A peine trois semaines, et d\u00e9j\u00e0 l’on s’attelle \u00e0 tenter de comprendre la politique ext\u00e9rieure de Donald Trump. Divers auteurs s’y sont mis, sous des angles diff\u00e9rents, et la profusion d’analyses qui se d\u00e9veloppent sont \u00e0 la mesure de l’incompr\u00e9hensibilit\u00e9 de la chose. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 vu avec Wayne Madsen<\/a> ce que cette politique donnait, c’est-\u00e0-dire la mise \u00e0 nu d’un immense d\u00e9sordre global qui existait d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e0 l’\u00e9tat de latence sous le r\u00e8gne plein de sagesse paresseuse et suffisante du pr\u00e9sident Obama<\/strong>. (R\u00e9ponse positive \u00e9vidente \u00e0 la question : « L’activisme de Trump ainsi que son int\u00e9r\u00eat pour certaines mati\u00e8res et son d\u00e9sint\u00e9r\u00eat pour d’autres ne feraient-ils pas simplement que mettre en \u00e9vidence le d\u00e9sordre latent existant sous l’administration Obama<\/strong>, et que seuls l’attentisme et la prudence extr\u00eame, ainsi que les th\u00e8ses de ce pr\u00e9sident d’une sorte d’exceptionnalisme paresseux des USA, tenaient dans un certain immobilisme ?<\/em> »)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Alastair Crooke, cet ancien officier du MI6 pass\u00e9 \u00e0 l’UE avant de choisir la voie de l’ind\u00e9pendance du jugement et de l’\u00e9crit, met toute sa culture et ses connaissances diverses \u00e0 tenter de d\u00e9cortiquer cette politique ext\u00e9rieure, pour mieux tenter d’en comprendre le langage secret (\u00ab\u00a0les runes\u00a0\u00bb, \u00e9crit Crooke). Il voit trois tendances essentielles \u00e0 la fois politiques, id\u00e9ologiques et conceptuelles, cohabitant au sein de l'\u00a0\u00bb\u00e9quipe Trump\u00a0\u00bb et l’\u00e9loignant du mod\u00e8le \u00ab\u00a0en noir et blanc\u00a0\u00bb qu’on serait tent\u00e9 de tracer lorsqu’il s’agit de Trump<\/strong> : une tendance classique, dite de l'\u00a0\u00bbh\u00e9g\u00e9monie bienveillante\u00a0\u00bb des USA, qui a plus ou moins pr\u00e9valu dans la politique ext\u00e9rieure des USA depuis 1947-48 ; une tendance dite des \u00ab\u00a0guerriers chr\u00e9tiens\u00a0\u00bb mobilis\u00e9s contre l’agression de l’islamisme extr\u00e9miste et exprimant in fine<\/em> le courant de mobilisation alarm\u00e9e de ce qui constituait l’Am\u00e9rique traditionnelle (WASP, blanche, protestante et anglo-saxonne) et qui est devenue simplement \u00ab\u00a0la minorit\u00e9 majoritaire\u00a0\u00bb des USA, avant d’\u00eatre remplac\u00e9e, quelque part dans l’une ou l’autre d\u00e9cennie \u00e0 venir, par les hispaniques (pourtant chr\u00e9tiens eux aussi, et pas si loin d’\u00eatre \u00ab\u00a0Blancs\u00a0\u00bb si l’on veut s’attacher \u00e0 ces choses) ; enfin la tendance mercantiliste \u00ab\u00a0America-First<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb qui constitue le credo <\/em>personnel de Donald Trump. « Chacune de ces tendances se m\u00e9fie des deux autres<\/em>, \u00e9crit Crooke, et pourtant elle peut s’allier avec l’une pour s’opposer ou \u00e9quilibrer la troisi\u00e8me, ou au moins intervenir pour entraver son action<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Cette classification th\u00e9orique constitue d’abord une tentative de mettre de l’ordre dans un d\u00e9sordre consid\u00e9rable, ou qui semble l’\u00eatre, notamment apparu du point de vue aussi bien des manœuvres pour conduire \u00e0 des choix et des nominations au sein de l’administration, que pour certaines de ces nominations. On pourrait d’ailleurs r\u00e9torquer, ou interpr\u00e9ter diff\u00e9remment, en observant que cette \u00ab\u00a0classification th\u00e9orique\u00a0\u00bb a inversement pour but d’expliquer d’une fa\u00e7on plus rationnelle que le simple constat, le d\u00e9sordre pr\u00e9sidant actuellement \u00e0 la politique ext\u00e9rieure de Trump, ou \u00e0 ce qui tient lieu de politique en v\u00e9rit\u00e9<\/strong>. De l\u00e0, on passe \u00e0 des constats de situations sp\u00e9cifiques, que nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 faits ou d\u00e9velopp\u00e9s, et il confirme \u00e9videmment tr\u00e8s rapidement que la \u00ab\u00a0classification th\u00e9orique\u00a0\u00bb se heurte \u00e0 des contradictions \u00e9tablissant un d\u00e9sordre qu’elle \u00e9tait cens\u00e9e expliquer.