{"id":78201,"date":"2018-10-01T14:49:18","date_gmt":"2018-10-01T14:49:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2018\/10\/01\/fable-narrative-f-35-et-s-300-en-syrie\/"},"modified":"2018-10-01T14:49:18","modified_gmt":"2018-10-01T14:49:18","slug":"fable-narrative-f-35-et-s-300-en-syrie","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2018\/10\/01\/fable-narrative-f-35-et-s-300-en-syrie\/","title":{"rendered":"Fable &\u00a0narrative\u00a0<\/em>: F-35 et S-300 en Syrie"},"content":{"rendered":"

Fable & narrative <\/em>: F-35 et S-300 en Syrie<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

Le S-300 est un mythe… Le F-35, sigle d\u00e9sormais g\u00e9n\u00e9rique et \u00e9m\u00e9rite du JSF, ou F-35, ne l’est pas moins. Ainsi trouve-t-on, aujourd’hui en Syrie, deux mythes face-\u00e0-face ; dans tous les cas, du point de vue de la communication c’est fait, sans savoir une seconde si l’op\u00e9rationnel (la v\u00e9rit\u00e9-de-situation<\/a> en l’occurrence) suivra. Mais \u00ab\u00a0en m\u00eame temps\u00a0\u00bb comme l’on dit, exactement en m\u00eame temps, l’on sait que l’on tient sur ce site que le syst\u00e8me de la communication est sans aucun doute le domaine de puissance le plus important aujourd’hui. Aussi importe-t-il assez peu de savoir si le duel aura lieu stricto sensu<\/em>, tout se passe comme s’il avait d\u00e9j\u00e0 lieu… <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Ces derniers jours, et consid\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00ab\u00a0hors-Syrie\u00a0\u00bb (donc \u00ab\u00a0hors-S-300\u00a0\u00bb), le F-35 a eu la vedette avec deux nouvelles contrast\u00e9es : premi\u00e8re mission de guerre en Afghanistan (le 27 septembre<\/a>), premi\u00e8re destruction accidentelle officielle<\/strong> d’un avion du programme en Californie (le 28 septembre<\/a>), – dans les deux cas, il s’agissait de la version F-35B du Corps des Marines. Dans le cadre d’un programme a\u00e9ronautique normal comme il en existait avant l’\u00e8re post-9\/11, cette sorte de p\u00e9rip\u00e9tie ne constituait en aucun cas l’un ou l’autre \u00e9v\u00e9nement extraordinaire. Il est tout \u00e0 fait normal qu’un avion de combat commence \u00e0 voler en combat, dans un conflit vieux de 17 ans où il n’existe aucun risque a\u00e9rien et où toutes les missions sont du type air-sol ; et il est tout \u00e0 fait courant qu’un grand programme d’avion de combat enregistre des pertes accidentelles durant son d\u00e9veloppement. Mais le F-35 n’a rien de \u00ab\u00a0normal\u00a0\u00bb ni de \u00ab\u00a0courant\u00a0\u00bb comme l’on sait, aussi ces deux nouvelles ont-elles fait l’objet d’une large publicit\u00e9<\/strong>. Cela permet de mesurer le poids \u00e9norme de la pol\u00e9mique et de la communication qui entoure le programme F-35\/JSF aujourd’hui vieux de 25 ans (lancement en 1993) et qui, \u00e0 ce terme du quart de si\u00e8cle, enregistre une premi\u00e8re mission de combat et une premi\u00e8re perte accidentelle officielle alors que les essais de d\u00e9veloppement sont toujours en cours.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Dans ce cadre absolument mythique et ressortant du simulacre am\u00e9ricaniste aussi bien que des budgets se comptant en dizaines de milliards, la livraison de S-300 russes \u00e0 la Syrie et la possession de F-35 (F-35I) par Isra\u00ebl ne pouvaient que susciter l’hypoth\u00e8se d’un affrontement entre les deux. Les deux syst\u00e8mes sont entour\u00e9s d’une aura extraordinaire de diverses narrative <\/em>qui rendent quasi in\u00e9luctable cette hypoth\u00e8se.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

