\n• Articles du 23 avril 2021. • En consultants des articles de 2002 sur les grandes nouvelles de 2001 pour les USA (JSF et Afghanistan), et en comparant leur contenu aux nouvelles de 2021, on mesure le gouffre qui a englouti la puissance des États-Unis<\/strong>. • Ce que confirme l’un des membres du Congr\u00e8s les plus puissants sur les mati\u00e8res militaires et strat\u00e9giques, qui annonce devant le think tank <\/em>favori des neocons <\/em>« la fin de l’\u00e8re de l’unipolarit\u00e9 et de la pr\u00e9\u00e9minence militaire des Etats-Unis<\/em> »<\/strong>. • Contributions de dedefensa.org<\/em>, de John T. Correll et de John A. Tirpak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Nous avons \u00e9tudi\u00e9 quelques archives pour illustrer l’annonce quasi-officielle de la fin du programme JSF, devenu F-35, par le Lieutenant G\u00e9n\u00e9ral Eric Fick, de l’USAF, hier devant la commission des forces arm\u00e9es de la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants. Fick parle d’une « pause strat\u00e9gique<\/a> <\/em>» dans le d\u00e9veloppement et la production du programme, devant l’amoncellement des difficult\u00e9s, des tares et vices irr\u00e9solues, de l’avion de combat qui devait dominer le monde. C’est le plus proche que l’on puisse dire, pour sauver ce qu’il reste de face et en hommage au torrent de communication dithyrambique qui nous abreuv\u00e9s durant vingt ans communication, de l’annonce pure et simple de l’abandon du programme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Nous devons alors comparer cette terrible nouvelle \u00e0 cet article retrouv\u00e9 dans les archives, de janvier 2002, dans Air Force Magazine <\/em>(AFM), apr\u00e8s la s\u00e9lection en octobre 2001 du Lockheed-Martin X-35 de pr\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 son candidat postulant, le Boeing X-35. On se demandait encore, en ce temps-l\u00e0, comme une coquetterie de puissance invincible si le JSF allait \u00eatre baptis\u00e9 F-24 ou F-35 ; et vraiment, cet article ultra-d\u00e9taill\u00e9 donne toute la dimension extraordinaire de cet \u00ab\u00a0avion de combat qui devait dominer le monde\u00a0\u00bb, venu de la source \u00ab\u00a0ext\u00e9rieure\u00a0\u00bb la plus proche de l’USAF (AFM est publi\u00e9 par l’Air Force Association <\/em>[AFA], lobby officiel de l’USAF \u00e9tabli en 1946, dont l’acteur James Stewart, pilote de bombardier pendant la guerre, fut l’un des premiers pr\u00e9sidents).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Ainsi peut-on, mesurer, \u00e0 vingt ans d’\u00e9cart, tous d\u00e9lais et pr\u00e9visions pulv\u00e9ris\u00e9es, la chute monumentale des capacit\u00e9s technologiques des USA. En m\u00eame temps, ce m\u00eame num\u00e9ro d’AFM nous permet de mesurer un autre effondrement : celui des capacit\u00e9s militaires am\u00e9ricanistes r\u00e9elles, en lisant l’\u00e9ditorial de ce num\u00e9ro de janvier 2002. Il salue la \u00ab\u00a0victoire\u00a0\u00bb foudroyante des USA contre les talibans et Al Qa\u00efda en Afghanistan, lors de l’offensive d’octobre-d\u00e9cembre 2001. Vingt ans plus tard, on d\u00e9compte tristement les lambeaux sanglants de ce simulacre de \u00ab\u00a0victoire\u00a0\u00bb, alors que les forces US doivent quitter officiellement l’Afghanistan en septembre 2021 apr\u00e8s une campagne catastrophique de vingt ans, ayant prouv\u00e9 au monde l’incapacit\u00e9 totale des forces US de remporter une \u00ab\u00a0victoire\u00a0\u00bb (autant pour l'\u00a0\u00bbind\u00e9fectibilit\u00e9<\/a>\u00ab\u00a0), – nous sans y laisser un reliquat sous la forme de contingents de la CIA et de mercenaires de soci\u00e9t\u00e9s priv\u00e9es, pour poursuivre la catastrophe au-del\u00e0 de la catastrophe courante, en une catastrophe-exceptionnaliste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Pour l’exemple et le triste anniversaire, nous reprenons ci-dessous ce second article de AFM, janvier 2002. Malgr\u00e9 l’utilisation de la langue originale, il nous semble tr\u00e8s ais\u00e9 d’acc\u00e8s, en mettant l’accent sur la puissance a\u00e9rienne comme moyen privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 sinon unique de cette sorte de \u00ab\u00a0victoire\u00a0\u00bb. On a ainsi une id\u00e9e bien document\u00e9e des vingt ann\u00e9es les plus catastrophiques, avant la Chute, de l’histoire des États-Unis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
…Cela, confirm\u00e9 par un parlementaire d\u00e9mocrate de grand poids.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\nEn effet, Adam Smith, d\u00e9mocrate de l’État de Washington et pr\u00e9sident de la puissante commission des forces arm\u00e9es de la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants, exposait le 22 avril, devant l’American Enterprise Institute<\/em> (AEI), rien de moins que l’affreuse v\u00e9rit\u00e9 de la fin de la domination militaire des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Ce discours constituait aussi une sorte de message sinon un avertissement, car l’avoir fait devant l’AEI n’est pas indiff\u00e9rent. Cet institut est le repaire favori des neocon<\/em>, principale force d’influence pour la politiqueSyst\u00e8me d’agression militaire et de d\u00e9structuration ; fa\u00e7on de leur dire : \u00ab\u00a0D\u00e9sol\u00e9 les gars, mais la f\u00eate est finie, et cessez donc de pousser \u00e0 des guerres que nous ne pouvons plus faire…\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Voici des extraits d’un article pr\u00e9sentant l’intervention<\/a> du d\u00e9put\u00e9 Smith :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
