Cet article nous paraît tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressant pour compl\u00e9ter le F&C<\/em> du 28 septembre 2017<\/a> sur « Le paradoxe syrien de Poutine<\/em> », et ajoutant qu’il trouve ses compl\u00e9ments mim\u00e9tiques dans divers textes sur la puissance militaire US, notamment celui qui est publi\u00e9 aujourd’hui, ce m\u00eame 30 septembre 2017<\/a>. Il s’agit d’un texte sur Unz.com <\/em>du 27 septembre 2017<\/a> d’Andrei Martianov, qui est un auteur int\u00e9ressant : sorti de l’Acad\u00e9mie Navale Kirov en 1985, il a servi bri\u00e8vement dans les garde-c\u00f4tes avant semble-t-il de quitter la marine russe dans les ann\u00e9es 1990 pour finir par s’\u00e9tablir aux USA. Il a acquis une tr\u00e8s grande expertise en mati\u00e8re militaire russe, notamment navale<\/strong>, ce qui est reconnu notamment par sa collaboration r\u00e9guli\u00e8re<\/a> avec l’institution de l’US Navy, le US Naval Institute<\/em> et sa prestigieuse revue Proceedings<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n (Il a notamment publi\u00e9 dans cette revue, le mois dernier [28 août 2017<\/a>], un article où il affine sa position g\u00e9n\u00e9rale sur la question aujourd’hui chaudement d\u00e9battue aux USA de la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 des porte-avions face aux capacit\u00e9s des missiles guid\u00e9s mer-mer ou air-mer, \u00e0 tr\u00e8s grandes capacit\u00e9 et tr\u00e8s grande vitesse, et quasiment impossibles \u00e0 intercepter. On sait qu’il s’agit d’une des questions strat\u00e9giques les plus importantes aujourd’hui pour les USA, et en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pour l’\u00e9quilibre des forces, s’il s’av\u00e9rait que ces monstres de 100.000 tonnes au prix incontr\u00f4lables [$20 milliards sans doute, au moins, et au-del\u00e0], et qui forment la structure fondamentale de l’US Navy, sont vuln\u00e9rables \u00e0 des tirs d’armes d’un coût par comparaison d\u00e9risoires, disponibles en tr\u00e8s grand nombre, avec des performances qui les rendent quasiment inarr\u00eatables, poss\u00e9dant une puissance d’impact \u00e9norme \u00e9galement \u00e0 cause de leur vitesse [plus de Mach 4.2 pour le missiles conventionnel russe \u00e0 longue distance X-32\/KH-32].)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n L’article ci-dessous de Martianov s’attache essentiellement \u00e0 montrer la puissance nouvelle des missiles russes du type missiles de croisi\u00e8re, dont des tirs op\u00e9rationnels mais surtout d\u00e9monstratifs ont eu lieu durant les op\u00e9rations russes en Syrie. Il s’agit des missiles de la famille des Kalibr<\/em>, dont les premiers tirs, comme le rappelle Martianov \u00e0 l’appui de sa th\u00e8se impliquant \u00e9galement la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 des porte-avions, ont aussit\u00f4t convaincu l’US Navy de retirer son porte-avions d’attaque<\/a> USS Theodore Roosevelt<\/em> de sa position dans le Golfe vers une autre position en retrait, \u00e0 distance plus prudente par rapport \u00e0 la port\u00e9e des Kalibr<\/em>. (On ne sait si cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 est av\u00e9r\u00e9e mais la d\u00e9cision de l’US Navy de retirer le USS Theodore Roosevelt <\/em>d\u00e8s que fut connue la nouvelle des tirs de Kalibr <\/em>montre que la psychologie est convaincue \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard<\/strong>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Martianov d\u00e9ploie une connaissance extr\u00eamement profonde des armes de ce type que les Russes ont en service ou mettent en service, avec des capacit\u00e9s de port\u00e9e et de vitesse absolument consid\u00e9rables en plus des capacit\u00e9s inh\u00e9rentes aux missiles de croisi\u00e8re (vol \u00e0 tr\u00e8s basse altitude, furtivit\u00e9, pr\u00e9cision). Un commentaire (dans les commentaires directs \u00e0 la suite de l’article) de l’\u00e9diteur du site, Ron Unz, insiste d’ailleurs sur l’importance de cet article autant que sur la question des capacit\u00e9s des missiles de croisi\u00e8re russes…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n « In support of the strategic thesis advanced in this important article, I seem to recall that the original Russian military intervention in Syria was accompanied by a volley of ultra-long-range cruise missiles, whose capabilities greatly surprised American military analysts. At the time, such a high-tech attack on ISIS positions seemed rather cost-ineffective to me, but presumably a major purpose was to dissuade America (and Israel) from considering any future attack on what was a rather small and isolated Russian expeditionary force<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Tout cela laisse \u00e0 penser que Martianov exprime, directement ou indirectement, des positions ou des conceptions sinon officielles, du moins proches des pouvoirs militaires strat\u00e9giques, et cela, hypoth\u00e9tiquement vu sa situation, aussi bien aux USA qu’en Russie<\/strong>. De m\u00eame, l’argument de l’article est-il int\u00e9ressant : c’est une