{"id":79000,"date":"2019-12-11T18:59:35","date_gmt":"2019-12-11T18:59:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2019\/12\/11\/impasse-du-cul-de-sac-les737max-papers\/"},"modified":"2019-12-11T18:59:35","modified_gmt":"2019-12-11T18:59:35","slug":"impasse-du-cul-de-sac-les737max-papers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2019\/12\/11\/impasse-du-cul-de-sac-les737max-papers\/","title":{"rendered":"Impasse du cul-de-sac\u00a0: les\u00a0737Max Papers…<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Impasse du cul-de-sac : les 737Max Papers…<\/em><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

Le 737Max et Boeing (et la FAA) n’en finissent pas d’encaisser de rudes coups, cr\u00e9ant un climat d’effondrement de la confiance au point que, d\u00e9sormais, le commentaire ne se prive plus d’envisager que le 737Max en l’\u00e9tat ne sera plus jamais autoris\u00e9 \u00e0 voler. Les circonstances m\u00e9langent la corruption bureaucratique, l’emploi intensif de la tricherie et de la dissimulation, c’est-\u00e0-dire toutes les avanies habituelles dans l’empire tr\u00e8s-tardif de la postmodernit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

Si l’on veut, le 737Max est un peu, d\u00e9sormais, le double a\u00e9rien de la guerre en Afghanistan, et nous pourrons bient\u00f4t ouvrir un chapitre The 737Max Papers<\/em>, comme il y eut les Pentagon Papers <\/em>et comme il y a aujourd’hui les Afghanistan Papers<\/a>. <\/em>L\u00e0 aussi, la presseSyst\u00e8me a son dr\u00f4le de jeu \u00e0 jouer, avec le Wall Street Journal<\/em> <\/a>(WSJ) devenu pourvoyeur n°1 d’informations cruelles pour la crise 737Max, ayant certainement quelques lanceurs d’alerte de premi\u00e8re classe au sein de la FAA (surtout) et chez Boeing (tout de m\u00eame).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

La derni\u00e8re (avanie) en date est une sorte de sauve-qui-peut \u00e0 mesure des fuites qui d\u00e9couvrent l’ampleur de l’escroquerie, de la corruption et de la dissimilation. La FAA (son administrateur Stephen Dickson \u00e0 CNBC)vient aujourd’hui de remettre Boeing, qui annon\u00e7ait une recertification du 737Max pour fin d\u00e9cembre, s\u00e8chement \u00e0 sa place : \u00ab\u00a0certainement pas avant 2020\u00a0\u00bb dit l’autorit\u00e9 de l’aviation civile aux USA, quelques heures apr\u00e8s que le Wall Street Journal<\/em>ait r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 que la FAA avait fait, \u00e0 la fin 2018, ses propres \u00e9valuations du 737Max apr\u00e8s le premier accident (Indon\u00e9sie), pour conclure que l’avion \u00e9tait tr\u00e8s dangereux, et pourtant pour ne prendre aucune d\u00e9cision de suspension de vol.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

La FAA est donc aussi compromise que Boeing et songe pour l’instant \u00e0 se prot\u00e9ger des effets de la crise. Elle ne fera donc d\u00e9sormais plus aucun cadeau \u00e0 Boeing, malgr\u00e9 les liens tr\u00e8s-incestueux qui lient les deux entit\u00e9s. ZeroHedge.com<\/em>, qui a dû essuyer quelques critiques pour avoir peint en noir l’avenir boursier de Boeing, s’empresse de conclure aujourd’hui<\/a> : « Il vaut donc mieux oublier toutes les sp\u00e9culations pour un retour rapide du 737Max en op\u00e9ration, et peut-\u00eatre m\u00eame envisager pas de retour du tout<\/em>. » C’est-\u00e0-dire que l’issue de la crise se confond d\u00e9sormais, dans noire temps-courant, vue l’importance \u00e9norme du programme 737Max et l’effondrement de la confiance \u00e0 laquelle on assiste, avec le sort m\u00eame de Boeing<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

« …There’s a reason for the FAA’s caution: earlier today the WSJ reported that U.S. regulators decided to allow the 737 MAX jet to keep flying after its first fatal crash last fall, despite their own analysis \u00ab\u00a0indicating it could become one of the most accident-prone airliners in decades without design changes<\/strong>\u00ab\u00a0.<\/em><\/p>\n

» \u00ab\u00a0The November 2018 internal Federal Aviation Administration analysis, expected to be released during a House committee hearing Wednesday, reveals that without agency intervention, the MAX could have averaged one fatal crash about every two or three years, according to industry officials and regulators<\/strong>. That amounts to a substantially greater safety risk than either Boeing Co. or the agency indicated publicly at the time.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n

» The assessment and related materials raise new questions about the FAA’s decision-making in the wake of the Lion Air crash in Indonesia, along with what turned out to be faulty agency assumptions on ways to alleviate hazards.<\/em><\/p>\n

» The FAA’s intervention proved inadequate after a second fatal MAX crash, this time in Ethiopia, put the global fleet on the ground and sparked an international controversy over the agency’s safety oversight.<\/em><\/p>\n

» And as public outrage is sure to return at both the FAA and Boeing, one can forget about the 737 MAX return to operation any time soon, and perhaps, any time ever<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Mis en ligne le 11 d\u00e9cembre 2019 \u00e0 18H57<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Impasse du cul-de-sac : les 737Max Papers… Le 737Max et Boeing (et la FAA) n’en finissent pas d’encaisser de rudes coups, cr\u00e9ant un climat d’effondrement de la confiance au point que, d\u00e9sormais, le commentaire ne se prive plus d’envisager que le 737Max en l’\u00e9tat ne sera plus jamais autoris\u00e9 \u00e0 voler. Les circonstances m\u00e9langent la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[4195,19555,2880,3858,2631,19197,7241,3823,19556,3372,4584,3132],"class_list":["post-79000","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-breves-de-crise","tag-aviation","tag-boing","tag-civile","tag-corruption","tag-de","tag-faa","tag-interdiction","tag-journal","tag-recertification","tag-street","tag-vol","tag-wall"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79000","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=79000"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79000\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=79000"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=79000"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=79000"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}