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Ainsi Crooke constate-t-il, comme il est logique et de simple bon sens de le faire, l’absurdit\u00e9 de l’hostilit\u00e9 contre l’Iran du pr\u00e9sident lui-m\u00eame et de nombre de ses conseillers<\/strong> (dont Flynn, qui vient juste de partir avec pertes et fracas), dans un contexte explicitement pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme celui de la lutte contre le terrorisme (les \u00ab\u00a0guerriers chr\u00e9tiens\u00a0\u00bb) : « Mais qu’est-ce qui explique la concentration paradoxale de Trump contre l’Iran, qui se bat<\/strong> contre le radicalisme islamiste, plut\u00f4t que, par exemple, l’Arabie Saoudite <\/em>[qui ne fait rien<\/strong> contre lui] ?<\/em> ». A quoi sert-il de proclamer, et \u00e9ventuellement de travailler dans le sens d’apaiser tous les conflits en cours au Moyen-Orient, alors qu’on risque, en affrontant l’Iran, de les d\u00e9chaîner tous \u00e0 nouveau, de la plus terrifiante des mani\u00e8res ? Tout cela fait partie de l’\u00e9nigme-Trump, dont Crooke nous dit qu’elle susciterait une politique ext\u00e9rieure selon une sorte de logique \u00ab\u00a0bipolaire\u00a0\u00bb pour emprunter ce terme \u00e0 la psychiatrie<\/strong> : dans un sens, puis dans le sens contraire, ou bien dans un sens et dans le sens contraire dans un m\u00eame d\u00e9chaînement particuli\u00e8rement intrigant et accablant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mais tout cela (\u00ab\u00a0les runes\u00a0\u00bb) sera d’autant plus difficile \u00e0 d\u00e9chiffrer et \u00e0 distinguer que la tactique de Trump est faite de \u00ab\u00a0feintes et de simulations\u00a0\u00bb, et qu’elle s’op\u00e9rationnalise selon un mod\u00e8le extr\u00eamement mobile et insaisissable<\/strong>, dans le chef de la m\u00e9thode choisie par Trump des affirmations se d\u00e9mentant les unes les autres, des affirmations \u00e0 l’emporte-pi\u00e8ce gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la techniques des tweet, etc. Crooke cite alors longuement un analyste et technicien des \u00e9checs, recommandant une tactique tr\u00e8s sp\u00e9cifique consistant \u00e0 ne jamais laisser l’adversaire d\u00e9velopper une strat\u00e9gie en proc\u00e9dant soi-m\u00eame par \u00ab\u00a0coups de main\u00a0\u00bb impliquant chaque fois une strat\u00e9gie diff\u00e9rente qui oblige cet adversaire \u00e0 \u00e9tablir \u00e0 chaque fois une autre d\u00e9fense sans pouvoir d\u00e9clencher sa propre strat\u00e9gie. On observera que cette analogie rejoint assez bien celle que nous avons d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e en puisant dans les exemples guerriers, avec les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux Stuart et Patton<\/a>, deux tacticiens de g\u00e9nie qui marqu\u00e8rent l’un la Guerre de S\u00e9cession pour le Sud, l’autre la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale sur le th\u00e9\u00e2tre europ\u00e9en occidental. Dans le cas de Stuart et de Patton, il y avait \u00e9galement cette tactique de la surprise, de la vitesse, la philosophie \u00ab\u00a0un mauvais plan aujourd’hui vaut mieux qu’un plan parfait dans une semaine\u00a0\u00bb… Bien entendu, Stuart et Patton \u00e9taient des tacticiens au service d’une strat\u00e9gie, l’une \u00e9tablie par Lee, l’autre par le Grand Quartier-G\u00e9n\u00e9ral alli\u00e9, et notamment le couple Marshall-Eisenhower…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mais si, selon cette analogie, comme selon celle du joueur d’\u00e9chec \u00e0 la tactique si particuli\u00e8re, Trump est une sorte de tacticien de g\u00e9nie (ce qu’on peut rapprocher par ailleurs de sa bonne r\u00e9putation d’excellent \u00ab\u00a0faiseur d’accords\u00a0\u00bb selon ce qu’on sait de sa pratique des affaires), \u00e0 quelle strat\u00e9gie r\u00e9pond-il ? Pour le cas iranien, il y aurait, et il y a bien entendu, toute une cat\u00e9gorie de commentateurs pour r\u00e9pondre que la strat\u00e9gie est dict\u00e9e par l’in\u00e9vitable comploteur isra\u00e9lo-sioniste, avec ses innombrables moyens de pression (selon les m\u00eames), attach\u00e9 \u00e0 l’ennemi jur\u00e9 qu’est l’Iran ; l’on pourra aussit\u00f4t r\u00e9pondre que cette marche contre l’Iran rencontre \u00e0 un moment ou l’autre une Russie d\u00e9termin\u00e9e<\/a> \u00e0 ne pas laisser faire, alors que le pr\u00e9sident Trump compte tant sur l’am\u00e9lioration de ses relations avec la susdite Russie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Par ailleurs, le camp des anti-Trump et des neocons<\/em> applaudit implicitement et explicitement \u00e0 la liquidation du G\u00e9n\u00e9ral Flynn dont il serait l’architecte<\/a>, cette liquidation d\u00e9sormais interpr\u00e9t\u00e9e par les pro-Trump comme un complot anti-Trump r\u00e9ussi<\/a> ; mais l’on sait \u00e9galement que si Flynn \u00e9tait un partisan d’un rapprochement avec la Russie, il s’\u00e9tait montr\u00e9, comme on l’a vu plus haut, comme un des adversaires les plus f\u00e9roces de l’Iran, notamment par sa d\u00e9claration du 3 f\u00e9vrier qualifi\u00e9e d’extraordinaire par Alexander Mercouris<\/a>… Qu’est-ce donc que cette strat\u00e9gie des neocons<\/em> (pour eux aussi se pose la question), qui liquideraient un homme que les Isra\u00e9liens devraient normalement ch\u00e9rir<\/strong>, alors que ces m\u00eames Isra\u00e9liens d\u00e9testent Obama, notamment pour sa retenue contre l’Iran, et qu’on connaît le r\u00f4le d’Obama & Cie dans les attaques anti-Trump?