• Le S-300 est une famille de missiles sol-air d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e \u00e0 partir de 1969 mais qui a acquis ces quinze derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es une image extraordinaire de puissance et d’efficacit\u00e9. La cause se trouve essentiellement dans les efforts diplomatiques et de communication qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 faits du c\u00f4t\u00e9 du bloc-BAO (surtout USA et Isra\u00ebl) pour bloquer la livraison de ce syst\u00e8me \u00e0 certains pays, notamment et surtout l’Iran et la Syrie : l’argument essentiel de cette entrave a \u00e9t\u00e9 n\u00e9cessairement les capacit\u00e9s consid\u00e9rables pr\u00eat\u00e9es \u00e0 ce syst\u00e8me<\/strong>. (Ces capacit\u00e9s ont une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 bien entendu, surtout au travers des nouvelles versions et des modernisations, et l’int\u00e9gration du syst\u00e8me dans des ensembles tr\u00e8s puissants de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne, – mais l’on parle ici d’une dimension \u00ab\u00a0mythique\u00a0\u00bb v\u00e9hicul\u00e9e dans le domaine de la communication et non dans le domaine op\u00e9rationnel.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

• Le F-35 (JSF) est un programme bien connu pour ses avatars catastrophiques, et pour sa repr\u00e9sentation symbolique pour nous d’une sorte d’impasse du technologisme entr\u00e9 dans une phase de d\u00e9veloppement contre-productive. Par complet contraste, et compte tenu de l’importance fondamentale, – financi\u00e8re, communicationnelle, d’influence, etc., – du programme pour les USA et leurs divers pouvoirs et suppl\u00e9tifs, le JSF a \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme l’avion de combat \u00ab\u00a0ultime\u00a0\u00bb du XXI\u00e8me si\u00e8cle, devant dominer aussi bien le march\u00e9 que la forme nouvelle et postmoderne (impos\u00e9 par lui) du combat a\u00e9rien. C’est dire que sa stature de d\u00e9fense contre ses critiques sans nombre d\u00e9pend de cette narrative <\/em>d’invincibilit\u00e9 et d’irr\u00e9sistibilit\u00e9. Le cas d’un seul F-35 officiellement abattu par un S-300 serait per\u00e7u comme une catastrophe et une d\u00e9faite \u00e9pouvantable<\/strong>, alors qu’il s’agirait pourtant d’un \u00e9v\u00e9nement assez courant dans un conflit où s’affrontent une offensive et une d\u00e9fensive conventionnelle d’assez haut niveau, comme ce pourrait \u00eatre le cas en Syrie si, une fois les S-300 install\u00e9s et op\u00e9rationnels, les Isra\u00e9liens d\u00e9cidaient de les affronter et, notamment, de chercher \u00e0 les d\u00e9truire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Avec le texte de Federico Pieraccini pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 ci-dessous, tr\u00e8s document\u00e9 et selon des hypoth\u00e8ses tr\u00e8s plausibles, on dispose d’une assez bonne approche du cas envisag\u00e9, du \u00ab\u00a0F-35 versus <\/em>le S-300 en Syrie\u00a0\u00bb. Manifestement, ce sont les Isra\u00e9liens, et surtout derri\u00e8re eux le syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme et le complexe militaro-industriel, qui auraient le plus \u00e0 perdre dans un tel affrontement<\/strong>. Du fait des exag\u00e9rations constantes d’un syst\u00e8me de la communication quasi-exclusivement nourri aux narrative<\/em> et enchaîn\u00e9 \u00e0 l’affirmation constante de la sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 de la puissance US devenue d\u00e9pendante d’un r\u00e9flexe du type d\u00e9terminisme-narrativiste<\/a><\/strong>, la d\u00e9monstration symbolique de l’invincibilit\u00e9 et de l’irr\u00e9sistibilit\u00e9 (du F-35 dans ce cas) est pour les USA une n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 absolue de promotion et d’influence pour satisfaire la perception de leur propre ontologie autant que pour assurer la fortune des actionnaires de Lockheed Martin<\/strong>. Une entorse \u00e0 cette d\u00e9monstration symbolique dans le chef d’un syst\u00e8me tel que le F-35 charg\u00e9 de tout le poids de la communication fortement appuy\u00e9e sur le symbolisme est une perspective catastrophique ; cela alors que les USA craignent chaque jour de plus en plus de perdre leur position de leadership \u00e9crasant et tonitruant dans la vente et la manipulation des armements dans le monde pour assurer leur interventionnisme dans la souverainet\u00e9 de leurs clients.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