« Les forces arm\u00e9es am\u00e9ricaines doivent se rendre compte que la domination mondiale n’est plus une strat\u00e9gie viable pour la d\u00e9fense nationale, car la poursuite de cet objectif irr\u00e9alisable rend le pays moins sûr, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 le 22 avril le pr\u00e9sident de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es de la Chambre des repr\u00e9sentants.<\/em><\/p>\n
» Les technologies de d\u00e9fense \u00e9mergentes, telles que les essaims de drones \u00e0 bon march\u00e9, ont mis fin \u00e0 l’\u00e8re de l’unipolarit\u00e9 et de la pr\u00e9\u00e9minence militaire des États-Unis, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 le repr\u00e9sentant Adam Smith (D-Wash) \u00e0 l’American Enterprise Institute, un organisme \u00e0 tendance conservatrice.<\/em><\/p>\n
» \u00ab\u00a0Vous ne pouvez plus pr\u00e9tendre \u00eatre si puissant et fort au point de d\u00e9courager quiconque de vous affronter car on peut vous affronter avec un tout petit drone\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-il d\u00e9clar\u00e9. Au d\u00e9but de l’ann\u00e9e, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de marine Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., chef du commandement central des États-Unis, avait qualifi\u00e9 la prolif\u00e9ration des petits drones d’attaque \u00e0 bas prix de \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9veloppement tactique le plus inqui\u00e9tant\u00a0\u00bb depuis l’apparition des v\u00e9hicules pi\u00e9g\u00e9s en Irak il y a 15 ans. Il a ajout\u00e9 que les inqui\u00e9tudes \u00e9taient amplifi\u00e9es par le manque de contre-mesures fiables et abordables.<\/em><\/p>\n
» \u00ab\u00a0Des essaims de ces drones<\/em> … [qui] ne coûtent presque rien, peuvent d\u00e9livrer une puissance de feu sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 celle d’un F-35, qui ne peut pas entrer dans la zone \u00e0 cause des missiles surface-air qui la prot\u00e8gent\u00a0\u00bb, a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 M. Smith, brossant un sombre tableau d’une situation où \u00ab\u00a0nous avons des avions venus d’un programme de $100 milliards qui ne peuvent pas poursuivre nos adversaires, mais nos adversaires peuvent nous mettre compl\u00e8tement KO avec des drones d’une valeur unitaire de $75 000\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em><\/p>\n
» Smith a soulign\u00e9 la capacit\u00e9 de la Russie \u00e0 obtenir des capacit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques asym\u00e9triques similaires \u00ab\u00a0\u00e0 bas prix\u00a0\u00bb par le biais de campagnes de piratage et de d\u00e9sinformation comme un exemple de l’\u00e9rosion des conditions pour entrer dans la comp\u00e9tition g\u00e9opolitique mondiale.<\/em><\/p>\n
» \u00ab\u00a0Dans le monde dans lequel nous vivons aujourd’hui, aucune<\/em> [nation] ne peut dominer parce que les conditions de la puissance sont si faibles. Il faut donc \u00eatre beaucoup plus agile, beaucoup plus intelligent et beaucoup plus diversifi\u00e9 dans la mani\u00e8re d’atteindre ses objectifs de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-il d\u00e9clar\u00e9<\/em>. »<\/p>\n
» À propos de la strat\u00e9gie de d\u00e9fense nationale, Smith a fait remarquer que, bien qu’elle soit cens\u00e9e reconnaître la fin de la pr\u00e9\u00e9minence militaire mondiale des États-Unis, elle n’aborde pas les cons\u00e9quences de cette nouvelle situation. \u00ab\u00a0C’est une reconnaissance <\/em>[que l’\u00e8re de la domination unipolaire est termin\u00e9e], mais ce n’est pas une transition vers une politique r\u00e9elle qui reconnaît les v\u00e9ritables implications de cette reconnaissance\u00a0\u00bb, a-t-il d\u00e9clar\u00e9<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
La parole de Smith est importante du fait de sa position et du fait qu’il est du parti du pr\u00e9sident, – et un adversaire d\u00e9termin\u00e9 du JSF, qu’il surnomme \u00ab\u00a0trou \u00e0 rats\u00a0\u00bb, et qui est largement \u00e9voqu\u00e9 dans cette explication de la fin de la domination militaire US. Il y a un hiatus consid\u00e9rable entre le sens g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de cette d\u00e9claration et les pr\u00e9tentions (verbales, compl\u00e8tement d\u00e9menties par les faits<\/a> bien entendu) de l’administration Biden, surtout du pr\u00e9sident pr\u00e9tendant constituer une vaste coalition des d\u00e9mocraties avec les USA \u00e0 leur t\u00eate, d\u00e9cidant tout, remportant tout et ainsi de suite. D’autre part apparaît une logique d’affrontement avec les neocon <\/em>qui ont autant d’influence dans la politique ext\u00e9rieure d’agression que les wokenistes en politique int\u00e9rieure de terrorisation. Un conflit d’une grande importance se dessine au sein du parti d\u00e9mocrate et de l’establishment<\/em>, pour ajouter au d\u00e9sordre d\u00e9j\u00e0 existant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Ci-dessous, on trouve donc les deux textes anniversaires de AFM de janvier 2002 : sur la \u00ab\u00a0victoire\u00a0\u00bb en Afghanistan<\/a> et sur le JSF<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n