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Alors enfin, puisque cet homme est \u00e0 l’origine de tout ce chaos washingtonien et mondial gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 une tactique de g\u00e9nie, alors qui est le strat\u00e8ge de Trump ? La m\u00e9tahistoire elle-m\u00eame ?<\/strong> Crooke a le bon goût de terminer son article tr\u00e8s long et d\u00e9taill\u00e9, et excellent pour mieux suivre les m\u00e9andres du flux politique et crisique en cours, par une derni\u00e8re ligne qui, au dernier moment, renvoie toute la logique de l’effort \u00e0 la simplicit\u00e9 m\u00eame de son inutilit\u00e9 quant au but pr\u00e9cis qu’il s’\u00e9tait assign\u00e9<\/strong>. Cette ligne de type \u00ab\u00a0Well<\/em>…\u00a0\u00bb (« Well, peut-\u00eatre est-il pr\u00e9f\u00e9rable de s’asseoir et d’observer, et de ne plus tenter de d\u00e9chiffrer les runes<\/a><\/em> »), se traduit pour nous par la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 l’inconnaissance<\/a>, qui est la posture du sage, qui sait parfaitement jusqu’où il importe de ne pas trop aller dans les affaires terrestres, et de laisser l’explication d’un temps historique d\u00e9pass\u00e9 par son propre rythme au point où l’on est conduit ou oblig\u00e9 de se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer \u00e0 la m\u00e9tahistoire, simplement, sans fausse honte, sans \u00e9tat d’\u00e2me, sans rien du tout, parce qu’il s’agit l\u00e0 d’une lib\u00e9ration de l’esprit<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Voici donc l’article d’Alastair Crooke, sur ConsortiumNews<\/em>, le 12 f\u00e9vrier 2017<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n _________________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n It is now a commonplace to note that President Trump is advocating a mercantilist \u00ab\u00a0America First\u00a0\u00bb foreign policy, at odds with the prevailing globalist view of a cosmopolitan, super-culture; that he is intent on dismantling this globalist zeitgeist that he believes imposes moral and cultural norms which have weakened America’s mercantile \u00ab\u00a0animal spirits\u00a0\u00bb and whose embrace of the politics of diversity has sapped the strength from America’s moral and cultural sinews.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n In practice, the policy that emerges will not be so black and white, or so easily categorized. \u00ab\u00a0Team Trump,\u00a0\u00bb in fact, embraces three distinct approaches: the \u00ab\u00a0benevolent American hegemon\u00a0\u00bb traditionalists, the Christian warriors pitted against an Islamic \u00ab\u00a0hostile\u00a0\u00bb ethos – and, of course, Trump’s own \u00ab\u00a0America First\u00a0\u00bb mercantilism. Each of these trends distrusts the other, yet must ally with one or the other in order to balance the third or at least avoid having it act as spoiler.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n This inter-connectivity makes it especially hard to read the runes – the Trump administration’s marks of mysterious significance – of likely U.S. policy given the jostling and elbowing ahead between three distinct world views. And it is made even harder given President Trump’s and strategic adviser Steve Bannon’s deliberate embrace of a politics of feint and distraction, to throw opponents off-balance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Trump’s style of mercantilist politics – though novel in our era – is not new. It has occurred before, and in its earlier setting led to profound geo-political consequences. It led then to war and ultimately to the emergence of a new geo-political order.