{"id":78990,"date":"2019-12-05T15:35:08","date_gmt":"2019-12-05T15:35:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2019\/12\/05\/usa-limpuissance-detre-de-la-legitimite\/"},"modified":"2019-12-05T15:35:08","modified_gmt":"2019-12-05T15:35:08","slug":"usa-limpuissance-detre-de-la-legitimite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2019\/12\/05\/usa-limpuissance-detre-de-la-legitimite\/","title":{"rendered":"USA, l&rsquo;impuissance d&rsquo;\u00eatre de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_a.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:2em\">USA, l&rsquo;impuissance d&rsquo;\u00eatre de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il y a pr\u00e8s d&rsquo;un mois et demi, le <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/des-generaux-contre-trump\">21 octobre 2019<\/a>, nous proposions un texte ext\u00e9rieur de (<em>WSWS.org<\/em>) avec un commentaire introduit par le titre &laquo; <em>Des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux contre Trump <\/em>&raquo;, pr\u00e9sentant l&rsquo;action publique de certains officiers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux qui ont quitt\u00e9 le service actif mais restent redevables du \u00ab\u00a0devoir de r\u00e9serve\u00a0\u00bb et de l&rsquo;observance des hi\u00e9rarchies fondamentales. Justement, ces officiers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux (et amiraux pour l&rsquo;US Navy) avaient pos\u00e9 des actes qui tournaient en ridicule la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 du pouvoir civil supr\u00eame, notamment par leurs attaques et leurs jugements sur le pr\u00e9sident Trump :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Ces mises en cause sont radicales, comme lorsque l&rsquo;amiral McRaven  <a href=\"https:\/\/thehill.com\/policy\/defense\/466369-former-special-ops-commander-our-republic-is-under-attack-from-the-president\">signe un article<\/a><\/em>  <em>dans le New York Times  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2019\/10\/17\/opinion\/trump-mcraven-syria-military.html\">sous le titre<\/a>  <\/em><em>\u00ab\u00a0Our Republic Is Under Attack From the President\u00a0\u00bb ; ou lorsque le G\u00e9n\u00e9ral Petraeus, en r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 une question sur CNN hier, qualifie de &lsquo;trahison&rsquo; la d\u00e9cision de Trump de retrait de forces US de Syrie, qui est \u00e9galement l&rsquo;argument essentiel de l&rsquo;article de McRaven<\/em>. &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Depuis d&rsquo;autres incidents du m\u00eame type, sinon plus graves puisque l&rsquo;un a entrain\u00e9  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/secretaire-a-lus-navy-youre-fired\">la mise \u00e0 pied<\/a> du Secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 La Navy apr\u00e8s la mise en &oelig;uvre d&rsquo;une proc\u00e9dure qui consistait en  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/lus-navy-defie-trump\">un refus d&rsquo;ob\u00e9issance<\/a> de la part d&rsquo;un contre-amiral, s&rsquo;exprimant par le refus d&rsquo;une d\u00e9cision du pr\u00e9sident. Cela signifie qu&rsquo;il existe aujourd&rsquo;hui une tr\u00e8s forte tendance \u00e0 la mise en cause des principes fondamentaux du gouvernement aux USA, notamment dans les rapports entre les autorit\u00e9s de la communaut\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale (non seulement les militaires mais les agences et services divers, notamment du renseignement) et l&rsquo;autorit\u00e9 supr\u00eame que repr\u00e9sente le pr\u00e9sident.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Un chercheur et universitaire sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9 dans les questions juridiques et institutionnelles, William S. Smith, chercheur et directeur de la gestion du <em>Center for the Study of Statesmanship  <\/em>\u00e0 l&rsquo;Universit\u00e9 Catholique de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique (<em>Catholic University of America<\/em>) s&rsquo;attache \u00e0 la question de ces rapports d&rsquo;autorit\u00e9 et de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 dans la crise profonde que ces deux principes traversent aujourd&rsquo;hui dans un article de <em>The American Conservative <\/em>du  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theamericanconservative.com\/articles\/welcome-to-the-potemkin-village-of-washington-power\/\">2 d\u00e9cembre 2019<\/a>. Il part surtout de l&rsquo;intervention de l&rsquo;amiral McRaven et de son article dans le New York <em>Times <\/em>du <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2019\/10\/17\/opinion\/trump-mcraven-syria-military.html\">17 octobre 2019<\/a> o&ugrave; cet officier g\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e9crit que si le pr\u00e9sident Trump ne suit pas la politique de la communaut\u00e9 de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale (ce que nous nommons \u00ab\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/glossairedde-politiquesysteme-ii\">politiqueSyst\u00e8me<\/a>\u00ab\u00a0), il doit \u00eatre d\u00e9pos\u00e9, et \u00ab\u00a0le plus vite sera le mieux\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>(Il est probable que Smith a \u00e9crit son article avant l&rsquo;incident signal\u00e9 plus haut, de l&rsquo;insubordination du contre-amiral Green et de la mise \u00e0 pied du Secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la Navy, sinon bien s&ucirc;r il l&rsquo;aurait signal\u00e9 comme un cas d&rsquo;un certaine fa\u00e7on encore plus grave puisque touchant des responsables en activit\u00e9.