_________________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Blood and Thunder<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
The war on terror will be long and hard. Before it is over, we will need all of our instruments of national power and all of our military forces. It will be important to understand the diverse capabilities that we can bring to bear.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
In every conflict for the past 10 years, airpower has been extraordinarily successful for us.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
This does not mean we should expect to win our wars with airpower alone. Other capabilities are also essential. It would be foolish to discount them.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
It would be even more foolish to disparage airpower, which has been our single best capability in recent conflicts. Nevertheless, that is exactly what happened.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Air strikes in Afghanistan began Oct. 7. Within the month, an outcry arose that the war was being lost. Airpower couldn’t get the job done, and we had not sent in ground forces for fear of taking casualties.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
It would not be possible, said the naysayers, to take Kabul or any of the other cities with airpower and indigenous forces. The operation was bogged down. The Taliban would hold on through the winter.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Our best hope, they said, was a ground offensive in the spring. It would take between 20,000 and 100,000 US ground troops. There would be casualties, of course, but that was to be expected in war. Reluctance to take casualties was said to be cowardly, and bombing from a safe altitude was seen as unfair.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Besides, the critics said, it was ground power, not airpower, that carried the day in the Gulf War and in Kosovo. That story had been invented and spread by the land power lobby, but a surprising number of columnists and commentators bought it. The New Republic<\/em>, for example, predicted another failure of airpower in Afghanistan, which would not be surprising since \u00ab\u00a0airpower certainly has a rather impressive record of failure.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
By November, the prognosticators began to look less than astute. The Taliban was seriously weakened from previous strikes. When heavy bombers, assisted by US spotters on the ground, began hammering the front-line positions, the defenses crumbled. Afghan irregulars, supported by airpower and a handful of US Special Forces, took Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul, swept south, and were soon in control of most of the country.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Even so, not everyone was satisfied. Max Boot, an editor with the Wall Street Journal<\/em>, complained that \u00ab\u00a0President Bush promised that this would not be another bloodless, push-button war, but that is precisely what it has been.\u00a0\u00bb Our success in Afghanistan might come back to haunt us, Boot said, because it \u00ab\u00a0did nothing to dispel the widespread impression that Americans are fat, indolent, and unwilling to fight the barbarians on their own terms.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
There is plenty of fighting left in the war on terror. Boot may yet see all the blood he can tolerate. He may even see it before operations end in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Surely, though, we will not be so unwise as to \u00ab\u00a0fight the barbarians on their own terms.\u00a0\u00bb The sound strategy is to apply \u00ab\u00a0asymmetric power,\u00a0\u00bb pitting our strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
One such asymmetric strength is airpower. In the Gulf, in Bosnia, in Serbia, and more recently in Afghanistan, airpower gave us an overwhelming advantage. The enemy couldn’t match it, and couldn’t defend against it.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
It is time to put away the tired old story that airpower doesn’t work.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Airpower worked in the Gulf War. The 38-day air campaign left the Iraqi force demoralized, reeling, and degraded by about 50 percent. Coalition ground forces, supported by airpower, needed only 100 hours to chase the staggering Iraqis out of Kuwait.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Airpower worked in Serbia. It was the only military force engaged in a 78-day operation that ended with the Serb surrender. The threat of a land offensive had little to do with it. NATO had no plans to invade Serbia and could not have done so for another six months, if then.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
It was a good idea to give airpower a chance to do what it could in Afghanistan. It turned out to be quite a lot.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
