{"id":78145,"date":"2018-08-31T15:12:34","date_gmt":"2018-08-31T15:12:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2018\/08\/31\/vostok-18-a-bon-entendeur-salut\/"},"modified":"2018-08-31T15:12:34","modified_gmt":"2018-08-31T15:12:34","slug":"vostok-18-a-bon-entendeur-salut","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2018\/08\/31\/vostok-18-a-bon-entendeur-salut\/","title":{"rendered":"Vostok<\/em>-18\u00a0: \u00e0 bon entendeur, salut"},"content":{"rendered":"

Vostok<\/em>-18 : \u00e0 bon entendeur, salut<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

En Syrie, dans la r\u00e9gion d’Iblid, et en M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e orientale au large de la Syrie, se poursuivent les p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties de la trag\u00e9die-bouffe autour du dernier montage d’une Attaque-Chimique-Bidon, sous \u00ab\u00a0faux-drapeau\u00a0\u00bb largement d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 et extr\u00eamement identifi\u00e9, – les Russes ne cessant de diffuser informations et mat\u00e9riels de communication divers, y compris des images, sur les activit\u00e9s de la chose ; jusqu’\u00e0 les communiquer \u00e0 leurs \u00ab\u00a0partenaires\u00a0\u00bb<\/a> du d\u00e9partement d’État pour les informer de ce qu’ils (ces susdits-\u00ab\u00a0partenaires\u00a0\u00bb) sont en train de pr\u00e9parer eux-m\u00eames. Pendant ce temps, les Russes affutent leurs forces a\u00e9riennes pour soutenir avec force l’attaque syrienne contre cette r\u00e9gion devenue un point de rassemblement massif pour les djihadistes extr\u00e9mistes soutenus par les USA, comme il se doit, et derni\u00e8re r\u00e9gion de la Syrie hors du contr\u00f4le du gouvernement. Du point de vue naval, les flottes US et russe se renforcent au large de la Syrie, avec semble-t-il un net avantage num\u00e9rique et une technologie tr\u00e8s avanc\u00e9e du c\u00f4t\u00e9 russe, où l’on effectue des manœuvres<\/a>…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

(Cette situation renouvelle la surprise horrifi\u00e9e du CNO de l’US Navy d’alors, l’amiral Zumwalt, en septembre 1970, lors de la crise jordano-palestinienne dite \u00ab\u00a0Septembre noir\u00a0\u00bb. Dans une audition au Congr\u00e8s peu apr\u00e8s, Zumwalt avait d\u00e9clar\u00e9 que, pour la premi\u00e8re fois depuis que l’US Navy avait une pr\u00e9sence globale, depuis 1945, elle s’\u00e9tait trouv\u00e9e en M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e, lors d’une crise, face \u00e0 une flotte russe [sovi\u00e9tique] sup\u00e9rieure num\u00e9riquement et en puissance de feu.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Mais pour l’instant, – avec \u00e0 l’esprit la possibilit\u00e9 de changements tr\u00e8s rapides de situation strat\u00e9gique, – le point strat\u00e9gico-militaire essentiel se trouve plut\u00f4t \u00e0 Omsk, \u00e0 partir d’où l’on pourra suivre l’exercice Vostok<\/em>-2018, ou Vostok<\/em>-18, dans la r\u00e9gion Trans-Ba\u00efkal de la Sib\u00e9rie Orientale, du 11 au 15 septembre. Andrei Akoulov nous donne, dans Sytrategic-Culture.org <\/em>ce 31 août<\/a> une id\u00e9e de la massivit\u00e9 de cet exercice, qui peut pr\u00e9tendre \u00eatre le plus \u00ab\u00a0grand exercice de toute l’histoire militaire\u00a0\u00bb <\/strong>(qualification \u00e0 d\u00e9battre, mais qui a nombre d’arguments en sa faveur) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

« [Vostok-18]verra la participation d’\u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s 300 000 hommes, 36 000 pi\u00e8ces d’\u00e9quipements militaires d’artillerie, blind\u00e9s et motoris\u00e9s, plus de 1 000 avions de combat, l’implication de deux Flottes <\/em>[celles du Pacifique et de la Mer du Nord] et toutes les unit\u00e9s a\u00e9roport\u00e9es. A peu pr\u00e8s un tiers de toutes les forces arm\u00e9es russes participeront \u00e0 Vostok-18<\/em>… […]La contribution chinoise<\/em>[\u00e0 cet exercice russe] est tr\u00e8s significative, avec 3 200 hommes, 900 pi\u00e8ces d’\u00e9quipements d’artillerie, blind\u00e9s et motoris\u00e9s, et une trentaine d’avions de combat et d’h\u00e9licopt\u00e8res<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