r\u00e9ponse cat\u00e9gorique \u00e0 un article de Ralph Peters dans le New York Post <\/em>du 19 septembre 2017<\/a>, qui dit en substance : \u00ab\u00a0Vite, vite, d\u00e9truisons les forces russes en Syrie, et notamment leurs deux bases<\/strong>, avant qu’il ne soit trop tard pour attaquer sans risque de monter au nucl\u00e9aire (avant que les USA ne soient plus assez puissants pour attaquer de cette fa\u00e7on, purement conventionnelle)\u00a0\u00bb. C’est en effet l’argument de Peters : les USA peuvent (encore, pour l’instant) d\u00e9truire les Russes en Syrie d’une fa\u00e7on telle qu’on \u00e9vite la mont\u00e9e apocalyptique au nucl\u00e9aire strat\u00e9gique…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Nous connaissons Ralph Peters depuis longtemps (et nos lecteurs aussi, par cons\u00e9quent, esp\u00e9rons-nous…). Peters est m\u00eame l’objet de deux Glossaire.dde <\/em>(« Le Barbare jubilant<\/em> » I et II, tous les deux du 22 f\u00e9vrier 2016<\/a> et du 22 f\u00e9vrier 2016<\/a>), non \u00e0 cause de son g\u00e9nie propre mais parce qu’il repr\u00e9sente, depuis plus de vingt ans d\u00e9j\u00e0, une voix extr\u00e9miste sinon hyst\u00e9rique qui est particuli\u00e8rement significative de l’\u00e9volution de la pens\u00e9e (?) et des conceptions strat\u00e9giques de la d\u00e9mocratie am\u00e9ricaniste, et de la d\u00e9mocratie en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, tendant vers le nihilisme puis le rien et l’entropisation apocalyptiques<\/strong>. (Effectivement, un \u00ab\u00a0barbare jubilant\u00a0\u00bb…) L’article que vise Martianov est sans aucun doute de la m\u00eame eau.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Notre appr\u00e9ciation est qu’il y a l\u00e0, de la part de Martianov, et par cons\u00e9quent des milieux qu’il repr\u00e9sente directement ou indirectement, un message adress\u00e9 \u00e0 ceux dont Peters illustre la pens\u00e9e (?) et les conceptions de fa\u00e7on tonitruante et totalement d’une fureur jubilatoire<\/strong>… En l’occurrence, on dirait qu’il s’agit de dire quelque chose comme \u00ab\u00a0Halte au fou !\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Certes, le message est de cette simplicit\u00e9-l\u00e0, par le biais de la description de l’\u00e9tat de la puissance de projection des Russes, notamment des missiles conventionnels \u00e0 longue distance dont les missiles de croisi\u00e8re sont l’exemple le plus \u00e9vident : \u00ab\u00a0Attaquer les Russes en Syrie ? N’y pensez pas une seconde, car la riposte serait n\u00e9cessairement d\u00e9vastatrice.\u00a0\u00bb On peut penser qu’un tel \u00ab\u00a0message\u00a0\u00bb pourrait venir, directement ou indirectement toujours, aussi bien de milieux dirigeants et\/ou militaires des USA que de la Russie, si l’on estime qu’effectivement Peters a exprim\u00e9 une conception courant dans les milieux les plus exacerb\u00e9s du camp dit-neocon<\/em>, sentant effectivement que le d\u00e9clin de la puissance militaire US va les priver du fondement de leurs r\u00eaveries apocalyptiques. Il est tout \u00e0 fait possible, et m\u00eame tr\u00e8s probable<\/strong>, que les militaires US craignent autant que les Russes d’\u00eatre entraîn\u00e9s par l’effet public et politique de l’influence de ces milieux vers une situation catastrophique pour tout le monde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n ________________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Size does matter and so does range and speed whenever anyone talks about weapons. It seems that there is a great deal of confusion which perpetuates itself in regards to a relatively small Russian military contingent in Syria. The most popular indicator of this confusion is a never ending discussion of a possible American attack on the Russian forces in Syria, primarily on the air base Khmeimim. Can such an attack, once one considers the size of forces US can deploy against Russians, succeed in \u00ab\u00a0defeating\u00a0\u00bb them?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n This is both a legitimate but also a highly unprofessional question. In fact, there are many people of prominence in the US who apart from considering such a terrifying scenario are actually pushing for it. Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters doesn’t mince words<\/a> when it comes to attacking Russians; in fact, he is a very straight to the point guy when giving prescriptions on how to fight those Russians: This could spin out of control very, very fast. If it does, we have to win rapidly and decisively — and keep it within Syria.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n There is no doubt that Peters and the bunch of US military and political people he represents did partake in the strategic wisdom of the past, from Clausewitz to Moltke to Guderian, but it is here where a seemingly legitimate question on the probability of American success in bombing those nasty Russkies into the stone age at Khmeimim and elsewhere in Syria stops being, well, serious. Of course, US can unleash whatever it has at its conventional disposal at Khmeimim and it will eventually overwhelm whatever the Russians have there, from several SU-35s to S-300s and S-400s and, possibly, make Peters’ wet dream of keeping the whole ordeal confined to Syria very real. This would work, say against anyone’s military contingent except Russia.