On sait combien les USA montrent par leur comportement la force et l’ampleur de cette crainte de perte du leadership de l’armement, notamment avec les dispositions qu’ils ont prises, assorties de sanctions\/de menaces de sanctions contre les pays achetant de l’armement russe<\/strong>, notamment contre l’Inde et la Turquie pour leurs commandes de S-400, et jusqu’\u00e0 l’incroyable intervention contre la Chine elle-m\u00eame pour ses commandes d’armement russes. Bien entendu, ce que les USA craignent le plus et veulent briser, c’est l’armement russe qui a de plus en plus de prestige et touche de plus en plus de client, <\/strong>et \u00e0 propos duquel ils ont mis en place la loi CAATS<\/a> (Counter America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions<\/em>) aux dispositions grotesques par ses pr\u00e9tentions interventionnistes<\/strong>. Ainsi comprend-on ais\u00e9ment que cette crainte joue un r\u00f4le important dans la situation hypoth\u00e9tique du F-35 versus <\/em>le S-300, quels que soient les param\u00e8tres de l’affrontement, quels que soient les circonstances et les effets op\u00e9rationnels, – parce qu’il s’agit d’abord de communication autour du simulacre de puissance que sont les USA<\/strong>…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

La th\u00e8se de Pieraccini est qu’Isra\u00ebl est, d’une certaine fa\u00e7on, compl\u00e8tement incontr\u00f4lable \u00e0 cause du m\u00eame symbolisme qu’il s’est lui-m\u00eame construit <\/strong>autour de sa sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 et de sa capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 passer outre la souverainet\u00e9 des autres, qui devient une sorte de folie d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9e <\/strong>lorsqu’on menace de lui d\u00e9nier ceci et cela. Isra\u00ebl a le m\u00eame comportement que les USA \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, et il n’est pour les USA de pire fou que celui qui a la m\u00eame folie qu’eux-m\u00eames et qu’ils (les USA) ne peuvent pas vraiment contr\u00f4ler<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Pieraccini parle effectivement du \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9sespoir\u00a0\u00bb d’Isra\u00ebl, qui pousserait ce pays vers des projets extr\u00eames, notamment vis-\u00e0-vis des USA ; le F-35 pourrait jouer dans ces projets un r\u00f4le d’instrument de chantage a contrario<\/em>, en jouant sur la crainte des USA d’\u00e9v\u00e9nements qui exposeraient les secrets et les faiblesses du F-35<\/strong>… L’hypoth\u00e8se est loin d’\u00eatre absurde, si l’on admet avec certaines sources qu’Isra\u00ebl est extr\u00eamement m\u00e9fiant \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard des capacit\u00e9s du F-35, qu’il a achet\u00e9 en bonne partie sous la contrainte des pressions US, et donc qu’il mesure le poids dont il pourrait faire un levier de la crainte US de l’emploi du F-35 dans des conditions autres que le \u00ab\u00a0tir au pigeon\u00a0\u00bb en Afghanistan : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

« Avec les syst\u00e8mes S-300 d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s dans une version mise \u00e0 jour et int\u00e9gr\u00e9s au syst\u00e8me de commandement, de contr\u00f4le et de communication (C3) russe, il existe un risque s\u00e9rieux (pour Washington) qu’Isra\u00ebl, d\u00e9sormais incapable de changer le cours des \u00e9v\u00e9nements en Syrie, puisse tenter une manœuvre d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9e<\/em>. […] Il suffit d’avoir \u00e0 l’esprit les conditions de la destruction de l’avion de surveillance russe Il-20 pour comprendre \u00e0 quel point de t\u00e9m\u00e9rit\u00e9 un Isra\u00ebl d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9 peut \u00eatre pouss\u00e9<\/em>… […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» Étant donn\u00e9 la tendance de Tel-Aviv \u00e0 placer ses propres int\u00e9r\u00eats au-dessus de tous les autres, il ne serait pas surprenant de le voir utiliser la possibilit\u00e9 d’attaquer le S-300 avec des F-35 comme moyen de chantage pour impliquer Washington dans le conflit. Pour les États-Unis, il existe deux sc\u00e9narios \u00e0 \u00e9viter. Le premier est une implication directe dans le conflit avec la Russie en Syrie, qui est maintenant impensable et irr\u00e9aliste. La seconde, beaucoup plus pr\u00e9occupante pour les planificateurs militaires, concerne la possibilit\u00e9 que les capacit\u00e9s et les secrets du F-35 soient compromis ou m\u00eame qu’il soit prouv\u00e9 que cet avion est vuln\u00e9rable face \u00e0 <\/em>des syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne vieux de pr\u00e8s d’un demi-si\u00e8cle<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Le texte de Federico Pieraccini (« The US Military-Industrial Complex’s Worst Nightmare: The S-300 May Destroy and Expose the F-35<\/em> ») est du 30 septembre 2018<\/a>, sur Strategic-Culture.org.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n