On jugera remarquable de l’\u00e9volution de la puissance militaire russe que la Russie puisse ainsi tenir deux points strat\u00e9giques d’activit\u00e9 militaire, – bien sûr pour deux buts tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rentes, – avec autant de moyens et autant de capacit\u00e9s de coordination et d’organisation<\/strong>. M\u00eame si la strat\u00e9gie russe insiste sur sa posture d\u00e9fensive et son peu de goût pour la projection de forces, les circonstances poussent sinon obligent la Russie \u00e0 manifester sa puissance militaire dans le sens de l’expansion et, au moins, d’une \u00ab\u00a0projection de communication\u00a0\u00bb de ses capacit\u00e9s militaires<\/strong>. Au reste, Vostok-<\/em>18 aura un compl\u00e9ment strat\u00e9gico-\u00e9conomique puisque se tiendra les 11-13 septembre le Eastern Economic Forum<\/a>, \u00e0 Vladivostok, où Poutine tiendra sommet avec l’alli\u00e9 Xi Jinping et saluera le pr\u00e9sident sud-cor\u00e9en Moon et le premier ministre japonais Abe qui seront \u00e9galement pr\u00e9sents. Tout cela vu dans les jumelles \u00e0 infra-rouges otaniennes-BAO, c’est du lourd<\/strong>…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Pour explorer la chose (Vostok<\/em>-18) plus en d\u00e9tails, nous avons choisi le texte d’un vieux renard du commentaire sur les choses russes et de la sph\u00e8re euro-asiatique avec un int\u00e9r\u00eat penchant vers l’Est, l’ancien diplomate indien M.K. Bhadrakumar. C’est du point de vue de la grande strat\u00e9gie politique que Bhadrakumar observe l’exercice, notamment en explorant les aspects politiques du fait que Vostok<\/em>-18 marque la r\u00e9alisation op\u00e9rationnelle de l’alliance russo-chinoise, – et Bhadrakumar insiste bien sur ceci : Russes et Chinois ne sont, ni des \u00ab\u00a0partenaires\u00a0\u00bb, ni des \u00ab\u00a0partenaires strat\u00e9giques\u00a0\u00bb, mais bien des \u00ab\u00a0alli\u00e9s\u00a0\u00bb<\/strong> ; cela implique de facto <\/em>un engagement strat\u00e9gique cons\u00e9quent, qui se retrouve dans l’exercice certes, mais qui se manifeste d’une fa\u00e7on concr\u00e8te voire op\u00e9rationnelle sur les \u00ab\u00a0th\u00e9\u00e2tres\u00a0\u00bb de la Cor\u00e9e du Nord, de l’Iran avec l’accord sur le nucl\u00e9aire, et bien entendu de la Syrie. Bhadrakumar expose l’avancement de la formidable \u00ab\u00a0alliance\u00a0\u00bb entre la Chine et la Russie <\/strong>d’une fa\u00e7on d\u00e9taill\u00e9e et convaincante, impliquant en contrepartie l’effrayante nullit\u00e9 strat\u00e9gique du bloc-BAO qui, depuis 2007-2010, et \u00e0 fond la caisse depuis 2014, porte la responsabilit\u00e9 quasi-directe de ce rapprochement strat\u00e9gique d\u00e9cisif<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Bhadrakumar, comme nombre de commentateurs, met d’autre part en \u00e9vidence que Vostok<\/em>-18 est le plus grand exercice de l’arm\u00e9e russe bien entendu, mais surtout le plus grand de l’arm\u00e9e rouge\/russe depuis Zapad-81<\/a><\/em>, avec plus de 100 000 hommes, dans la partie occidentale de l’URSS, avec des forces de pays du Pacte de Varsovie, \u00e0 la fin de l’automne 1981 comme un avertissement donn\u00e9 \u00e0 la Pologne en pleine r\u00e9volution-Solidarnosc <\/em>sur les capacit\u00e9s d’intervention de l’URSS. Les Polonais comprirent le message et le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Jaruzelski d\u00e9clara l’\u00e9tat de si\u00e8ge fin-d\u00e9cembre 1981, emp\u00eachant l’intervention sovi\u00e9tique et jouant un r\u00f4le remarquable pour \u00e9viter dans les ann\u00e9es qui suivirent l’irr\u00e9parable (l’intervention sovi\u00e9tique) et pr\u00e9parer la transition d\u00e9mocratique. On ne fait certes pas une comparaison de situation, qu’on verrait presque invers\u00e9e, mais une comparaison sur la teneur du message : comme l’URSS en 1981, pour la mauvaise cause dira-t-on, il y a des choses que la Russie, pour la bonne cause estime-t-elle cette fois, n’acceptera pas<\/strong>. Pechkov, porte-parole de Poutine, a observ\u00e9 que Vostok<\/em>-18 se d\u00e9roule dans le contexte d’« une situation internationale courante qui est fr\u00e9quemment marqu\u00e9e par une grande agressivit\u00e9 et un caract\u00e8re inamical pour notre pays<\/em> » ; cela, sans le moindre doute \u00e0 destination de l’OTAN.<\/strong>..<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

