{"id":77125,"date":"2017-03-03T14:27:23","date_gmt":"2017-03-03T14:27:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2017\/03\/03\/de-la-vanite-darroser-moby-dick-de-milliards\/"},"modified":"2017-03-03T14:27:23","modified_gmt":"2017-03-03T14:27:23","slug":"de-la-vanite-darroser-moby-dick-de-milliards","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2017\/03\/03\/de-la-vanite-darroser-moby-dick-de-milliards\/","title":{"rendered":"De la vanit\u00e9 d’arroser Moby Dick<\/em> de $milliards"},"content":{"rendered":"

De la vanit\u00e9 d’arroser Moby Dick<\/em> de $milliards<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

La newsetter<\/em> mensuelle du Strauss Military Reform Project<\/a> <\/em>(anciennement Center for Defense Information<\/em>) du groupe POGO, – une des meilleures sources d’analyse critique du fonctionnement du Pentagone, – nous donne une rapide analyse, le 2 mars, de la d\u00e9cision de Trump d’augmenter significativement le budget du Pentagone (surnomm\u00e9 Moby Dick<\/em>). Cette analyse nous confirme dans ce que nous avancions le 28 f\u00e9vrier<\/a>, \u00e0 savoir l’inutilit\u00e9 compl\u00e8te d’une telle mesure, sinon son effet n\u00e9gatif<\/strong> : cette augmentation « ne permettra pas de contr\u00f4ler les probl\u00e8mes<\/em> [du Pentagone] ; elle les aggravera<\/em> », \u00e9crit Mandy Smithberger, qui a succ\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e0 Winslow Wheeler \u00e0 la t\u00eate du groupe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

« The Pentagon can’t pass an audit, delivers ineffective and overpriced weapon systems, and desperately needs to reform its personnel system to make the military more effective. Throwing an additional $54 billion at the Pentagon, as the Trump administration has recently proposed<\/strong><\/a>, won’t fix these problems; it’ll make them worse<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» \u00ab\u00a0The American military’s shrinking capabilities have very little to do with money. Rather, they are the result of internal mismanagement,\u00a0\u00bb Center for Defense Information military advisor Lt. Col. Daniel Davis (U.S. Army, ret.) wrote last year<\/strong><\/a>. \u00ab\u00a0The only way to strengthen our national security is not to spend more money, but rather to reform the way the Department of Defense does business.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» Unfortunately it appears the Pentagon is going to get more money and come up with a list of priorities and justifications after the fact. When a White House budget official was asked where the increased spending would go they didn’t list specific programs or priorities, they said<\/strong><\/a> \u00ab\u00a0predominantly it will be going to the Pentagon.\u00a0\u00bb Taxpayers are already on the hook for $1 trillion of national security<\/strong><\/a> spending. Increasing the Pentagon’s budget would only be throwing good money after bad.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» The $54 billion may only be the beginning—it remains to be seen whether the Pentagon or its boosters in Congress will increase spending even more by adding funds to the Pentagon’s usual slush fund, the Overseas Contingency Operations account. This kind of spending is reckless and irresponsible, and with your support we’ll continue to fight it<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Ce suppl\u00e9ment de budget, \u00e0 lui seul proche de la valeur totale du budget militaire russe qui obtient une efficacit\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle bien sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle des USA, doit encore grandir la narrative<\/em> faussaire de la puissance militaire US. Plus cette puissance apparaît \u00e9norme en termes budg\u00e9taires, avec la transcription imm\u00e9diate en termes de communication de l’apparence de la puissance, plus s’accroissent l’impuissance et la paralysie des USA en termes d’op\u00e9rationnalit\u00e9 dans le domaine de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Cette situation accroit notablement l’instabilit\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 dans les rapports entre les puissances et la perception du rapport des forces entre ces diff\u00e9rentes puissance. Cette instabilit\u00e9 a surtout des effets au niveau de la communication et, indirectement, sur les analyses des capacit\u00e9s op\u00e9rationnelles que font les dirigeants et les commentateurs. Si la puissance du Pentagone est devenue un mythe faussaire par rapport \u00e0 ce qu’on en attend, le Pentagone n’en continue pas moins \u00e0 influencer la communication comme s’il manifestait effectivement la puissance qu’il pr\u00e9tend \u00eatre. Il est manifeste que personne dans l’administration ni au Congr\u00e8s n’a envisag\u00e9 un tel aspect de la situation, ni m\u00eame ne s’y int\u00e9resse<\/strong>. Moby Dick<\/em> est aujourd’hui en roues libres, install\u00e9 dans son gigantisme, son image faussaire d’\u00e9norme surpuissance, sa paralysie et son impuissance. Ainsi va le Syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Mis en ligne le 03 mars 2017 \u00e0 14H36<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

De la vanit\u00e9 d’arroser Moby Dick de $milliards La newsetter mensuelle du Strauss Military Reform Project (anciennement Center for Defense Information) du groupe POGO, – une des meilleures sources d’analyse critique du fonctionnement du Pentagone, – nous donne une rapide analyse, le 2 mars, de la d\u00e9cision de Trump d’augmenter significativement le budget du Pentagone… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[7921,6521,5319],"class_list":["post-77125","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-dick","tag-moby","tag-pogo"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77125","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77125"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77125\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77125"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=77125"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=77125"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}