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n At issue here is not the fact that Russia is a nuclear superpower—everyone knows that. Even the most rabid American Russophobes know this and can grasp, however slightly, the concept of their poor dears turning into radioactive ash pretty fast if they do the unthinkable, such as attacking Russia proper with nuclear weapons. Syria, however, is a bit different—the escalation to a nuclear threshold could, indeed, be controlled by those who hold a decisive advantage conventionally. At issue here is the fact of conventional war—a precise type of a conflict US military prided itself on for the last 30+ years, boasting of being able to handle any kind of adversary.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n In the foundation of this, rather overly assertive approach, the self-assurance was the real and not so real advantage of the US in stand-off weapons. Aggression against Yugoslavia showed the US military could overwhelm the air-defense of a nation such as Serbia fairly fast and from distances far beyond the reach of its obsolete air defenses. There were Tomahawk cruise missiles, which were launched at Serbia in thousands and which rendered her air defense almost useless after the first couple of weeks of incessant bombing.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n But here is the problem for the US: Russia can take this hypothetical conventional conflict well beyond Syria any time it wants and I am not talking about other strategic theaters, such as Ukraine, where Russia can \u00ab\u00a0compensate\u00a0\u00bb for a hypothetical \u00ab\u00a0defeat\u00a0\u00bb in Syria. The reason for this is purely technological—Russia can go tit-for-tat conventionally in Syria and anywhere in the Middle East. In fact, the Russian military has in its possession the most advanced arsenal of High Precision stand-off weapons which have been demonstrated in action for the whole world to see.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n This is what makes the whole talk about \u00ab\u00a0defeating\u00a0\u00bb the Russian contingent in Syria very amateurish. War is much more than some shoot-out between belligerents, the war starts in the operational rooms and political offices well before any shot is fired. If the Russian contingent in Syria had been deployed there say in 2005, there would have been no problem in imagining Ralph Peters’ scenario. But it is not 2005 and an 800 pound gorilla, which many continue to ignore, in the room is Russia’s stand-off capability—it is simply much better than the American one and it opens an operational door, in case of a hypothetical conventional attack on Kheimim, for a massive retaliation against any US asset in the region.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Yesterday, in the wake of the death of Lieutenant General Asapov in Syria, allegedly with some \u00ab\u00a0help\u00a0\u00bb from the so called Coalition in the vicinity of the liberated Deir-ez-Zor, Russia’s strategic aviation launched long-range stealthy X-101 cruise missiles at ISIS targets in Syria. There is nothing new now in Russia’s using 5,500+ kilometer range cruise missile, nor is there news any more for the Russian Navy being able to launch 2,500+ kilometer range 3M14 of Kalibr family from anywhere in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Caspian Sea. These are ranges which are simply beyond the reach of any stand-off weapon in US arsenal with Tomahawk TLAM-A Block II having the maximum range of around 2,500 kilometers while TLAM Block IV, currently being most produced variety, having the range of 1,600 kilometers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Raytheon says that these missiles are capable of loitering and that Tomahawk would be able to hit moving targets. It is all fine and dandy but the key is range and precision and here the US is not in the leading position to put it mildly. Range gives an unprecedented operational flexibility and yesterday’s launch from Russian Tu-95 Bears strategic bombers had a very serious message—not in terms of X-101′s range, even longer range cruise missiles are getting ready for procurement, with ranges in 10,000 kilometers vicinity. The message was in the fact that missiles were launched from Iranian and Iraqi aerospace. They didn’t have to do so, this could have been easily done from the area of the Caspian Sea. But Bears launched while being escorted in Iranian aerospace by Su-30s and Su-35s of Russian Air Space Forces and that, apart from obvious hint at Russian full capability to reach any US ground asset in the area, provided some ominous signs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Iran knows for sure that should the unthinkable but not improbable happen, such as an American attack on the Russian