We were fortunate to have a mix of service capabilities, with carrier-based aircraft generating the bulk of the early sorties and Air Force bombersworking with ground troops as events progresseddelivering the preponderance of the ordnance and accounting for more than half of the targets struck. Many others, including airlifters, tankers, gunships, fighters, and unmanned craft in air and space, contributed as well.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The best policy is to respect and support all of our forces. We are likely to need them, sooner or later. The time may come when we cannot avoid the clash of forces in ground combat or when high casualties are inevitable. However, we should not rush that moment because the peanut gallery is impatient with the progress of the campaign.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Assorted analysts, including retired military officers of a certain persuasion, are scornful of the effort to avoid casualties. We can only wonder at their motivation and take care not to put them in positions of authority.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
War is not a sporting event where the playing field is level and both sides are given an equal chance. We want to achieve our objectives with the fewest casualties possible. The point is to make war terrible for the enemy, not for ourselves.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
John T. Correll<\/h4>\n<\/p>\n
________________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/h4>\n<\/p>\n
A Strike Fighter for the Future<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche, the official in charge of selecting the JSF winner, said at a press conference to announce the choice that Lockheed Martin’s proposed aircraft and development program clearly offered \u00ab\u00a0the best value for the government\u00a0\u00bb across a range of competitive categories. These included technical merit of the design and flight testing of the X-35 concept demonstrator, as well as past performance of the contractor and predicted cost of the system over its lifetime.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The United States Navy and the air and naval services of the United Kingdom-partners on the project-said they concurred with Roche’s pick.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The JSF will replace the F-16 and A-10 fighter and attack aircraft in the Air Force, early model F\/A-18s in the Navy, and aging AV-8B Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing fighters in the Marine Corps. Specially configured but highly similar variants of the JSF will be built for each of those services.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The government promptly signed contracts-one worth about $19 billion for Lockheed Martin and teammates Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems and one for more than $4 billion to Pratt & Whitney, which will develop the aircraft’s F135 engine. These initial contracts cover about 10 years of development and flight testing and will pay for 22 aircraft–14 flyable airplanes, seven ground-test items, and one stealth \u00ab\u00a0pole model\u00a0\u00bb test airframe. Before the development phase ends, however, the Pentagon likely will award more contracts covering 465 initial production aircraft.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
First Flight 2006<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
The first flight of the Air Force version is slated for early 2006, and initial operational capability is planned for USAF and the Marine Corps in 2010. The Navy and Britain’s Royal Air Force and Royal Navy will have their first squadrons in 2012.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The JSF will be an enormous defense program. Plans call for Lockheed Martin to build about 3,000 fighter aircraft for the US and UK over 28 years or more. The work will make Lockheed Martin, near the end of this decade, the exclusive supplier of manned fighters to the nation’s military forces.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
In addition, the JSF builder will be well-positioned to dominate the overseas fighter market, where experts see potential for sales of another 3,000 airplanes to foreign forces. Along with the prize of building the actual jets goes a training and support package, including simulators, as well as the inside track on upgrades and modifications.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Pete Aldridge, DOD’s acquisition chief, noted that the value of the fighter contract ultimately \u00ab\u00a0could be in excess of $200 billion\u00a0\u00bb and acknowledged that it is the largest US military program ever.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Work on the 126-month development phase of the project began immediately.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0The train has left the station,\u00a0\u00bb said JSF program director Air Force Brig. Gen. John L. Hudson. Pieces of the aircraft will be made at numerous team locations, but final assembly will be performed in Fort Worth, Tex., on the same mile-long assembly line that churned out thousands of F-16s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Only a few months ago, there was no certainty there would even be a JSF program. The Bush Administration, in the midst of a months-long review of national military strategy, made it known it was considering scrapping one of three new fighters on the Pentagon’s books: the JSF, USAF’s F-22 Raptor, or the Navy’s F\/A-18E\/F Super Hornet. The JSF was considered the most vulnerable because, unlike the other two aircraft, it was not yet in production and therefore had a limited political constituency in terms of jobs and suppliers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
