{"id":76724,"date":"2016-08-16T09:35:16","date_gmt":"2016-08-16T09:35:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/08\/16\/le-noeud-strategique-est-noue\/"},"modified":"2016-08-16T09:35:16","modified_gmt":"2016-08-16T09:35:16","slug":"le-noeud-strategique-est-noue","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/08\/16\/le-noeud-strategique-est-noue\/","title":{"rendered":"Le \u201cn\u0153ud strat\u00e9gique\u201d est nou\u00e9"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_a.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d;font-size:2em;\">Le \u00ab\u00a0n&oelig;ud strat\u00e9gique\u00a0\u00bb est nou\u00e9<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>La Russie a ratifi\u00e9 la semaine derni\u00e8re l&rsquo;accord sur la base de Khmeimim n\u00e9goci\u00e9 avec la Syrie en 2015. Cette base devient ainsi une base russe permanente sur le territoire syrien, dans les normes l\u00e9gales n\u00e9goci\u00e9 avec le gouvernement l\u00e9gal de la Syrie. Alexander Mercouris analyse cette nouvelle situation dans un article <a href=\"http:\/\/theduran.com\/transforming-balance-power-eastern-mediterranean-russia-makes-syrian-base-permanent\/\">du 15 ao&ucirc;t<\/a> sur le site <em>The Duran.com<\/em>. Mercouris traite principalement de l&rsquo;attitude des Russes, leurs h\u00e9sitations devant un accord qui les engage de fa\u00e7on permanente en Syrie, puis il d\u00e9taille les capacit\u00e9s de cette base qui en fond un point strat\u00e9gique d&rsquo;une extr\u00eame puissance (un \u00ab\u00a0n&oelig;ud strat\u00e9gique\u00a0\u00bb, comme nous l&rsquo;avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 nomm\u00e9 et le rappelons plus bas) ; en termes de puissance et d&rsquo;importance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, Khmeimim est sans comparaison avec Tartus, le port syrien dont l&rsquo;acc\u00e8s est autoris\u00e9e en permanence \u00e0 la flotte russe mais qui constitue plut\u00f4t un point de relais et de soutien, et nullement une entit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique en soi. L&rsquo;id\u00e9e principale de Mercouris est qu&rsquo;en signant cette pr\u00e9sence permanente et puissante dans la zone moyenne-orientale et de la M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e, la Russie bouleverse l&rsquo;\u00e9quilibre strat\u00e9gique en M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e ; l&rsquo;h\u00e9g\u00e9monie sur cet espace naval \u00e9tait jusqu&rsquo;ici conc\u00e9d\u00e9 aux USA et au bloc-BAO (VI\u00e8me Flotte US, flotte fran\u00e7aise et britannique) ; il est d\u00e9sormais gravement mis en cause.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>(Le site isra\u00e9lien <em>DEBKAFiles<\/em> signalait <a href=\"http:\/\/www.debka.com\/article\/25525\/Russia-revamps-air-force-array-in-Syria-Mid-East\">en juin dernier<\/a> un renforcement important des forces arm\u00e9es russes. Il annon\u00e7ait notamment l&rsquo;arriv\u00e9e prochaine pour un s\u00e9jour temporaire dans la base navale de Tartus du seul porte-avions russe, le <em>Amiral Kouznetzov<\/em> cet automne [<a href=\"http:\/\/www.thedailybeast.com\/articles\/2016\/07\/07\/russia-s-biggest-warship-steams-to-syria.html\">d\u00e9placement confirm\u00e9<\/a>]. A cette \u00e9poque, l&rsquo;US Navy devrait avoir retir\u00e9 son seul porte-avions en M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e pour une p\u00e9riode d&rsquo;entretien, ce qui r\u00e9duirait singuli\u00e8rement la perception symbolique de l&rsquo;h\u00e9g\u00e9monie US dans la zone, m\u00eame si les diverses capacit\u00e9s des mat\u00e9riels impliqu\u00e9s sont tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rentes et sujettes \u00e0 des \u00e9valuations. Ce symbolisme rejoint par ailleurs une <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/glossairedde-verite-de-situation-verite\">v\u00e9rit\u00e9-de-situation<\/a> mise en \u00e9vidence durant l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2015, avec la pr\u00e9sence US dans la r\u00e9gion moyenne-occidental en cours de d\u00e9structuration sinon de dissolution, et plong\u00e9e dans l&rsquo;atonie ou le d\u00e9sordre d&rsquo;une politique incoh\u00e9rente par parcellisation des divers \u00ab\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/su-24-etat-parallele\">Etats parall\u00e8les<\/a>\u00a0\u00bb r\u00e9gnant aux USA. Au contraire, l&rsquo;intervention russe en Syrie d\u00e9montre une dynamique en pleine action, et une dynamique extr\u00eamement mesur\u00e9e et structur\u00e9e comme le confirme justement la ratification de l&rsquo;accord sur Khmeimim.