… On esp\u00e8re que c’est inform\u00e9 de ce contexte que nous avons d\u00e9velopp\u00e9, – ce qui impliquerait qu’il est au courant des choses de la strat\u00e9gie du monde, – que le pr\u00e9sident fran\u00e7ais Macron a lanc\u00e9 l’id\u00e9e de la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’un « \u00ab\u00a0aggiornamento complet de notre relation avec la Russie\u00a0\u00bb pour ne pas rester sur \u00ab\u00a0des erreurs ou des incompr\u00e9hensions des deux derni\u00e8res d\u00e9cennies\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/strong>. \u00ab\u00a0Notre int\u00e9r\u00eat est d’avoir des partenariats strat\u00e9giques, y compris en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense, avec nos voisins les plus proches\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-il ajout\u00e9 en \u00e9voquant notamment la relation entre l’UE et la Russie<\/em>. » (L’intervention de Macron, lors de sa visite en Finlande, est notamment d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 ici, sur le pourvoyeur sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9 de FakeNews <\/em>en France, soit RT-fran\u00e7ais du 31 août<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Ci-dessous, le texte MK Bhadrakumar, sur Strategic-Culture.org<\/em>, le 31 août 2018<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n

________________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Russia and China in Alliance Conditions<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

Three things stand out in the remarks made by the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Tuesday in the context of Russia’s forthcoming Vostok-2018 military exercise in the Trans-Baikal Region in East Siberia during September 11-15.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

At the obvious level, Peskov was speaking from the picturesque southwestern city of Omsk where he was accompanying President Vladimir Putin. Nothing that Peskov says can be unintentional and his remarks from Omsk carried added resonance, because he was also speaking from a vantage point in Russian history – from a garrison town founded by the Siberian Cossacks four centuries ago.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Second, Peskov was speaking about the forthcoming Vostok-2018, which is already being noticed in the international opinion, including in western media, as a military exercise of strategic significance. Peskov indirectly referred to the NATO’s belligerent military posturing toward Russia when he said that Vostok-2018 is taking place in the backdrop of \u00ab\u00a0the current international situation, which is frequently quite aggressive and unfriendly for our country.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Only a few hours before Peskov spoke, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu had said that the drills will be unprecedented in their scope and will involve about 300,000 troops and over 1,000 aircraft. The Vostok-2018 will focus on \u00ab\u00a0traditional security\u00a0\u00bb (read wars, external territorial aggression) as against \u00ab\u00a0non-traditional security\u00a0\u00bb (terrorism, separatism, religious extremism, etc.) and it is billed as the biggest Russian exercise since the famous Zapad-81 drills. Of course, the former Soviet Union’s Warsaw Pact allies had participated in the Zapad-81.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Taking all of the above into account, it was Peskov’s remark regarding China’s participation in the Vostok-2018 strategic drills that acquires salience. Peskov said, "This (China’s participation) speaks about the expansion of interaction of the two allies in all the spheres."<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Now, this is a profoundly significant choice of words. In all these decades since the 1960s, it is impossible to recall a top Kremlin official characterizing Russia and China as \u00ab\u00a0two allies in all the spheres.\u00a0\u00bb The common idiom is that they are \u00ab\u00a0partners\u00a0\u00bb. Officially, the Sino-Russian relations are described as \u00ab\u00a0comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

