Quelles que soient les conditions \u00e0 venir en Syrie, les possibilit\u00e9s de l’\u00e9tablissement d’une v\u00e9ritable paix, les risques de red\u00e9marrages d’hostilit\u00e9s intensives, une phase s’est achev\u00e9e \u00e0 la mi-d\u00e9cembre avec un retrait partiel des forces russes suivant une campagne a\u00e9ro-terrestre commenc\u00e9e en septembre 2015 (avec l’accent sur la dimension a\u00e9rienne), avec l’installation d’une structure g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de coordination avec les autres forces alli\u00e9es (syrienne, iranienne et Hezbollah), d’une structure de contr\u00f4le \u00e9lectronique de l’espace a\u00e9rien, avec un effort consid\u00e9rable de formation et d’impulsion de ces m\u00eames forces alli\u00e9es jusqu’\u00e0 leur transformation radicale, et tout cela avec des effectifs tr\u00e8s r\u00e9duits mais extr\u00eamement souples et d’un rythme d’emploi ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nal. Cette campagne se traduit par « une victoire russe en Syrie<\/em> [constituant] un des grands \u00e9v\u00e8nements de ce si\u00e8cle et, probablement, le seul exemple d’une campagne op\u00e9rationnelle militaire r\u00e9ussie dans une si courte p\u00e9riode de temps avec des r\u00e9sultats extr\u00eamement positifs et leur prolongement politique, ouvrant la voie \u00e0 un processus de n\u00e9gociation<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Ce jugement de l’expert militaire russe Andrei Akoulov d\u00e9finit une longue analyse, extr\u00eamement d\u00e9taill\u00e9e du point de vue technique et op\u00e9rationnel de l’engagement russe. Les mat\u00e9riels et leurs emplois sont examin\u00e9s pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, ainsi que les r\u00e9sultats obtenus, les pertes subies (extr\u00eamement faibles), le rythme des op\u00e9rations, le moral, l’allant et l’initiative des forces, etc. Akoulov met l’accent sur l’aspect le moins quantifiable et le moins spectaculaire, mais sans doute le plus important et le plus profond : une formidable exp\u00e9rience op\u00e9rationnelle acquise par les forces russe, qui devrait transcender l’effort de modernisation et de restructuration des arm\u00e9es russes en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, en inscrivant en termes op\u00e9rationnels int\u00e9gr\u00e9s les effets de cette campagne sur la coh\u00e9sion et l’efficacit\u00e9 de l’arm\u00e9e russe en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Il est manifeste qu’Akoulov estime que l’arm\u00e9e russe a acquis une formidable capacit\u00e9 de projection de force qu’il estime in fine<\/em>, en termes qualitatifs, en termes de rapidit\u00e9, de capacit\u00e9 et de pr\u00e9cision d’action, comme sans \u00e9quivalent dans le monde. On est assez ais\u00e9ment convaincu par le dossier qu’il pr\u00e9sente, notamment gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la minutie de la description qui correspond aux op\u00e9rations comme nous les avons suivies en temps r\u00e9el. Cette description pourrait \u00eatre d\u00e9crite comme \u00ab\u00a0de la propagande\u00a0\u00bb, mais le caract\u00e8re \u00e9tonnant de la \u00ab\u00a0propagande russe\u00a0\u00bb dans ce cas comme dans beaucoup d’autres pr\u00e9sente, \u00e0 cause de la narrative<\/em> et du simulacre anim\u00e9s par une sottise sans bornes qui r\u00e8gnent en face, le caract\u00e8re in\u00e9dit d’\u00e9noncer des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s-de-situation<\/a> : la \u00ab\u00a0propagande\u00a0\u00bb se r\u00e9alise sans douleur par l’\u00e9nonc\u00e9 des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s v\u00e9rifiables par ceux qui \u00e9chappent au d\u00e9terminisme-narrativiste<\/a>, tant ces v\u00e9rit\u00e9s sont dommageables au bloc-BAO… Ou la \u00ab\u00a0propagande\u00a0\u00bb par la v\u00e9rit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Avec la Syrie, suivant la d\u00e9monstration pr\u00e9liminaire de la Crim\u00e9e-2014, l’arm\u00e9e russe a compl\u00e8tement transform\u00e9 et renvers\u00e9 les caract\u00e8res de l’\u00e9norme Arm\u00e9e Rouge du temps de l’Union Sovi\u00e9tique de la guerre froide, qui se caract\u00e9risait par le nombre jusqu’\u00e0 la pl\u00e9thore, la lourdeur bureaucratique, le gaspillage, l’absence d’initiative et le moral tr\u00e8s bas, la lenteur qui va avec tout cela, etc. Ces tares sont d\u00e9sormais r\u00e9serv\u00e9es aux forces arm\u00e9es des USA, surcharg\u00e9es de technologies inutiles et souvent contre-productives du fait de leur complexit\u00e9, soumises \u00e0 des contraintes bureaucratiques sinon id\u00e9ologiques et soci\u00e9tales, subverties par des pratiques douteuses avec des auxiliaires tels que des mercenaires, des bandes du crime organis\u00e9e, des \u00ab\u00a0alli\u00e9s\u00a0\u00bb de type djihadistes et autres accouch\u00e9es par les \u00ab\u00a0coups tordues\u00a0\u00bb de la CIA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Texte d’Akoulov de Strategic-Culture.org<\/em>, repris sur Russia Insider le 22 d\u00e9cembre 2017<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n _______________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n …And tested numerous weapons. It’s safe to say that with two years of Syria under its belt its military is a far more capable beast than two years ago.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n The active phase of Russia’s military campaign in Syria is over. Russian President Vladimir Putin told his visiting Syrian counterpart, Bashar al-Assad, on Nov.21 that the operation against terrorists in Syria is coming to an end, with the focus shifting to a political process. The Russian president ordered<\/a> a partial withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria during a visit to the war-torn country on Dec.11. Now the time has come for diplomats, not guns, to talk.