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Pour notre compte, c&rsquo;est effectivement comme <strong>un \u00ab\u00a0n&oelig;ud strat\u00e9gique\u00a0\u00bb que nous consid\u00e9rons la base russe de <\/strong><strong>Khmeimim<\/strong>, dans un ensemble que nous d\u00e9crivions de la sorte <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/notes-sur-lhypothese-iskander-1\">le 17 avril dernier<\/a>, apr\u00e8s avoir signal\u00e9 l&rsquo;annonce par <em>DEBKAFiles<\/em> de l&rsquo;arriv\u00e9e de missiles <em>Iskander<\/em> \u00e0 Khmeimim, ainsi que la pr\u00e9sence de syst\u00e8mes sol-air S-400 que signale \u00e9galement Mercouris. (La venue de missiles <em>Iskander<\/em> n&rsquo;est pas confirm\u00e9e mais cela ne signifie pas grand&rsquo;chose du point de vue de la situation. Au contraire, un tel d\u00e9ploiement, m\u00eame si dans la plus grande discr\u00e9tion possible, aurait tout son sens dans les conditions actuelles, y compris avec des t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires  dont peuvent \u00eatre \u00e9quip\u00e9s les <em>Iskander<\/em>. <strong>Khmeimim deviendrait alors un pendant de la base US\/OTAN d&rsquo;Incirlink, devenue c\u00e9l\u00e8bre pour le r\u00f4le central de coordination qu&rsquo;elle aurait jou\u00e9 durant le putsch-avort\u00e9 du 15 juillet en Turquie et o&ugrave; l&rsquo;on trouve une centaine de bombe nucl\u00e9aires B-61<\/strong>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Le site DEBKAFile, qui donne cette information <\/em>[sur la pr\u00e9sence de missiles <em>Iskander<\/em>]<em>, ajoutait : \u00ab\u00a0Le 15 mars, Moscou a annonc\u00e9 que les formidables missiles sol-air S-400 resteront en Syrie apr\u00e8s le retrait. Dix jours plus tard, le 25 mars, les syst\u00e8mes Iskander M sont en place. Le Iskander-M est consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme le meilleur missile balistique de courte port\u00e9e au monde. Cette combinaison, selon les sources militaires de Debkafile, fait de la base de Khmeimim le foyer des missiles les plus sophistiqu\u00e9s de tout le Moyen-Orient.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> [&#8230;]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Effectivement, Khmeimim est en train de devenir une base strat\u00e9gique d&rsquo;une puissance fondamentale en Syrie, dans un ensemble connect\u00e9 \u00e0 la base de Tartus, avec divers autres points de d\u00e9ploiement. Aux syst\u00e8mes cit\u00e9s par DEBKAFile s&rsquo;ajoutent des syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense antia\u00e9riennes rapproch\u00e9e Pansir-1, des ensembles de contr\u00f4le et de ma&icirc;trise \u00e9lectronique de l&rsquo;espace a\u00e9rien couvrant un cercle d&rsquo;un rayon de plusieurs centaines de kilom\u00e8tres, ainsi qu&rsquo;un reliquat d&rsquo;a\u00e9ronefs de combat (apr\u00e8s le \u00ab\u00a0retrait\u00a0\u00bb annonc\u00e9 il y a quelques semaines) qui s&rsquo;av\u00e8re \u00eatre un contingent solide fait d&rsquo;avions de sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 a\u00e9rienne et d&rsquo;h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res de combat, dont certains d&rsquo;un nouveau type (Mil-28N et Ka-52) qui n&rsquo;ont \u00e9t\u00e9 que tr\u00e8s r\u00e9cemment d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s (en f\u00e9vrier ou en mars). L&rsquo;ensemble assure la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne de la base, la sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 a\u00e9rienne du domaine ainsi que les missions n\u00e9cessaire d&rsquo;attaque au sol, tout cela venant compl\u00e9ter le dispositif tactique\/strat\u00e9gique de contr\u00f4le offensif et d&rsquo;interdiction de l&rsquo;espace a\u00e9rien. Un renforcement tr\u00e8s rapide des syst\u00e8me dans tous les champs envisag\u00e9s peut \u00eatre assur\u00e9 en quelques heures&#8230; &raquo;<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Ainsi trouve-t-on, dans cette base, toute la graduation des champs d&rsquo;action, du tactique rapproch\u00e9 aux limites du strat\u00e9giques, du champ offensif au champ d\u00e9fensif, du contr\u00f4le \u00e9lectronique avanc\u00e9, passif et actif, de l&rsquo;armement conventionnel jusqu&rsquo;au nucl\u00e9aire si n\u00e9cessaire. Khmeimim contr\u00f4le jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 la quasi-ma&icirc;trise l&rsquo;enti\u00e8ret\u00e9 de l&rsquo;espace a\u00e9rien syrien, plus les pays adjacents, compl\u00e8tement (Isra\u00ebl, Jordanie) ou en partie (Turquie), avec une \u00e9quivalence navale sur la M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e orientale. En fait, la base constitue un \u00ab\u00a0n&oelig;ud strat\u00e9gique\u00a0\u00bb qui tend \u00e0 contr\u00f4ler une portion importante de la r\u00e9gion (le Moyen-Orient) avec possibilit\u00e9 tr\u00e8s rapide d&rsquo;expansion des capacit\u00e9s selon les n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s<\/em>. &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Ainsi placions-nous la base de Khmeimim dans un ensemble de \u00ab\u00a0n&oelig;uds strat\u00e9giques\u00a0\u00bb en arc Sud-Nord, allant jusqu&rsquo;au \u00ab\u00a0n&oelig;ud\u00a0\u00bb \u00e9quivalent en capacit\u00e9s et en puissance strat\u00e9gique de Kaliningrad, donnant \u00e0 la Russie une tr\u00e8s grande ampleur et l&rsquo;infrastructure d&rsquo;une profondeur strat\u00e9giques, avec une couverture d\u00e9fensive-offensive