However, in announcing the decision to press ahead with the JSF program, Aldridge acknowledged that the fighter fleets of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are rapidly aging. The Pentagon’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council had reaffirmed the urgent need for the JSF to replace its wearing-out inventory of fighters, many of which are already near or at the end of their planned service lives.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Aldridge chairs the Defense Acquisition Board, which just prior to the contract go-ahead, decided that the JSF is in fact a necessary program, the technology is mature enough to proceed into development, and the project is affordable within expected Pentagon budgets. This blessing allowed the contracts to be signed and also gave assurance that the program would not be reduced in scope, at least not in the near future.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Close Scrutiny<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Affordability was \u00ab\u00a0one of the questions that we looked at very carefully,\u00a0\u00bb Aldridge said. He noted that tactical aviation has averaged about an 18 percent share of the Pentagon’s budget over the last 20 years, getting as high as 25 percent during the mid-1980s. In the coming decade, all tactical aviation procurement–not just the JSF–will stay under that average until Fiscal 2007. Even after that, \u00ab\u00a0the peak of the spending for Tacair will not reach but 22 percent of the DOD budget, less than what we did in the mid-’80s,\u00a0\u00bb Aldridge said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The same Pentagon panel had, less than two months before, given a green light to proceed with production of the F-22, which will replace the F-15C in the air superiority mission.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Three versions of the JSF will be built, and all will be stealthy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The Air Force model–plans call for building 1,763 of them for the service–will be the least expensive of the three. It is expected to cost about $40 million a copy in 2001 dollars. It will replace the F-16 and have similar or better aerodynamic performance–a top speed of about Mach 1.8 and able to turn at nine Gs–as well as a combat radius of 690 miles. Internally, it will carry two 2,000-pound bombs. After enemy air defenses have been beaten down and stealth is less important, the Air Force JSF will also be able to carry external stores and fuel tanks, as well as missiles on wingtip launchers, all of which greatly diminish the low observability qualities of an aircraft.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The JSF used by the Air Force and Marines will be slightly larger than the F-16, with wingspan four feet wider but length only one foot longer. The fuselage, however, will be far deeper, to hold munitions and fuel internally. Whereas the F-16 needs to carry bulky and heavy targeting and vision pods, the JSF will be externally \u00ab\u00a0clean,\u00a0\u00bb and all optics will be accommodated through a faceted aperture under the nose.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The airplane will also have basic flight displays on the inside of the helmet visor, helmet-mounted cuing of weapons, and respond to certain voice commands.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
USAF plans to use the JSF in much the same way as it now employs the F-16. It will principally be an attack aircraft but with sufficient aerodynamic agility to win dogfights with almost any other aircraft. Because of its stealth and nimbleness, said Aldridge, the JSF will \u00ab\u00a0provide an air-to-air capability second only to the F-22 air superiority fighter.\u00a0\u00bb He has said previously that, at half the price of rival foreign fighters and twice the capability, the JSF could doom foreign fighter makers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Combat Persistence<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Gen. John P. Jumper, Air Force Chief of Staff, said the JSF will provide persistence over the battlefield in future combat operations because it will be numerous enough to strike in many places simultaneously and stealthy enough to survive against emerging air defense threats.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Because the Air Force JSF won’t arrive for another decade, USAF will have to invest several billion dollars in a systems and structural upgrade of the F-16 fleet, which will start to reach retirement age in large numbers beginning in 2005.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Jumper has said he expects some of the JSF buy will go to Air National Guard units as well as for active squadrons, to keep the Total Force balanced in its equipment.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The Navy model will be capable of landing on an aircraft carrier. To achieve that, it will have larger and heavier landing gear, more structural strength, an arresting hook, and larger wings for better range and carrier landing characteristics. The Navy plans to build 480 JSFs, at a 2001 unit cost of about $50 million. It will be about the size of the C model of the F\/A-18.