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n That is not necessarily to say that the same will occur today, but on Sept. 17, 1656, Oliver Cromwell, a Protestant puritan who had fought a civil war in England against its Establishment and its \u00e9lite and who had deposed and then executed the reigning king, addressed his revolutionary parliamentarians in Westminster by posing the question: Who are our enemies? There was, he answered to the gathered parliamentarians, an alignment of \u00ab\u00a0wicked men\u00a0\u00bb in the world led by a powerful state – Catholic Spain with the Pope at its head. The \u00ab\u00a0enmity\u00a0\u00bb that Cromwell’s countrymen faced was, at its root, the evil of a religion – Catholicism – that \u00ab\u00a0refused the Englishman’s desire for simple liberties … that put men under restraint … [and] under which there was no freedom.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Since Cromwell’s day, the mainly English-speaking (Protestant) world has demonized its \u00ab\u00a0enemies\u00a0\u00bb as opponents of \u00ab\u00a0God’s will\u00a0\u00bb through their clinging to the failings of a static and backward religious ethic (as the Puritans characterized Catholicism). And, as for the complaint of \u00ab\u00a0restraint\u00a0\u00bb and \u00ab\u00a0lack of liberty\u00a0\u00bb? At its crux lay English frustration at the impediments faced by its traders and merchants. The Puritans of that time saw in Catholicism an ethos that was not welcoming to individual enterprise, to profit or to trade.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n English \u00ab\u00a0hawks\u00a0\u00bb – usually Puritans and merchants – wanted an aggressive anti-Spanish policy that would open new markets to burgeoning English trade. Catholicism was not an ethos, the Cromwellians fervently and dogmatically asserted, in which the nascent capitalism of the time could thrive.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Cromwell’s address to Parliament in 1656 was an early articulation of the Protestant ethic: one that has contributed hugely to shaping American entrepreneurial capitalism, and in taking America to its position of power (Steve Bannon does in fact acknowledge<\/a> the parallel: \u00ab\u00a0I am Thomas Cromwell in the court of the Tudors,\u00a0\u00bb he once said to a reporter).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Today, for one significant Trump constituency (the Tea Party base), Iran is today’s Spain, and it is Islam (vice <\/em>Catholicism) that is frustrating \u00ab\u00a0God’s will,\u00a0\u00bb by embracing an ethos that hates the Christian \u00ab\u00a0ethic.\u00a0\u00bb And, it is secular globalization that has sapped America’s mercantile animal spirits, imposed restrictions on trade (i.e. NAFTA), and whose cultural and \u00ab\u00a0value\u00a0\u00bb norms are sapping America’s moral and spiritual muscularity.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Army Lieutenant General Michael Flynn speaks at the Defense Intelligence Agency change of directorship at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, July 24, 2012. (DoD photo by Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Why should this Cromwell analogy matter today? In one sense, Trump had little choice. In opposing the (\u00ab\u00a0restrictive\u00a0\u00bb) globalist, foreign policy – with its spinal cord of a U.S.-led global defense sphere – the President needed to stand up some alternative foreign policy to the embedded totem of \u00ab\u00a0America as the gyroscope of the global order<\/a>.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Pure mercantilism – in the style of businessman negotiator-ism – is not really, of itself, a foreign policy. The power of the \u00ab\u00a0benign U.S. hegemon\u00a0\u00bb meme would require something more powerful to be set up, over, and against it, to balance it out. Trump has opted for the \u00ab\u00a0Christianity in peril\u00a0\u00bb narrative. It is one that touches on deeply buried cultural veins of Protestant imagery within the President’s Tea Party constituency.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Retired General Michael Flynn, now Trump’s National Security Advisor, perhaps best represents this religiously based, pro-Christian Republican foreign policy, while retired General James Mattis, now U.S. Defense Secretary, perhaps has a foot in both Republican camps — as Martin Wright from Brookings explains<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a0Republican foreign policy since 9\/11 has had two basic strands, which sometimes contradict each other<\/em>. The first is that the United States is in an existential fight against radical Islam. The second is that America’s global interests involve the maintenance of U.S. leadership in Europe and East Asia — interests, in other words, that extend far beyond combating radical Islam. The Republican establishment has always toed the line on the first, but it has increasingly focused much more on the second. The global war on terror has, of late, taken second place to balancing China and containing Russia.