d&rsquo;une exceptionnelle capacit\u00e9 et d&rsquo;une remarquable int\u00e9gration g\u00e9ographique. <strong>C&rsquo;est encore dans ce cadre que nous consid\u00e9rerions cette ratification de l&rsquo;accord syro-russe par la Russie, et bien plus encore en fonction d&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e9nements r\u00e9cents, qui devraient avoir jou\u00e9 leur r\u00f4le dans la concr\u00e9tisation de la d\u00e9cision russe<\/strong>. Le plus \u00e9vident \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard nous semblent le putsch-avort\u00e9 de Turquie et le rapprochement avec la Turquie, lesquels donnent encore plus de sens strat\u00e9gique \u00e0 une pr\u00e9sence russe majeure en Syrie comme l&rsquo;est celle de Khmeimim) ; ne serait-ce aussi bien que pour des t\u00e2ches de surveillance \u00e9lectronique, de renseignement, etc., celles qui ont montr\u00e9 leur efficacit\u00e9 en permettant au gouvernement russe d&rsquo;intervenir pour sauver Erdogan avant et lors du putsch ; que pour des t\u00e2ches d&rsquo;action arm\u00e9e, pour toutes les r\u00e9gions de cette zone, mais dans ce cas particuli\u00e8rement par rapport \u00e0 la Turquie, aussi bien pour la coordination que pour la surveillance du \u00ab\u00a0partenaire\/pseudo-alli\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb turc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Bien plus et en \u00e9largissant le cadre d&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation, on comprend que cette d\u00e9cision russe signifie essentiellement \u00e0 l'\u00a0\u00bbautre parti\u00a0\u00bb, &ndash; quand il s&rsquo;en sera aper\u00e7u et s&rsquo;il parvient \u00e0 se choisir un pr\u00e9sident, certes, &ndash; <strong>que d&rsquo;une part la Russie n&rsquo;a absolument pas l&rsquo;intention de c\u00e9der sur l&rsquo;essentiel en Syrie, que d&rsquo;autre part la Russie continue effectivement \u00e0 parfaire son dispositif strat\u00e9gique<\/strong>, notamment au cas o&ugrave; la politique militariste US deviendrait vraiment trop aventureuse, notamment avec une pr\u00e9sidente Clinton. (On rappelle que <strong>c&rsquo;est aussi <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/veillee-darmes\">dans cet esprit<\/a><\/strong> que, selon nous, il faut voir l&rsquo;intervention russe pour sauver Erdogan face \u00e0 ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 sans nul doute une agression de l&rsquo;appareil-Syst\u00e8me des USA pour \u00e9tablir un complet contr\u00f4le de la Turquie, et qu&rsquo;il faut appr\u00e9hender l&rsquo;\u00e9volution des relations de la Russie avec la Turquie.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Dans tous les cas, l&rsquo;article de Mercouris nous rappelle, en citant longuement Poutine, avec quelle minutie et apr\u00e8s quelles h\u00e9sitations les Russes en sont venus \u00e0 s&rsquo;engager l\u00e9galement par un accord en bonne et due forme en Syrie. (Pour eux, cette l\u00e9galisation a une tr\u00e8s grande signification, contrairement aux pratiques US et du bloc-BAO. Elle a une signification politique profonde et un tr\u00e8s grand poids strat\u00e9gique.) <strong>Il s&rsquo;agit, compte tenu de toutes les donn\u00e9es que nous avons rappel\u00e9es, d&rsquo;une indication s\u00e9rieuse du caract\u00e8re d&rsquo;une r\u00e9elle gravit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, selon l&rsquo;analyse minutieuse qu&rsquo;en font les Russes<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Voici donc l&rsquo;article d&rsquo;Alexander Mercouris <a href=\"http:\/\/theduran.com\/transforming-balance-power-eastern-mediterranean-russia-makes-syrian-base-permanent\/\">du 15 ao&ucirc;t<\/a> sur le site <em>The Duran.com<\/em>. On prendra ses commentaires en ayant \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit que Mercouris n&rsquo;est pas un analyste prompt \u00e0 l&rsquo;hyperbole et \u00e0 l&#8217;emportement ; par cons\u00e9quent, ses appr\u00e9ciations et ses \u00e9valuations sont tr\u00e8s mesur\u00e9es et l&rsquo;\u00e9valuation qu&rsquo;il fait de l&rsquo;importance de la d\u00e9cision russe a d&rsquo;autant plus de poids.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>____________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d;font-size:1.65em;font-variant:small-caps;\">Russia just tipped the balance of power in the Mediterranean<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Though there has been remarkably little discussion of the subject in the Western media, Russia last week quietly acquired for the first time in its modern history a proper permanent base in the Mediterranean.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Following negotiations between the Syrian government and Russia an agreement dating to 2015 has now been ratified by Russia turning the Russian air base at Khmeimim in Syria into a permanent base.  