forces in Syria, Iran will not be left standing on the side—she gets immediately \u00ab\u00a0involved\u00a0\u00bb whether she wants it or not. So, the logic goes, why not make the best of it when all bets, other than nuclear, will be off. Iran may as well have Russian forces on her side and in her airspace, which, obviously helps significantly. But that also opens another serious operational possibility in case of a real conventional conflict in the area between Russia and the US—a scenario Neocons, due to their military illiteracy and overall detachment from the strategic reality, are dreaming about. Putting inevitable emotions aside and looking at the factual side of things, Russia’s Military Doctrine since 2010, reaffirmed in 2014 Edition, views the use of stand-off High Precision as a key in strategic force containment, as Article 26 of a doctrine clearly states. Russia doesn’t want war with the US, but if push comes to shove Russia is totally capable of not only reaching US ground assets, such as CENTCOM’s Qatar forward installation but, what is even more significant, also the naval ones in the Persian Gulf.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Apart from 66 long-range strategic bombers, the Tu-160s and Tu-95s, Russia has at her disposal more than 100 TU-22M3 bombers many of which are capable of both inflight refueling and of carrying a rather intimidating weapon—the X-32 (Kh-32) cruise missile whose range is 1000 kilometers and the speed is in excess of Mach 4.2. This missile, apart from being able to attack anything on the ground, is capable in fact was designed primarily for the purpose, of hitting anything moving on the surface of the sea. The missile, let alone a salvo of those, is incredibly difficult if possible at all to intercept and as yesterday’s demonstration showed, Iran, most likely would have no problem with allowing these very TU-22M3s to operate from her airspace in case of the worst case scenario. Launched anywhere from Darab area the salvo will not only cover all of a Persian Gulf but will reliably close off Gulf of Oman for any naval force. No ship, no Carrier Battle Group will be able to enter this area in case of a conventional conflict with Russia in Syria—the strategic ramifications of this are enormous. Even the salvo of 3M14s from Caspian Sea on October 7, 2015 made such an impression that USS Theodore Roosevelt<\/em> and her CBG almost immediately left the Gulf<\/a><\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Moreover, this simple, single operational fact shows precisely why for two years a relatively small Russian military contingent has been able to operate so effectively in Syria and, in fact, dictate conditions on the ground and in the area of its operations. The answer is simple—many adrenaline junkies are lowered in a cage into the water to face sharks, with only metal rods separating them and sharks’ deadly jaws. Yet, up there, in the boat one can always put a man with a gun which can be used in case of emergency to a deadly effect should the cage give. The Russian military contingent in Syria is not just some military base—it is the force tightly integrated with Russian Armed Forces that have enough reach and capability to make anyone face some extremely unpleasant choices, including the fact that it is Russia, not the US, who controls escalation to a threshold and that can explain a non-stop anti-Russian hysteria in US media since the outcome of the war in Syria became clear. Let us only hope that all described above remains merely speculation and has no basis in real life—if those scenarios do not become reality, it is all for the better.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Message personnel : \u00ab\u00a0Halte au fou !\u00a0\u00bb Cet article nous paraît tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressant pour compl\u00e9ter le F&C du 28 septembre 2017 sur « Le paradoxe syrien de Poutine », et ajoutant qu’il trouve ses compl\u00e9ments mim\u00e9tiques dans divers textes sur la puissance militaire US, notamment celui qui est publi\u00e9 aujourd’hui, ce m\u00eame 30 septembre 2017.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[13453,12925,2631,13455,13454,2970,3250,3704,3249,3867],"class_list":["post-77522","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-andrei","tag-croisiere","tag-de","tag-kalibr","tag-martianov","tag-missiles","tag-peters","tag-porte-avions","tag-ralph","tag-syrie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77522","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77522"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77522\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77522"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=77522"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=77522"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}\n
dde.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n
Russia’s Stand-Off Capability: The 800 Pound Gorilla in Syria<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Andrei Martianov<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"