_________________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The US Military-Industrial Complex’s Worst Nightmare…<\/em><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

The tragic episode<\/a>that caused the death of 15 Russian air force personnel has had immediate repercussions<\/a>on the situation in Syria and the Middle East. On September 24, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu informed allies and opponents that the delivery of the S-300 air-defense systems to the Syrian Arab Republic had been approved by President Vladimir Putin. The delivery had been delayed and then suspended as a result of Israeli pressure back in 2013<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

In one sense, the delivery of S-300 batteries to Syria is cause for concern more for Washington than for Tel Aviv. Israel has<\/a>several F-35 and has claimed to have used<\/a>them in Syria to strike alleged Iranian weapons transfers to Hezbollah. With the S-300 systems deployed in an updated version and incorporated into the Russian command, control and communications (C3) system, there is a serious risk (for Washington) that Israel, now incapable of changing the course of events in Syria, could attempt a desperate maneuver.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

It is no secret that Greece purchased S-300s<\/a>from Russia years ago, and that NATO and Israel have trained numerous times against the Russian air-defense system. Senior IDF officials have often insisted that they are capable<\/a>taking out the S-300s, having apparently discovered their weaknesses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Tel Aviv’s warning that it will attack and destroy the S-300 battery should not be taken as an idle threat. It is enough to look at the recent downing of Russia’s Il-20 surveillance aircraft to understand how reckless a desperate Israel is prepared to be. Moreover, more than one IDF commander has over the years<\/a>reiterated that a Syrian S-300 would be considered a legitimate target if threatening Israeli aircraft.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

At this point, it is necessary to add some additional information and clarify some points. Greece’s S-300s are old, out of maintenance, and have not had their electronics updated. Such modern and complex systems as the S-300s and S-400s require maintenance, upgrades, and often replacement of parts to improve hardware. All this is missing from the Greek batteries. Secondly, it is the operator who uses the system (using radar, targeting, aiming, locking and so forth) that often makes the difference in terms of overall effectiveness. Furthermore, the system is fully integrated into the Russian C3 system, something that renders useless any previous experience gleaned from wargaming the Greek S-300s. No Western country knows the real capabilities and capacity of Syrian air defense when augmented and integrated with Russian systems. This is a secret that Damascus and Moscow will continue to keep well guarded. Yet two years ago, during the operations to free Aleppo, a senior Russian military officer warned<\/a>(presumably alluding to fifth-generation stealth aircraft like the F-35 and F-22) that the range and effectiveness of the Russian systems may come as a surprise.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The following are the words of Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu concerning the deployment of the S-300 to Syria and its integration with other Russian systems:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

"Russia will jam satellite navigation, onboard radars and communication systems of combat aircraft, which attack targets in the Syrian territory, in the Mediterranean Sea bordering with Syria. We are convinced that the implementation of these measures will cool hotheads and prevent ill-considered actions threatening our servicemen. Otherwise, we will respond in line with the current situation. Syrian troops and military air defense units will be equipped with automatic control systems, which have been supplied to the Russian Armed Forces. This will ensure the centralized management of the Syrian air defense forces and facilities, monitoring the situation in the airspace and prompt target designation. <\/em>Most importantly, it will be used to identify the Russian aircraft by the Syrian air defense forces."<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