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a0But a group within the Republican tent never made this shift. These are the people who believe the United States is engaged in a war against radical Islam that is equivalent to World War II or the Cold War. They believe it is a struggle rooted in religion to which all else should be subservient — that America’s overwhelming focus must be on radical Islam instead of revisionist powers in Europe or Asia. They also generally favor moving away from a values-based foreign policy to harsh methods to wage a major war.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a0For the most part, the leaders of this school of thought have been dismissed as cranks or ideologues. But their views were widely shared in the Republican electorate, who were increasingly alarmed by the Islamic State. And they found an ally in Trump.\u00a0\u00bb (emphasis added)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n In short, we should expect the Administration’s policy to oscillate between these two poles of Republican foreign policy, as Trump plays off one against another, in order to insert his own (\u00ab\u00a0non – foreign policy\u00a0\u00bb) of radical mercantilism. The Cromwellian meme of making Iran the \u00ab\u00a0number one\u00a0\u00bb terrorist state and radical Islam the \u00ab\u00a0hostile ethos\u00a0\u00bb does fit well for the U.S. President to embrace the businessman-negotiator modus operandi <\/em>– under the cover of belligerency towards the Islamic \u00ab\u00a0ethos.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Belligerency towards Iran is, of course, popular and in this way Trump’s policy translates well or at least understandably to the mores of the Washington Beltway. This \u00ab\u00a0hostile Islam\u00a0\u00bb meme also provides the rationale (defeating Islamic terror) for d\u00e9tente with Russia. I have suggested earlier<\/a> that d\u00e9tente with Russia<\/a> is key to Trump’s dismantling of Washington’s \u00ab\u00a0benign <\/em>hegemon\u00a0\u00bb global defense sphere. Trump argues that the \u00ab\u00a0blanket\u00a0\u00bb U.S. defense sphere precisely limits the possibilities for the U.S. to negotiate advantageous trade terms with its allies on a case-by-case bilateral basis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n An Iranian child holding a photo of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at one of his public appearances. (Iranian government photo)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n In effect, under the cover of fighting a hostile Islamic \u00ab\u00a0ethos,\u00a0\u00bb Trump can pursue d\u00e9tente with Russia – and then toughly \u00ab\u00a0businessman-negotiate\u00a0\u00bb with allied states (now stripped of the Russian \u00ab\u00a0threat\u00a0\u00bb elevating them to a status as America’s somehow privileged, defense allies). This seems to be Secretary Tillerson’s intended role.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Martin Wright again<\/a>: \u00ab\u00a0This is why naming Rex Tillerson as secretary of state was so important for Trump. A week before he was named, Trump’s senior aide Kellyanne Conway told the press that Trump was expanding the list of names for secretary of state and that the most important consideration was that the nominee ‘would be to implement and adhere to the president-elect’s America-first foreign policy — if you will, his view of the world.’ The implication was clear: [Mitt] Romney, David Petraeus, and others would not fit the bill, so Trump would have to look elsewhere. He found Tillerson.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a0Tillerson is a pragmatist and a dealmaker. In many ways, he is a traditionalist. After all, he was endorsed by James Baker, Robert Gates, Hadley, and Condoleezza Rice. However, Trump also sees him, based on his personal relationship with Putin and opposition to sanctions on Russia, as someone willing to cut deals with strongmen and who sees national security through an economic lens and is thus an embodiment of his own America First views.<\/em> Speaking in Wisconsin hours after naming Tillerson, Trump said, ‘Rex is friendly with many of the leaders in the world that we don’t get along with, and some people don’t like that. They don’t want them to be friendly. That’s why I’m doing the deal with Rex, ’cause I like what this is all about.'