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il est vrai que l&#8217;empilement d&rsquo;avatars les plus extraordinaires de cette \u00ab\u00a0\u00e9trange \u00e9poque\u00a0\u00bb autant que la personnalit\u00e9 \u00e9galement extraordinaire par rapport \u00e0 sa fonction d&rsquo;un Trump (et de quelques autres) nous font oublier, et par \u00ab\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/tc-83-grosse-fatigue\">Grosse-fatigue<\/a>\u00a0\u00bb \u00e9galement, le caract\u00e8re justement extraordinaire de tous ces \u00e9v\u00e9nements, de toutes ces situations. Tout se passe comme si, aujourd&rsquo;hui, dans ce chaos d&rsquo;un indescriptible d\u00e9sordre, l'\u00a0\u00bbextraordinaire\u00a0\u00bb \u00e9tait une sorte de \u00ab\u00a0nouvelle normalit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb (le \u00ab\u00a0<em>new normal<\/em>\u00ab\u00a0), et que l&rsquo;on n&rsquo;usait plus \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard du fondement m\u00eame du jugement \u00e9quilibr\u00e9 qu&rsquo;est l&rsquo;esprit critique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;article de Smith nous ram\u00e8ne aux r\u00e9alit\u00e9s de la  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/glossairedde-verite-de-situation-verite\">v\u00e9rit\u00e9-de-situation<\/a> : ce qui se passe est effectivement extraordinaire, et l&rsquo;extraordinaire ne peut pas \u00eatre la \u00ab\u00a0nouvelle normalit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb d&rsquo;un syst\u00e8me \u00e9quilibr\u00e9, notamment par rapport \u00e0 des r\u00e9f\u00e9rences telles que les principes d&rsquo;autorit\u00e9 et de l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9. On pourrait et m\u00eame l&rsquo;on devrait  plut\u00f4t avancer que l'\u00a0\u00bbextraordinaire\u00a0\u00bb pourrait effectivement \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme la \u00ab\u00a0normalit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb d&rsquo;une situation crisique totale, voire totalitairement crisique, avec la crise comme essence m\u00eame de cette situation&#8230;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>La chose (cette situation) appara&icirc;t particuli\u00e8rement aux USA pour deux raisons essentielles, qui sont dues \u00e0 l&rsquo;exacerbation de la crise certes mais qui existaient d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tat de latence ou de \u00ab\u00a0situation normale\u00a0\u00bb dont le caract\u00e8re promis \u00e0 devenir anormal \u00e9tait justifi\u00e9 par des pressions et des \u00e9v\u00e9nements imp\u00e9ratifs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&bull; La premi\u00e8re de ces raisons est que les USA, qui sont directement une cr\u00e9ation de la modernit\u00e9, sinon une repr\u00e9sentation terrestre d&rsquo;une modernit\u00e9 qui constituerait un r\u00e9gime id\u00e9al en soi et conduisant \u00e0 la \u00ab\u00a0fin de l&rsquo;Histoire\u00a0\u00bb, n&rsquo;a pas pr\u00e9vu du tout une affirmation aussi ferme, aussi structur\u00e9e, aussi indiscutable de l&rsquo;autorit\u00e9 et de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 que l&rsquo;ont fait les autres grandes nations de cette civilisation occidentale, et m\u00eame de civilisations qui la pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e8rent sous d&rsquo;autres formes que \u00ab\u00a0la nation\u00a0\u00bb. D&rsquo;une certaine fa\u00e7on, les USA \u00e9tant con\u00e7us comme une sorte de \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9gime parfait\u00a0\u00bb, d&rsquo;ailleurs selon des normes de communication propagandiste que nombre de grands esprits non-US acceptaient (Germaine de Sta\u00ebl \u00e0 Jefferson en 1815 : &laquo; <em>Si vous parvenez \u00e0 d\u00e9truire l&rsquo;esclavage dans le Midi, il y aura au moins dans le monde un gouvernement aussi parfait que la raison humaine peut le concevoir <\/em>&raquo;), il n&rsquo;est pas n\u00e9cessaire du tout qu&rsquo;ils soient structur\u00e9s aussi fermement et dans le m\u00eame sens, d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on aussi principielle qu&rsquo;un &Eacute;tat-nation en Europe. La Constitution rend compte de cela :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>La Constitution devrait <\/em>[en th\u00e9orie] <em>pr\u00e9voir le contr\u00f4le civil de l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e et d&rsquo;autres institutions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Le probl\u00e8me, c&rsquo;est qu&rsquo;en pratique, la Constitution ne fait rien de tel. Comme l&rsquo;a soulign\u00e9 Samuel Huntington, la surveillance constitutionnelle de l&rsquo;establishment militaire par les civils \u00e9lus est fragment\u00e9e, non lin\u00e9aire et pr\u00e9caire. Le pr\u00e9sident est commandant en chef, un titre plus qu&rsquo;une