But there is no big surprise that the Sino-Russian relations have reached alliance conditions. The fashionable western interpretation is that the Kiev Euromaidan (2014) and the sanctions against Russia that followed had pushed Russia reluctantly into a Chinese embrace. But this is more of a self-serving western notion, since Russia’s \u00ab\u00a0pivot to China\u00a0\u00bb by far predates the regime change in Ukraine and had much to do with Moscow’s strategic focus on the global shift in power to the East and about turning Russia into a hub of intra-Asian trade and cooperation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Equally, Western analysts faltered in their estimation that \u00ab\u00a0Unfortunately for Putin, Moscow has limited capacity to make its pivot dreams a reality\u00a0\u00bb – to quote from a 2013 essay by Fiona Hill who presently serves in the National Security Council in the White House. But then, these alliance conditions have been consciously fostered through sustained efforts, often at the highest levels of leadership in Moscow and Beijing, and it is all too obvious today that they stand on firm foundations of mutual understanding and a rapidly expanding economic cooperation that is to mutual advantage.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

What is the kind of alliance that Russia and China could have? For a start, what the two countries will not have is at once obvious if the obsolete North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is taken as the readily available benchmark. Evidently, no alliance headquarters is going to be built at a cost of 1.17 billion euros and there isn’t going to be any interest to define the casus foederis of the Russian-Chinese alliance. Nor is there going to be anything like NATO’s $6 billion defence budget in 2017 (which is expected to jump to $7.8 billion in 2020.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Most certainly, the Russia-China alliance will not be riveted on cost-accounting principles of the sort US President Donald Trump is constantly dinning into the ears of his European allies. Needless to say, there aren’t going to be any \u00ab\u00a0standing forces\u00a0\u00bb on active duty on a permanent basis – or any grandiose notions that some day the Russian-Chinese alliance will blossom into a global security organization, with its tentacles reaching out into the heart of Africa.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

On the other hand, the Russia-China alliance will also be a \u00ab\u00a0unique community of values\u00a0\u00bb, as NATO keeps proclaiming itself. Conceivably, these \u00ab\u00a0values\u00a0\u00bb will include strict adherence to international law and the UN Charter, respect for national sovereignty – no Libya or Iraq-style interventions, for example – and the peaceful resolution of disputes and differences without the use of force. However, one cardinal difference with the NATO will be that unlike the latter, which takes cover behind inchoate \u00ab\u00a0values\u00a0\u00bb such as \u00ab\u00a0liberty\u00a0\u00bb, \u00ab\u00a0rule of law\u00a0\u00bb, \u00ab\u00a0democracy\u00a0\u00bb, et al, the Russian-Chinese alliance will be focused and purposive on the strengthening of a multipolar world order.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Arguably, the Russian-Chinese alliance will be in sync with the spirit of our times – unlike NATO, which must constantly justify its raison d’etre through the juxtaposition of an \u00ab\u00a0enemy\u00a0\u00bb, caught up in the tragic predicament of having to stir up paranoia and xenophobia among member states in order to simply keep the herd from wandering away toward greener pastures.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Where the Russia-China alliance has an advantage is that it is a new type of alliance that allows the two countries to pursue their national interests while also creating space for each other through mutual support and foreign-policy coordination to maneuver optimally in the prevailing volatile international environment where it is no longer possible for any single power to exercise global hegemony. Indeed, the Sino-Russian coordination is working well in the Syrian conflict, the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Iran nuclear issue or the struggle against terrorism and has become a factor of peace and regional stability.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Peskov’s meaningful description of China as Russia’s ally provides a new perspective on the forthcoming visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Russia and his expected participation in the Eastern Economic Forum summit in Vladivostok next month.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

MK Bhadrakumar<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Vostok-18 : \u00e0 bon entendeur, salut En Syrie, dans la r\u00e9gion d’Iblid, et en M\u00e9diterran\u00e9e orientale au large de la Syrie, se poursuivent les p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties de la trag\u00e9die-bouffe autour du dernier montage d’une Attaque-Chimique-Bidon, sous \u00ab\u00a0faux-drapeau\u00a0\u00bb largement d\u00e9ploy\u00e9 et extr\u00eamement identifi\u00e9, – les Russes ne cessant de diffuser informations et mat\u00e9riels de communication divers, y… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[17812,2996,5474,2913,9585,9161,2827,18514,18512,18513,3867,18511],"class_list":["post-78145","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-17812","tag-alliance","tag-bhadrakumar","tag-les","tag-manoeuvres","tag-plus","tag-pologne","tag-puissantes","tag-russie-chine","tag-siberie","tag-syrie","tag-zapad-81"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78145","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=78145"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78145\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=78145"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=78145"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=78145"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}