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Russia’s victory in Syria is one of the main events of this century and, probably, the only example of successful military operation achieved in a short period of time with positive results, paving the way for a negotiation process.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n When the operation was launched in September 2015, President Bashar Assad’s administration was on the verge of collapse, his forces losing on all fronts. It was predicted that Russia would slide into a protracted conflict, which would be sapping its resources while producing no results. Many believed that Russia’s military was incapable<\/a> of sustaining a long-term deployment so far from Russia’s shores.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Those predictions were wrong. The operation is a success story. Syria has not turned out to be a quagmire for Russia, no rerun Afghanistan. The doomsayers have been proven wrong.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The Syrian government has become stronger and is firmly in power, the Islamic State is routed and the remnants of jihadist rebel forces control only a part of the Idlib province, and being reduced to insignificance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The victory was achieved with very limited forces employed. No significant deployments of Russian troops have taken place. The casualties are minimal – 41 men in two years. The Aerospace Forces group was estimated at 30-50 combat aircraft and 16-40 helicopters on average. The operational tempo was very high during the active phase – up to 100 sorties delivering around 250 strikes. As of late September, the Aerospace Forces had flown 30,650 combat sorties in Syria delivering around 92,000 strikes against 96,800 terrorist targets. 53,700 terrorists had been eliminated. All in all, Russia has lost three airplanes. One was hit by a Turkish plane and two aircraft carrier-based airplanes – Su-33 and MiG-29K – were lost as a result of accidents, not enemy fire. Russian drones have flown about 15,000 sorties.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Special forces teams have been active ever since the start of the Russian operation in Syria. They not only call in air and cruise missile strikes but also take part directly in armed clashes with terrorists.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The Russian forces have been well-supplied by cargo planes landing daily and ships arriving at the Mediterranean ports of Tartus and Latakia.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n As a result, terrorist formations have been cut off from supply routes. And financial flows from illegal oil shipments have been stopped.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The training provided by Russian advisers<\/a> has greatly enhanced the Syrian personnel’s professional skills, enabling the government forces to score one victory after another. Russian support personnel and special operators often accompanied Syrian army units in combat. Russia high-ranking officers and generals on training, advisory and assist missions often led Syrian troops to victories sharing their experience and expertise. The personnel of the 5th Volunteer Assault Corps – the Syrian Army’s main strike force – was recruited by Russian commanders, hand-picking the right candidates and equipping them with Russian hardware.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Almost all senior Russian military commanders have received combat experience in Syria. Many have learned how to command joint forces and organize humanitarian operations. As of September 2017, 86% of the Aerospace Forces’ flying personnel gained combat experience, including long-range aviation crews: 75%, tactical aviation crews: 79%, military transport aviation: 88%. 89% of Army aviation crews have also served in Syria.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Syria has become a testing ground for Russian weapon systems, many of them offered for sale to other countries. The Aerospace Forces used Su-24M and Su-25 attack aircraft, Su-34 fighter-bombers, Tu-22M3, Tu-160 and Tu-95 long-range strategic bombers, Su-27SM, Su-30SM and Su-35S multirole fighters, MiG-31 interceptors, Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-28N, Ka-52 combat helicopters, A-50 early warning aircraft, Tu-214R reconnaissance aircraft, Il-20M1 electronic intelligence and electronic warfare aircraft. All in all, Russia has tested over 160 weapons<\/a> in Syria, with only 10 of them performing below expectations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The Russian aircraft use the new SVP-24<\/a> special computing subsystem to enhance the precision of the strikes. It is installed on Tu-22M, Su-24M and Su-25 combat aircraft. The subsystem uses GLONASS satellite navigation system to constantly compare the position of the aircraft and the target. It measures the environmental parameters and receives information from datalinks to compute an «envelope» (speed, altitude, course) inside which a gravity bomb is automatically released at the precise moment. Even if GLONASS were jammed, the countless sensors would allow the computer to give a targeting solution. As a result, the gravity bombs strike with the same precision as modern guided munitions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Lessons learned from their Syrian operation are taken home, and that knowledge is incorporated. The Syrian campaign showed that Russia’s new advanced Su-34<\/a>, Su-35S <\/a>, and the Su-30SM<\/a> required minor modifications to their flight controls and engines as a result of combat experience. The problems were corrected on the spot. The performance of the Su-34 using weapons like the KAB-500S GLONASS-guided bomb and guided missiles like the Kh-25ML and the Kh-29L was impressive enough to earn an award for Sergei Smirnov, the director of the Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Association. Mi-24P helicopters<\/a> were also engaged, strafing enemy positions at low altitude while firing off flares to avoid being hit by man-portable surface-to-air missiles. SU-35s have also been selling particularly well. China purchased<\/a> 24 of them in November 2015, Indonesia purchased 10 in April 2016, and the United Arab Emirates<\/a> also bought 10 in March.