fonction, et le Congr\u00e8s contr\u00f4le les cordons de la bourse, le pouvoir de d\u00e9clarer la guerre et la confirmation des hauts responsables de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale nomm\u00e9s. La Garde nationale rel\u00e8ve des pr\u00e9sidents et des gouverneurs. Quiconque regarde un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, un amiral ou un directeur de la CIA t\u00e9moigner devant le Congr\u00e8s sait que le service de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale a plus d&rsquo;un patron. Qui, au sein du gouvernement civil, est en dernier ressort aux commandes ? Tout le monde et personne<\/em>. &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&bull; La deuxi\u00e8me de ces raisons est bien entendu l&rsquo;\u00e9norme d\u00e9veloppement de l&rsquo;appareil, de la bureaucratie, de la mentalit\u00e9, de la psychologie d&rsquo;influence de la communaut\u00e9 de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Eisenhower, que Smith ne cite pas, l&rsquo;avait dit et avait tout dit en janvier 1961, avec ces phrases fameuses o&ugrave; le qualificatif \u00ab\u00a0spirituelle\u00a0\u00bb appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0 l&rsquo;influence du Complexe Militaro-Industriel (CMI) est \u00e0 mettre en \u00e9vidence : &laquo; <em>Cette conjonction d&rsquo;une immense institution militaire et d&rsquo;une grande industrie de l&rsquo;armement est nouvelle dans l&rsquo;exp\u00e9rience am\u00e9ricaine. Son influence totale, \u00e9conomique, politique, <strong>spirituelle m\u00eame<\/strong>, est ressentie dans chaque ville, dans chaque Parlement d&rsquo;Etat, dans chaque bureau du Gouvernement f\u00e9d\u00e9ral<\/em>. &raquo; Cette fantastique puissance \u00e0 la fois technologique (force et s\u00e9curit\u00e9) et communicationnelle (influence sur les psychologies), \u00e9tait inconcevables pour les P\u00e8res Fondateurs qui r\u00e9dig\u00e8rent la Constitution. Ils n&rsquo;en dirent mot par cons\u00e9quent, les choses de ce &laquo; <em>gouvernement aussi parfait que la raison humaine peut le concevoir <\/em>&raquo; devant aller de soi. Par cons\u00e9quent, toujours, cette \u00e9norme puissance qui domine tout aux USA aujourd&rsquo;hui ne fut en aucune fa\u00e7on contrebalanc\u00e9e par un pouvoir civil centralis\u00e9, &ndash; comme on l&rsquo;a vu plus haut&#8230;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>Ainsi certains seraient-ils conduits \u00e0 dire, et justifi\u00e9s de dire d&rsquo;ailleurs, que l&rsquo;ach\u00e8vement quasiment parfait du mod\u00e8le d\u00e9mocratique porte en lui-m\u00eame sa propre mort, comme la surpuissance du Syst\u00e8me accouche en m\u00eame temps qu&rsquo;elle s&rsquo;affirme, de son autodestruction. On en d\u00e9duira que, observant les USA agit\u00e9s dans leurs d\u00e9lires furieux, c&rsquo;est le mod\u00e8le m\u00eame de la modernit\u00e9 que l&rsquo;on voit s&rsquo;agiter fi\u00e9vreusement dans les rets de sa crise ontologique, sous nos yeux qui ne sont m\u00eame plus \u00e9bahis tant le spectacle dure et se poursuit sans d\u00e9vier d&rsquo;un millim\u00e8tre dans sa course vers l&rsquo;ab&icirc;me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Nous ne croyons nullement que les USA, ainsi remis dans leur v\u00e9ritable perspective, se dirigent vers une dictature militaire ou quelque chose de la sorte. Toutes les impuissances du pouvoir civil ainsi d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sont partout pr\u00e9sentes, pour quelque pouvoir que ce soit. Si un pouvoir militaire s&rsquo;installait, il se heurterait aux m\u00eames obstacles de la pratique de la Constitution et des m&oelig;urs et structurations des \u00e9lites qui pr\u00e9voient un pouvoir qui s&rsquo;exerce d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on &laquo; <em>fragment\u00e9e, non lin\u00e9aire et pr\u00e9caire<\/em> &raquo;. Certes, il r\u00e8gnerait par les armes, &ndash; et encore, s&rsquo;il y arrive, &ndash; mais il n&rsquo;acquerrait jamais, ni l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9, ni autorit\u00e9 par cons\u00e9quent ; simplement parce que les USA sont cette construction \u00ab\u00a0parfaite\u00a0\u00bb qui plaisait tant \u00e0 Germaine, qui ne peut v\u00e9ritablement concevoir aucune autorit\u00e9 qui soit l\u00e9gitime puisque r\u00e8gne l&rsquo;\u00e9galit\u00e9 intrins\u00e8que voulue par la d\u00e9mocratie apr\u00e8s qu&rsquo;elle ait \u00e9t\u00e9 annonc\u00e9e par la religion, dominante et ultime selon l&rsquo;oreille qu&rsquo;on lui pr\u00eate.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Donc, l&rsquo;article de William S. Smith est publi\u00e9 dans <em>The American Conservative<\/em>, le <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theamericanconservative.com\/articles\/welcome-to-the-potemkin-village-of-washington-power\/\">2 d\u00e9cembre 2019<\/a>, sous le titre complet de &laquo; <em>Bienvenus au Village-Potemkine de la puissance de Washington. <\/em>&raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>_________________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">The Potemkin Village Of Washington Power<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>What American constitutional government most urgently needs at present is for our Madisonian institutions&mdash;the presidency, the Congress, and the courts&mdash;to wrest back control of national security policy from an unelected and increasingly rogue national security establishment. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>That ominous challenge to constitutionalism was on full display with the recent  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2019\/10\/17\/opinion\/trump-mcraven-syria-military.html\">op-ed<\/a>  piece in the <em>New York Times<\/em> by retired Admiral William McRaven, in which he brashly warned that unless Trump jumped aboard the Forever War bandwagon, he must be removed, and \u00ab\u00a0the sooner the better.\u00a0\u00bb The U.S. must have a policy, McRaven said, that protects \u00ab\u00a0the Kurds, the Iraqis, the Afghans, the Syrians, the Rohingyas, the South Sudanese and the millions of people under the boot of tyranny.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>How did we get to the point where a former senior military officer calls for the removal of a duly elected president because he doesn&rsquo;t stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the Rohingyas? McRaven&rsquo;s op-ed represents something new in American politics: the assertion that an elected president is illegitimate unless he works to spread our \u00ab\u00a0ideals of universal freedom and equality\u00a0\u00bb through military action and alliances. McRaven also argued that it is \u00ab\u00a0the American military&hellip;the intelligence and law enforcement community, the State Department and the press,\u00a0\u00bb all unelected institutions, that now embody the true American civic religion and protect its \u00ab\u00a0ideals.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Even though President Trump&rsquo;s promises to end wars and question expensive alliances were quite popular with the electorate, in the view of many in the national security establishment, elections do not bestow constitutional legitimacy. They assume instead that their \u00ab\u00a0ideals\u00a0\u00bb and belligerent foreign policy represent the true animating principles and governing force of the nation. To question them is tantamount to an \u00ab\u00a0attack\u00a0\u00bb on America \u00ab\u00a0from within.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>While the rank-and-file military are among the most patriotic of Americans and show unwavering support for the Constitution, there is a huge class of elite national security bureaucrats who, whatever they may say on ceremonial occasions, believe they are above the Constitution. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Wait a minute, you say, this is hyperbole. The Constitution provides for civilian control of the military and other national security institutions. The problem is that in practice the Constitution does no such thing. As Samuel Huntington  <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/american-political-science-review\/article\/civilian-control-and-the-constitution\/9D66500E90A5F54CFC698FBEA892C131\">pointed out<\/a>, the constitutional oversight of the military establishment by elected civilians is fractured, non-linear, and tenuous. The president is commander-in-chief, a title more than a function, and Congress controls the purse strings, the power to declare war, and the confirmation of senior national security nominees. The National Guard reports to presidents and governors. Anyone watching a general, admiral, or CIA director testify before Congress is aware that the national security establishment has more than one boss. Who in the civilian government is ultimately in control? Everyone and no one.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Huntington points out that, when the Constitution was framed, there was no real concern about controlling the military, and the intelligence community did not even exist. The military arts were not highly specialized and militia officers were typically members of the political establishment who were elected or appointed by local legislatures. Military leaders like George Washington were part and parcel of the political culture of the ruling class. There simply wasn&rsquo;t a danger of a rogue national security establishment in 1789, and for all their sagacity, the Framers of the Constitution did not foresee the emergence of one.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In the mid-19th century, all this changed. Militaries became highly specialized and officers became professional soldiers. A martial culture was developed that was distinct from politics. Military \u00ab\u00a0academies\u00a0\u00bb were founded to inculcate this new culture and to teach the new specialties within the military arts. As a result, Huntington argued, presidents needed more \u00ab\u00a0objective\u00a0\u00bb control of national security institutions. When Generals McClellan and McArthur famously questioned the national security decisions of their presidents, Lincoln and Truman fired them respectively. But the tradition that the national security establishment must take orders from the president is a political, not a constitutional, precedent, and it is breaking down. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Tufts law professor Michael Glennon points out in a recent <a href=\"https:\/\/css.cua.edu\/humanitas_journal\/populism-elites-and-national-security\/\">essay<\/a> in <em>Humanitas<\/em> that the Cold War brought something new and ominous in military-civilian relations. The national security bureaucracy became so large and omnipotent that the Madisonian branches of government became something like the British House of Lords, symbolically important but in reality without much power. The executive, legislature, and judiciary became a kind of Potemkin village, with real national security power lodged in, as Glennon describes it, \u00ab\u00a0a largely concealed managerial directorate, consisting of the several hundred leaders of the military, law enforcement and intelligence departments.\u00a0\u00bb As this bureaucracy grew, Glennon argues, \u00ab\u00a0those managers&hellip;operated at an increasing remove from constitutional limits and restraints, moving the nation slowly toward autocracy.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Glennon also points out that, prior to Trump, there was an unwritten pact between the bureaucracy and the Madisonian government: never publicly disagree. While national security policies have long been crafted and maintained by deep state bureaucracies, everyone played along and told the public these were the result of \u00ab\u00a0intense deliberations.\u00a0\u00bb Yet a few people noticed that, whether under Republican or Democrat administrations, national security policies never really changed, intelligence operations were never disrupted, and even peacenik-seeming presidential candidates became warlike presidents. For decades, neither elected officials nor bureaucratic leaders publicly acknowledged that American national security policy was being run by what Glennon describes as a \u00ab\u00a0double government,\u00a0\u00bb with elected officials largely impotent. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>However, with the staggering intelligence failure that was 9\/11 and two protracted and losing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, some have begun to question whether the \u00ab\u00a0grown-ups\u00a0\u00bb in the national security bureaucracy are even competent. Trump gave voice to those concerns in the 2016 campaign, and the result has been a breakdown in the Cold War truce between the two components of the double government. Leaders of the national security establishment, who know they have real power, took precautions in the unlikely event of a Trump victory and then proceeded to try to overturn Trump&rsquo;s election. When they failed, they partnered with Congress to have Trump removed through impeachment, taking full advantage of the fractured nature of civilian control of national security institutions. Impeachment witnesses, such as Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, have been unanimous in their implicit belief that the foreign policy of the United States should be managed by a professional class of bureaucrats, not by the elected president.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The American constitutional order is thus in great peril. Those obsessed with getting rid of the president should consider that, were Trump to be removed, it could be the constitutional equivalent of Julius Caesar&rsquo;s crossing of the Rubicon.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Call Donald Trump cartoonish and erratic, but he also happens to be the duly elected president of the United States. And while we must admire the selfless service of so many in the national security establishment, as citizens, we also have the right to ask people like William McRaven: who elected you?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4>William S. Smith<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>USA, l&rsquo;impuissance d&rsquo;\u00eatre de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 Il y a pr\u00e8s d&rsquo;un mois et demi, le 21 octobre 2019, nous proposions un texte ext\u00e9rieur de (WSWS.org) avec un commentaire introduit par le titre &laquo; Des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux contre Trump &raquo;, pr\u00e9sentant l&rsquo;action publique de certains officiers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux qui ont quitt\u00e9 le service actif mais restent redevables du&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[7287,3806,4518,2631,2744,19539,18829,3555,11106,3769,3866,4457,12464,3865],"class_list":["post-78990","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-autorite","tag-cmi","tag-constitution","tag-de","tag-eisenhower","tag-fragmente","tag-germaine","tag-legitimite","tag-mcraven","tag-pouvoir","tag-s","tag-smith","tag-stael","tag-william"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78990","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=78990"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78990\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=78990"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=78990"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=78990"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}