If the Israelis will follow through with their reckless attempts to eliminate the S-300 (if they can find them in the first place, given that they are mobile), they will risk their F-35s being brought down. The US military-industrial complex would suffer irreparable damage. This would also explain why Israel (and probably the US) has for more than five years put enormous pressure on Moscow not to deliver the S-300 to Syria and Iran. The US State Department’s reaction over the future purchase by Turkey and India of the S-400 confirms the anxiety that US senior officials as well as generals are experiencing over the prospect of allies opting for the Russian systems. This would allow for a comparison with weapons these allies purchased from the US, leading to the discovery of vulnerabilities and the realization of the US weapons’ relative inferiority.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Given Tel Aviv’s tendency to place its own interests above all others, it would not be surprising to find them using the possibility of attacking the S-300 with their F-35s as a weapon to blackmail Washington into getting more involved in the conflict. For the United States, there are two scenarios to avoid. The first is a direct involvement in the conflict with Russia in Syria, which is now unthinkable and impractical. The second – much more worrying for military planners – concerns the possibility of the F-35’s capabilities and secrets being compromised or even being shown not to be a match against air-defense systems nearly half a century old.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

An illuminating example of how the United States operates its most advanced aircraft in the region was given in eastern Syria around Deir ez-Zor. In this part of Syria, there is no threat from any advanced air-defense systems, so the US is often free to employ its F-22 in certain circumstances. The Russian military has repeatedly shown radar evidence that unequivocally shows that when Russian Su-35s appear in the same skies as the F-22, the US Air Force simply avoids any confrontation and quickly withdraws<\/a>such fifth-generation assets as the F-22. The F-35 is not even<\/a>ready in its naval variant, and has yet to be deployed on a US aircraft carrier near the Middle Eastern theater or the Persian Gulf; nor is it present in any US military base<\/a>in the region. The US simply does not even consider using the F-35 in Syria, nor would it risk its use against Russian air defenses. Israel is the only country that so far may have already used<\/a>these aircraft in Syria; but this was before the S-300 came onto the scene.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The F-35 program has already cost hundreds of billions of dollars<\/a>and will soon reach the exorbitant and surreal figure of over 1 trillion dollars. It has already been sold to dozens of countries bound by decades-long agreements. The F-35 has been developed as a multi-role fighter and is expected to be the future backbone<\/a>of NATO<\/a>and her allies. Its development began more than 10 years ago and, despite the countless problems that still exist, it is already airborne and combat-ready, as the Israelis insist. From the US point of view, its employment in operations is played down and otherwise concealed. The less data available to opponents, the better; though the real reason may lie in a strong fear of any revelation of potential weaknesses of the aircraft damaging future sales. At this time, the Pentagon’s marketing of the F-35 is based on the evaluations provided by Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer, and on the tests carried out by the military who commissioned it to Lockheed Martin. Obviously, both Lockheed Martin and the US Air Force have no interest in revealing any weaknesses or shortcomings, especially publicly. Corruption is a big thing in Washington, contrary to common assumptions.<\/a><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

The combination of Israel’s ego, its inability to change the course of events in Syria, coupled with the loss of its ability to fly throughout the Middle East with impunity due to Syria now being equipped with a superior air defense – all these factors could push Israel into acting desperately by using the F-35 to take out the S-300 battery. Washington finds itself in the unenviable position of probably having no leverage with Israel over the matter ever since losing any ability to steer events in Syria.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

With the Russian air-defense systems potentially being spread out to the four corners of the world, including China, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and who knows how many other countries waiting in the queue, Russia continues to increase its export capacity and military prestige as it demonstrates its control of most of the Syria’s skies. With the introduction of the the S-500 pending, one can imagine the sleepless nights being spent by those in the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin’s headquarters worrying about the possibility of an F-35 being taken down by an S-300 system manufactured in 1969.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Federico Pieraccini<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Fable & narrative : F-35 et S-300 en Syrie Le S-300 est un mythe… Le F-35, sigle d\u00e9sormais g\u00e9n\u00e9rique et \u00e9m\u00e9rite du JSF, ou F-35, ne l’est pas moins. Ainsi trouve-t-on, aujourd’hui en Syrie, deux mythes face-\u00e0-face ; dans tous les cas, du point de vue de la communication c’est fait, sans savoir une seconde… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[3236,14955,3015,3019,14448,2774,250,3501,3502,18581,2730],"class_list":["post-78201","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-afghanistan","tag-antiaerienne","tag-communication","tag-defense","tag-federico","tag-israel","tag-jsf","tag-lockheed","tag-martin","tag-pieraccini","tag-russie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78201","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=78201"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78201\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=78201"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=78201"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=78201"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}