{"id":76725,"date":"2016-08-16T14:12:29","date_gmt":"2016-08-16T14:12:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/08\/16\/backfire-russes-en-iran-messagesen-plus-des-bombes\/"},"modified":"2016-08-16T14:12:29","modified_gmt":"2016-08-16T14:12:29","slug":"backfire-russes-en-iran-messagesen-plus-des-bombes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/08\/16\/backfire-russes-en-iran-messagesen-plus-des-bombes\/","title":{"rendered":"<em>Backfire<\/em> russes en Iran\u00a0: messages\u00a0en plus des bombes"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\"><em>Backfire<\/em> russes en Iran : messages en plus des bombes<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Pendant des ann\u00e9es, \u00e0 partir du d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1970, le <em>Backfire<\/em> figura parmi les principales chroniques de l&rsquo;OTAN et du Pentagone face \u00e0 la \u00ab\u00a0Menace\u00a0\u00bb (<em>the Threat<\/em>), mot d\u00e9signant dans le jargon otanien la puissance militaire sovi\u00e9tique. <em>Backfire<\/em> \u00e9tait (et reste) le nom-code donn\u00e9 par l&rsquo;OTAN au bombardier Tupolev Tu-22 apparu \u00e0 cet \u00e9poque, dont on se demandait si l&rsquo;autonomie ne le classait pas dans les limites de mat\u00e9riels strat\u00e9giques \u00e9tablies par les accords SALT et START. Depuis, le Tu-22 a \u00e9volu\u00e9 dans de nouvelles versions qui l&rsquo;ont consid\u00e9rablement transform\u00e9 et il reste aujourd&rsquo;hui, avec les vieux Tu-95 et le Tu-160, l&rsquo;un des avions de l&rsquo;aviation strat\u00e9gique russe. C&rsquo;est donc un avion aur\u00e9ol\u00e9 d&rsquo;une longue lign\u00e9e de pol\u00e9mique strat\u00e9gique qui a pris ses quartiers d&rsquo;\u00e9t\u00e9 sur la base iranienne de Hamadan, \u00e0 l&rsquo;Ouest de l&rsquo;Iran, d&rsquo;o&ugrave; il a effectu\u00e9 hier ses premi\u00e8res frappes contre Daesh et Al-Nusra (ou ex-Al-Nusra, il faut suivre&#8230;).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;avantage est que le Tu-22 a 700 kilom\u00e8tres \u00e0 effectuer \u00e0 partir d&rsquo;Hamadan pour sa mission en Syrie, au lieu des 2.000 kilom\u00e8tres \u00e0 partir de ses bases du Sud de la Russie. La sensation est qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de la <strong>premi\u00e8re nouvelle effectivement sensationnelle de la coop\u00e9ration militaire op\u00e9rationnelle directe entre la Russie et l&rsquo;Iran<\/strong>, et qu&rsquo;elle est achaland\u00e9e d&rsquo;un nombre impressionnant de photos et de nombreux d\u00e9tails par le minist\u00e8re russe de la d\u00e9fense. La Russie veut faire savoir les choses, et l&rsquo;\u00e9pisode s&rsquo;inscrit \u00e9videmment dans le cadre des d\u00e9veloppements concernant <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/le-noeud-strategique-est-noue\">la base russe en Syrie<\/a> de Khmeimim. (Parmi les projets russes, il y a celui d&rsquo;allonger la piste d&rsquo;envol de cette base pour permettre \u00e0 des bombardiers strat\u00e9giques type Tu-22 d&rsquo;y stationner : tout comme le d\u00e9ploiement \u00e0 Hamadan, il s&rsquo;agit de rapprocher les bombardiers toujours plus de leurs objectifs, <strong>essentiellement pour pouvoir frapper rapidement avec leurs charges massives par rapport \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de la situation en Syrie<\/strong>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>De nombreux textes sont publi\u00e9s simultan\u00e9ment sur l&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e9nement. Il y a ceux de RT, <a href=\"https:\/\/francais.rt.com\/international\/25115-bombardiers-russes-provenance-iran-frappent-daesh-syrie\">en fran\u00e7ais<\/a> et <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rt.com\/news\/356098-russian-bombers-iran-hamadan\/\">en anglais<\/a>, ainsi que des diverses sources du bloc-BAO. Pour notre part, nous jugeons qu&rsquo;on peut s&rsquo;arr\u00eater \u00e0 celui de <em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.zerohedge.com\/news\/2016-08-16\/first-time-russian-strategic-bombers-strike-isis-irans-hamadan-air-base\">ZeroHedge.com<\/a><\/em>, qui reprend de nombreuses sources pour pr\u00e9senter l&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e9nement&#8230; Dans tous ces textes, on retrouve la m\u00eame collection g\u00e9n\u00e9reuse de documents photographiques. Quoi qu&rsquo;il en soit, le point le plus remarquable est bien cet aspect de la communication, &ndash; que Moscou entend faire savoir <strong>qu&rsquo;il a d\u00e9sormais un alli\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique actif et \u00ab\u00a0op\u00e9rationnel\u00a0\u00bb de plus au Moyen-Orient<\/strong>. De leur c\u00f4t\u00e9, les Iraniens ne sont pas m\u00e9contents qu&rsquo;on le sache, et qu&rsquo;on sache bien entendu <strong>qu&rsquo;une attaque contre l&rsquo;Iran (certains y pensent toujours) a toutes les chances d&#8217;emmener vers un conflit g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9<\/strong>. Bref, outre les aspect op\u00e9rationnels, le saga des <em>Backfire<\/em> en Iran (avec d&rsquo;autres mod\u00e8les d&rsquo;avions russes, dont les tout nouveaux Su-34) a des allures d&rsquo;avertissement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>While Obama is campaigning on behalf of Hillary Clinton, Vladimir Putin is making friends<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Russian strategic bombers with full payloads delivered their first airstrikes on terrorist targets in Syria operating from an Iranian airbase, the Russian Defence Ministry said, after Moscow deployed Russian aircraft to an Iranian air force base to widen its campaign in Syria. The ministry said the strikes, by Tupolev-22M3 long-range bombers and Sukhoi-34 fighter bombers, were launched from Iran&rsquo;s Hamadan air base. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Russia&rsquo;s state-backed Rossiya 24 channel earlier on Tuesday broadcast uncaptioned images of at least three bombers and a Russian military transport plane apparently inside Iran, but said it was unclear how many Russian bombers had arrived there. This was the first time that Russia has struck targets inside Syria from Iran since it launched a bombing campaign to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in September last year.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Moscow and Tehran signed a military agreement allowing Russian aircraft to station at Hamadan Airport in western Iran, and according to Iran&rsquo;s Natioanl Security Council the cooperation between the two countries in Syria is \u00ab\u00a0strategic.&quot; Tehran has agreed to share its military facilities and capacities with Moscow, confirming dedication to strategic cooperation in fighting against terrorism in Syria, Iran&rsquo;s Secretary of Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani told Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) in an interview on Tuesday.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Russian media said the Tupolev-22M3 bombers, which had already conducted many strikes on militants in Syria from their home bases in southern Russia, were too large to be accommodated at Russia&rsquo;s air base inside Syria. According to RT, the main benefit for the Russian Air Force is a drastic reduction in flying time to terrorist targets in Syria. Russian long-range bombers delivered airstrikes in Syria from a base in Mozdok, Russia, and had to cover a distance of about 2,000km to get to Syrian airspace. Now that distance is reduced to some 700km, so time-sensitive airstrikes can be delivered immediately and more cheaply.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>As Reuters notes, the move shows Russia is expanding its role and presence in the Middle East and comes amid Russian media reports Moscow has asked Iran and Iraq for permission to fire cruise missiles at Syrian targets across their territory from the Caspian Sea. The ministry said Tuesday&rsquo;s strikes had targeted Islamic State and militants previously known as the Nusra Front in the Aleppo, Idlib and Deir al Zour provinces. The bombers had been protected by fighters based at Russia&rsquo;s Hmeymim air base in Syria&rsquo;s Latakia Province, it said. <\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Meanwhile, military cooperation between Iran and Russia is developing rapidly. In January this year, Moscow and Tehran signed military cooperation deal that implies wider collaboration in personnel training and counter-terrorism activities. Russia&rsquo;s Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and his Iranian counterpart Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan signed the document during a visit by Russia&rsquo;s top brass to the Iranian capital.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>The Kremlin won&rsquo;t stop there: on Monday, Interfax reported that Moscow has once again requested Iran and Iraq to allow cruise missiles to fly through their respective airspace to deliver strikes on terrorist targets in Syria. Also on Monday, Russia launched tactical naval drills in the Mediterranean and Caspian Seas. The warships taking part in the exercise are to engage in live artillery and missile fire \u00ab\u00a0under simulated battlefield conditions.\u00a0\u00bb The Mediterranean force includes two fast attack guided missile craft, both armed with Kalibr-NK cruise missile complexes equipped with eight missiles each&#8230;<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 16 ao&ucirc;t 2016 \u00e0 14H14<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Backfire russes en Iran : messages en plus des bombes Pendant des ann\u00e9es, \u00e0 partir du d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1970, le Backfire figura parmi les principales chroniques de l&rsquo;OTAN et du Pentagone face \u00e0 la \u00ab\u00a0Menace\u00a0\u00bb (the Threat), mot d\u00e9signant dans le jargon otanien la puissance militaire sovi\u00e9tique. Backfire \u00e9tait (et reste) le nom-code donn\u00e9&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[12768,2773,17436,3068,3867,17685],"class_list":["post-76725","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-hamadan","tag-iran","tag-khmeimim","tag-strategique","tag-syrie","tag-tu-22"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76725","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76725"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76725\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76725"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76725"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76725"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}