depth of 50 km inside Syria. Frequently, after committing attacks in Turkey, Kurdish terrorists refuge in northern Syria. Subsequently, air strikes of Turkish aviation would neutralize the force of combat groups of Arab-Kurdish YPG \/ SDF that is considered a rebel group by Bashar Al Assad, although it is supported by special forces of the four Western countries (USA, UK, France and Germany). Aviation and an anti ISIS coalition led by Americans would be required to give notice or to coordinate missions with the Russians and Turks.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4>Valentin Vasilescu<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Turquie-Russie : un sc\u00e9nario Parall\u00e8lement \u00e0 la rencontre Poutine-Erdogan de Saint-Petersbourg, le site Katehon.com (tendance eurasisme, domin\u00e9 par la personnalit\u00e9 et l&rsquo;influence d&rsquo;Alexandre Douguine) publie un article, ce 9 ao&ucirc;t, du Roumain Valentin Vasilescu, sur un \u00ab\u00a0sc\u00e9nario\u00a0\u00bb du rapprochement Russie-Turquie. L&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat de ce texte, qui fait partie de ce que nous nommions dans notre F&#038;C&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[17631,2792,9772,584,4090,2859,17675,17676],"class_list":["post-76713","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-avorte","tag-douguine","tag-guenon","tag-otan","tag-putsch","tag-saint-petersbourg","tag-valentin","tag-vasilescu"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76713","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76713"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76713\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76713"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76713"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76713"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}