In other words Russia will retain the base at Khmeimim beyond the conclusion of the Syrian conflict, and its presence there has just been made permanent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>That the Syrian government has wanted to grant the base to Russia on a permanent basis has been known for some time.  From the Syrian point of view the Russian base not only guarantees Russia&rsquo;s support for the present Syrian government but also provides Syria with a measure of protection it has never had before from Israeli air incursions.  These have been a continuous reality for decades with Syria lacking the capability to prevent them.  The Russians do have that capability and the Syrians will be hoping that because of the presence of the base they will now use it to protect Syria from Israeli air incursions.  As it happens reports suggest that the number of Israeli incursions of Syrian airspace have fallen off significantly since the Russian Aerospace Forces deployed to Syria last autumn, with the Israelis now careful to keep the Russians informed of their flights.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Whilst the Syrian government is known to have been keen to grant Russia a permanent base, the Russians have up to now been less sure.  Establishing a permanent foreign base in Syria is for the Russians a major departure from their former policy given the Russian military&rsquo;s overwhelming focus on defending Russian territory rather than projecting Russian military power far beyond Russia&rsquo;s borders.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Some Russian military officials are also believed to have questioned the military utility of a Syrian base, pointing out that the eastern Mediterranean where the base is located is well within the range of Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.  Importantly, judging from comments he made <a href=\"http:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/50971\">in December last year<\/a>, one of the leading skeptics was none other than Putin himself:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\u00ab\u00a0<em>about the base, opinions differ, you know. Some people in Europe and the US repeatedly said that our interests would be respected, and that our<\/em> [<em>military<\/em>] <em>base can remain there if we want it to. But I do not know if we need a base there. A military base implies considerable infrastructure and investment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>After all, what we have there today is our planes and temporary modules, which serve as a cafeteria and dormitories. We can pack up in a matter of two days, get everything aboard Antei transport planes and go home. Maintaining a base is different.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>Some believe, including in Russia, that we must have a base there. I am not so sure. Why? My European colleagues told me that I am probably nurturing such ideas. I asked why, and they said: so that you can control things there. Why would we want to control things there? This is a major question.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>We showed that we in fact did not have any medium-range missiles. We destroyed them all, because all we had were ground-based medium-range missiles. The Americans have destroyed their Pershing ground-based medium-range missiles as well. However, they have kept their sea- and aircraft-based Tomahawks. We did not have such missiles, but now we do &ndash; a 1,500-kilometre-range Kalibr sea-based missile and aircraft-carried Kh-101 missile with a 4,500-kilometre range.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>So why would we need a base there? Should we need to reach somebody, we can do so without a base.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><em>It might make sense, I am not sure. We still need to give it some thought. Perhaps we might need some kind of temporary site, but taking root there and getting ourselves heavily involved does not make sense, I believe. We will give it some thought.<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>These comments, whilst carefully leaving the option open, suggest a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the idea of a permanent base and an ongoing debate on the subject within the Russian leadership.  Presumably it was these doubts and this debate that held up ratification of the base agreement for so long.  It is clear that that debate has now been settled, with the agreement finally ratified and with the decision finally made to make Khmeimim into a permanent base.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>It should be said clearly that this is a major shift.  Tsarist Russia did operate naval bases in the Greek islands and in Piedmont in Italy in the nineteenth century, and the USSR negotiated naval and air facilities at various times with Albania, Yugoslavia, Syria and Egypt, which however all fell well short of being true permanent naval and air bases.  The USSR did seek at the end of the Second World War Western agreement for a Russian base in Libya, but unsurprisingly this was refused.