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Russia’s newest Kh-101<\/a> air-to-surface cruise missiles – the most modern weapon, with high-precision and high-power, and a decent range of 4,500 kilometers – showed a very high degree of reliability. They were launched by Tu-95 and Tu-160<\/a> strategic bombers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The ability to fire long-range sea- and air-launched cruise missiles shows that Russia no longer has to rely exclusively on nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Among the sophisticated weapons Russia used in Syria, the Kalibr<\/a> sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) launched from surface and underwater platforms against land-based stationary targets located at a distance of more than 1,500 km away, has prompted the keenest interest. Frigates, corvettes and submarines in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Caspian Sea served as platforms to launch the weapons. The launches from the vertical launch systems (VLS) of the surface combatants and the torpedo tubes of the submarines were smooth. There is no doubt that the usage of the Kalibr missiles during the operation in Syria will drastically increase the export potential of the weapon.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The Krasnopol 152-mm cannon-launched, fin-stabilized, base bleed-assisted, semi-automatic laser-guided, explosive projectile is another weapon to be mentioned here. The range is 30km. It automatically ‘homes in’ on a point illuminated by a laser designator, typically operated by a ground-based artillery observer. It is fired mainly from Russian self-propelled howitzers such as the 2S3 Akatsiya and 2S19 Msta-S and intended to engage ground targets such as tanks, artillery pieces, and strong-points. The kill probability is 90% to make it a perfect weapon for urban warfare.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The T-90 tank has proven to be a very efficient workhorse. It has survived and remained operational even after being hit<\/a> by US-made TOW anti-tank missiles launched by terrorists.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The 15Ts56M BPDM<\/a> or Typhoon-M anti-sabotage armored vehicles were able to overcome any terrain to deliver troops (16 men) and cargo where needed at the speed of 110km\/h. The combat experience in Syria has shown that it can withstand direct hits from rocket-propelled grenades. It is also effective for humanitarian operations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The operation in Syria highlighted the lack of large landing ships. France refused to comply with its contract to sell to Russia two Mistral amphibious assault ships under US pressure to punish Moscow for reunifying with Crimea. Russia has managed to cope with the problem without outside help. Ivan Gren<\/em>, a large amphibious ship is going through final trials<\/a> before joining service with Russian Navy. That’s how lessons learned translate into deeds.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The experience acquired and lessons learned from using air power, modern technology and special operations will define Russia’s military planning for years to come. The operation has completely turned the tide in Syria. It has deprived the terrorists of a major part of their revenues, severely undermining their capabilities in recruiting new adherents, buying weapons and disseminating jihadist ideology. The success has created the conditions for launching Russia’s initiative to promote a cease-fire between the Syrian government and \u00ab\u00a0moderate\u00a0\u00bb opposition groups. Battlefields have turned into de-escalation zones promoted by the Russia-, Turkey-, and Iran-led Astana peace process. The hope of Syrians for normal life has been revived. Moscow has turned into the leading mediator to smooth differences between pertinent actors involved in the Syrian conflict. Russia is to host the Syria "Congress of Syrian National Dialogue" this month to bring together all the parties to Syria’s conflict.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The military operation in Syria has also reaffirmed Russia’s status as a global superpower capable of projecting force far from its own borders. Its regional footprint comes with a degree of clout to make it a key stakeholder in the Middle East. Russia has demonstrated the ability to strike deals with various key players, including Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Jordan … you name it. In October, the Saudi king visited<\/a> Moscow. Russia has an understanding with Cairo to allow its warplanes to use Egyptian air bases. The two nations are concerned about the unstable situation in Libya.<\/p>\n<\/p>\ndde.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n
An Immense Military Experience in Syria<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
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