\u00a0\u00bb (emphasis added)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Is this – the war with a \u00ab\u00a0hostile Islamic ethos\u00a0\u00bb – then just a ploy, a diversion? Something for Iran to ignore? We suspect that Iran should not<\/em> assume <\/a>that Trump’s targeting of Iran and radical Islam is just some harmless diversion. It is not likely<\/a> that Trump actively seeks war with Iran, but were Iran to be perceived to be deliberately humiliating Trump or America, the President (self-confessedly) is not of a temperament to let any humiliation pass. He likes to repay those who do him harm, ten-fold.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n But additionally, since, as polls show<\/a>, and a leading American commentator on religion and politics, Robert Jones, has written<\/a>, the Trump phenomenon is also deeply connected with the end of an American era: The End of White Christian America (<\/em>as his book is entitled). In point of fact, the era has already passed. For, as Jones notes, \u00ab\u00a01993 was the last year in which America was majority white, and Protestant.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Jones writes of the \u00ab\u00a0vertigo\u00a0\u00bb felt – even within the insular settings of many Southern and Midwestern towns where white Protestant conservatives continue to dominate society, and politics – at their \u00ab\u00a0loss of place at the center of American culture, democracy and cultural power.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Salt has been rubbed into this wound by a Democratic Party that has somewhat reveled in the passing of white majority America and exacerbated the sore through rebranding itself as the new \u00ab\u00a0majority\u00a0\u00bb of minorities. Jones remarks that while some in America \u00ab\u00a0might celebrate\u00a0\u00bb its passing, white Christian America did provide some kind of \u00ab\u00a0civic glue,\u00a0\u00bb and he ruminates on how the sense of void and anxiety on \u00ab\u00a0what might serve that purpose [in the future], might well turn destructive.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n This is, Iran might recall, Trump’s core constituency, which he must mollify if he is to remain in office. The destructive impulse of Tea Party-ists, if scratched repeatedly, might seek to let off steam at some convenient target.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n But secondly, it seems that Trump shares in some measure, this embrace of Judeo-Christian values. Certainly Steve Bannon does. He has said plainly that American capitalism – if it is to survive – must be reconnected to Judeo-Christian values. But what explains Trump’s paradoxical focus on Iran, which is<\/em> fighting Islamic radicalism, rather than say, Saudi Arabia, which is not<\/em>?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Here, Martin Wright gives<\/a> us the clue: \u00ab\u00a0In January and February [2016], Trump was under pressure to unveil a foreign-policy team. The Republican foreign-policy establishment overwhelmingly condemned him, largely because of his America First views. It was at this point that retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn started advising him. … Several weeks after Flynn came on board, Trump rolled out a list of foreign-policy advisors. Most were completely unknown, but the name Walid Phares stood out. Phares has a controversial past as a leading figure in a Lebanese Christian militia, and is known as a hard-liner in the war on terror.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Mother Jones’<\/em> investigative report<\/a> is plain: Phares, a Lebanese Christian Maronite, is a Samir Gagea man, who has a long history, dating back to Lebanon’s civil war of (intellectual) animosity towards Iran and Syria. It seems Trump (and Flynn too?) may have imbibed deeply at the bitter well of Lebanese prejudice and civil war hatreds?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n So what do the runes tell us? The occult alphabet of Trump’s foreign policy will prove hard to read. The essential tension between, on the one hand, the \u00ab\u00a0America Firsters\u00a0\u00bb and the religious warriors – and all those who adhere to the American \u00ab\u00a0traditionalist\u00a0\u00bb policy position – portends the prospect of policies that might oscillate, from time to time, between these three diverse and conflicting poles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n
Deciphering Trump’s Opaque Foreign Policy<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
A Religious War<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
A Popular ‘Enemy’<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
End of White America<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Translating the Runes<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n