{"id":76750,"date":"2016-08-30T11:20:15","date_gmt":"2016-08-30T11:20:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/08\/30\/the-objectives-of-operation-euphrates-shield\/"},"modified":"2016-08-30T11:20:15","modified_gmt":"2016-08-30T11:20:15","slug":"the-objectives-of-operation-euphrates-shield","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2016\/08\/30\/the-objectives-of-operation-euphrates-shield\/","title":{"rendered":"The objectives of operation \u201cEuphrates Shield<\/em>\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

Notes de pr\u00e9sentation<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

Quelques notes sans commentaire structur\u00e9 pour pr\u00e9senter ce texte et compl\u00e9ter nos textes pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents des 27 et 29 août : venu du site Katehon.com<\/a><\/em> (Alexander Douguine), il s’oppose avec vigueur \u00e0 la th\u00e8se tr\u00e8s souvent rencontr\u00e9e chez les antiSyst\u00e8me, selon laquelle Erdogan a \u00ab\u00a0grug\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb Poutine \u00e0 Saint-Petersbourg, ou bien \u00e0 la variante-Mercouris<\/a> selon laquelle rien de fondamental ne s’est pass\u00e9 entre Russes et Turcs, que Poutine n’attend rien d’Erdogan qui reste un alli\u00e9 tr\u00e8s-ob\u00e9issant des USA. Katehon.com<\/em> s’oppose \u00e0 cette th\u00e8se de plus en plus clairement, tout comme il s’oppose \u00e0 l’id\u00e9e de la \u00ab\u00a0faiblesse\u00a0\u00bb de Poutine<\/a> (Paul Craig Roberts notamment) ; c’est une position int\u00e9ressante dans la mesure où les nationalistes-souverainistes (Douguine) sont les premiers \u00e0 d\u00e9noncer l’aile \u00ab\u00a0Int\u00e9grationnistes-Atlanticistes\u00a0\u00bb de la direction russe alors que, dans ce cas, ils d\u00e9fendent Poutine accus\u00e9 par nombre d’antiSyst\u00e8me (PCG) de justement c\u00e9der \u00e0 ces \u00ab\u00a0Int\u00e9grationnistes-Atlanticistes\u00a0\u00bb russes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

L’auteur de ce texte du 29 août 2016<\/a>, Soner Polat, est un contre-amiral \u00e0 la retraite de la marine turque. Son analyse militaire de l’op\u00e9ration \u00ab\u00a0Euphrates Shield\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> rencontre totalement, sans surprise bien \u00e9videmment, les th\u00e8ses de Katehon.com<\/em>. Sa conclusion g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, qui rencontre de ce point de vue effectivement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral notre propre appr\u00e9ciation<\/a>, est que la d\u00e9rive de la Turquie vers l’Eurasie et la Russie est irr\u00e9sistiblement en marche<\/strong>, tandis que l’administration Obama ne fait que tenter de prot\u00e9ger sans grand succ\u00e8s un statu quo ante<\/em> lupanar<\/em> (plut\u00f4t que ante <\/em>tout court) des positions US dans la r\u00e9gion, pour refiler ce bordel r\u00e9gional \u00e0 l’\u00e9lu(e) du 8 novembre<\/strong>. (On notera qu’un article du 30 août <\/a>de l’excellent commentateur du Moyen-Orient Elijah J. Magnier<\/a> va dans ce m\u00eame sens du point de vue de la configuration g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l’op\u00e9ration turque et d’une certaine entente Erdogan-Poutine \u00e0 ce propos : « Putin and Erdogan have agreed on a restricted road map in Syria: the Kurds and Nusra will be the main losers.<\/em> <\/strong>»)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

dde.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n

__________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The objectives of operation \u00ab\u00a0Euphrates Shield<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

As we know, any military operation has political objectives. As far as I am concerned, I understand from the statements of key figures that the political objective of operation \u00ab\u00a0Euphrates Shield\u00a0\u00bb is to guarantee the territorial integrity of Syria as well as to create a buffer zone or security belt along the Turkish-Syrian border between Jarabulus and other provinces which are less than 100 km from Turkey. As for the neutral objectives of this operation, I can distinguish between three aspects: tactical, operative, and strategic.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The tactical objective is to clear the area of terrorists from the Islamic State as well as the YPG.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The operative objective is to set up a security belt stretching from the Turkish-Syrian boarder into Syrian mainland at a 10-15 km in depth in order to stop terrorist activities from aiming at Turkish targets. Finally, the strategic objective is to exercise total control over the federal regions like Kobane and others, covering an area of 100 km length and 45 km depth from Turkish borders. In my opinion, these are the political and military objectives of this cross-border Turkish operation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The next step would be to clear out Manbij and the surrounding area of all terrorists, including YPG affiliates. In the meantime, Turkish troops are between Jarabulus and Manbij, and I believe that they are moving to the South.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The composition of the Free Syrian Army is the most sensitive issue at this moment because we have been very critical about it. I think these troops are somehow controllable, but there is no guarantee for the future. Experience shows that, in the end, these kinds of groups are steered by global forces. Yet, Turkey considers these groups as moderate opponents to the regime, but we know that Syria and the countries supporting it like Russia consider these groups to be terrorist organizations. So, I believe this is the most difficult issue for Turkey to deal with in cooperation with neighboring countries and Russia. I think that in the upcoming stages of the operation in Syria, this issue will be coordinated in detail with regional countries as well as with Russia. This problem should be solved if we want to create a united front against terrorist groups and the countries supporting them.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Quite honestly, I believe that this operation is also against American interests. The United States had no choice but to give a green light to this operation since the US is in a sensitive position. Turkey was very much determined to carry out this operation since too many bombs have exploded and taken many lives. Also, it is widely believed that the US was behind the failed coup d’\u00e9tat. Turkey is slowly but surely moving towards Eurasia, and the Putin-Erdogan meeting alarmed the West. If Turkey remains with the Western world, then the global geopolitical balance is paralyzed. Taking this into account, the Americans will follow through with their current policy until their presidential elections. At this moment, they are trying to get back to the status quo ante. It is very important for Turkey to establish friendly relations with Russia and all its neighbors. Therefore, the West does not want to lose Turkey. That’s why the US hesitated over the Turkish cross-border operation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Soner Polat<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Notes de pr\u00e9sentation Quelques notes sans commentaire structur\u00e9 pour pr\u00e9senter ce texte et compl\u00e9ter nos textes pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents des 27 et 29 août : venu du site Katehon.com (Alexander Douguine), il s’oppose avec vigueur \u00e0 la th\u00e8se tr\u00e8s souvent rencontr\u00e9e chez les antiSyst\u00e8me, selon laquelle Erdogan a \u00ab\u00a0grug\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb Poutine \u00e0 Saint-Petersbourg, ou bien \u00e0 la variante-Mercouris… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[2792,3737,16720,2667,17722,17721,2613],"class_list":["post-76750","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-douguine","tag-erdogan","tag-eurasie","tag-mercouris","tag-polat","tag-soner","tag-turquie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76750","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=76750"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/76750\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=76750"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=76750"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=76750"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}