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>All these previous projects proved ephemeral or stillborn, with whatever temporary arrangements the Russians negotiated with the various Mediterranean powers always reversed whenever these powers realigned towards the West, as they invariably did.  The one exception was the Russian naval facility in the Syrian port of Tartus which dates back to 1971.  Though it has attracted huge attention during the Syrian conflict, like all the other facilities the USSR acquired in the Mediterranean during the Cold War it is in no sense a base.  As even the BBC has been obliged to admit, the facility at Tartus is at best a support and resupply station for Russian ships in the Mediterranean.  It is too small to host Russian naval warships of frigate size and upwards, and has no facilities to host large numbers of Russian sailors or personnel such as a true base would need to do.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The military reality is that since 1943 it is the US Navy which together with its naval allies (primarily Britain and France) has been the overwhelmingly dominant military power in the Mediterranean.  Since the Second World War the Mediterranean has been in military terms an American lake.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The base at Khmeimin however is different from anything that has existed before.  Not only does it already host a formidable strike force of aircraft roughly equivalent to that of a US Navy carrier strike group, but it is heavily defended by formidable air defence assets including S400, BUK and Pantsir anti aircraft missiles, and contains a host of radar, electronic warfare and command facilities.  It is also defended by a formidable force of Russian ground troops, said to be of battalion strength.  Moreover there is talk the base is going to be significantly expanded to make it capable of hosting much heavier strike aircraft, possibly TU22M3s.  Khmeimim also forms part of what is becoming a very powerful complex of Russian military bases and facilities in Syria, which obviously include the Tartus naval facility (which may also now be expanded) and a top secret Russian listening post which has long been rumoured to exist somewhere in Latakia province.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In aggregate this is a base complex of a sort the Russians have never had in the Mediterranean before, and one that has now been made permanent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The Russian base in Syria cannot challenge the supremacy of the US Navy in the whole of the Mediterranean area.  However it does have the potential to change drastically political and military perceptions in its eastern half.  There is now the prospect of Russian fighters flying over the eastern Mediterranean in regular patrols, monitoring US warships and aircraft in the area, and making Russia&rsquo;s presence felt in the area as it has never been felt before.  It is one thing to know in the abstract that Russian ballistic and cruise missiles can reach this area.  It is quite another actually to be able to see Russian military aircraft physically present there.  The psychological and political impact on the countries that border the eastern Mediterranean (Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon and Israel) and on the US Navy (in an area where it has long been accustomed to sailing unchallenged) cannot be overstated, and would be tremendous.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>All this of course depends on the eventual outcome of the conflict in Syria.  By establishing a permanent base there Russia has just raised the stakes, a fact that undoubtedly explains the intensity of the conflict.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4>Alexander Mercouris<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le \u00ab\u00a0n&oelig;ud strat\u00e9gique\u00a0\u00bb est nou\u00e9 La Russie a ratifi\u00e9 la semaine derni\u00e8re l&rsquo;accord sur la base de Khmeimim n\u00e9goci\u00e9 avec la Syrie en 2015. Cette base devient ainsi une base russe permanente sur le territoire syrien, dans les normes l\u00e9gales n\u00e9goci\u00e9 avec le gouvernement l\u00e9gal de la Syrie. Alexander Mercouris analyse cette nouvelle situation dans&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[5518,3650,6582,17436,7170,2667,17680,8289,3867,12256,2613],"class_list":["post-76724","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-base","tag-hegemonie","tag-iskander","tag-khmeimim","tag-mediterranee","tag-mercouris","tag-putsch-avorte","tag-s-400","tag-syrie","tag-tartus","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76724","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76724"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76724\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76724"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76724"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76724"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}