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The USMC version will have Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing capability and will be the first operational STOVL aircraft that will also be capable of achieving supersonic speeds. The Marines plan to deploy their JSFs at unimproved forward airstrips and on amphibious assault ships to be near the action when close air support is needed for ground troops. A total of 609 STOVL versions of JSF are planned for the Marine Corps, which will pay about $45 million apiece for them in current dollars. They will have a combat radius of about 500 miles, the cost of having the capability to take off and land vertically.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The UK will decide within two years whether it wants to procure the carrier version or STOVL model of the JSF. The choice will be made after Britain makes a more basic decision about the style and design of the next generation of British aircraft carriers. In any event, the British requirement is for 150 airplanes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The UK has been a partner in the JSF since the inception of the program in 1996. In exchange for about $2 billion in contributions to the project, the UK was able to have input into the aircraft’s performance requirements and basic design. It will also receive its aircraft concurrently with the US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Six other nations are likely to join in the development phase. They are Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey. Those that participate will pay a share of development costs. In return, they will receive some share of the development work and move to the front of the line for foreign sales of the aircraft.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
About 35 nations operate the F-16, F\/A-18, or AV-8B, and all would be considered candidates to purchase the JSF at some point in the future. Pentagon and industry officials say the biggest issue in export would be the level of stealth the US would be willing to release to a customer, as well as the degree of sensor fusion and access to US combat information systems.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Congressional Unease<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
The JSF has always been structured as a winner-take-all contract; whoever emerged with the winning design would build all 3,000 airplanes planned. The scheme has been questioned numerous times by members of Congress who are reluctant to concentrate all fighter work with a single contractor facing no competition.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Jerry Daniels, president and chief executive officer of Boeing Military Aircraft and Missile Systems, acknowledged at a press conference to discuss why the company lost in its bid for the JSF work, that \u00ab\u00a0the danger of winner-take-all … is that one company–clearly now, that is Boeing–could get out of the fighter business.\u00a0\u00bb However, he noted, such an event \u00ab\u00a0isn’t going to happen tomorrow.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
At least through the end of this decade, Boeing will continue to build the F\/A-18E\/F Super Hornet, and it is a major subcontractor to Lockheed on the F-22, production of which is scheduled to run through 2012. Moreover, Boeing stands a good chance of selling F-15Es to South Korea, so Boeing will likely be producing fighter airplanes for at least another 10 years.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
However, the \u00ab\u00a0perishable commodity\u00a0\u00bb is the knowledge of engineers who are skilled in designing fighters, who know \u00ab\u00a0how to take metal and composite materials and glue and put it into something that weighs 30,000 pounds but you can’t find it with a radar,\u00a0\u00bb Daniels observed. This capability, which he called \u00ab\u00a0a national asset,\u00a0\u00bb will dissipate without \u00ab\u00a0meaningful work\u00a0\u00bb to do in fighter design.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The Pentagon has reviewed the winner-take-all approach at Congress’ insistence-three times in 2000 alone, Aldridge noted–and still found the approach to be the most cost-effective. Various Pentagon and independent analyses estimated that setting up a second production line for JSF could cost between $1 billion and $4 billion, depending on how much production capability is duplicated.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Aldridge noted Boeing’s ongoing work on the F-22 and Super Hornet and also pointed out \u00ab\u00a0there’s still design work going on [with] unmanned aircraft and unmanned combat aircraft.\u00a0\u00bb Boeing’s design teams would be \u00ab\u00a0appropriate\u00a0\u00bb to work on these, he said. Furthermore, DOD has put into the Fiscal 2002 budget some money to begin work on \u00ab\u00a0a new long-range strike platform that could have capabilities far out into the future,\u00a0\u00bb Aldridge said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
In the case of prime contractors, \u00ab\u00a0there’s plenty of work,\u00a0\u00bb he concluded. He added that Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles and other unmanned systems hold much promise. \u00ab\u00a0When you get to the period of 2025 or 2040,\u00a0\u00bb said Aldridge, \u00ab\u00a0it’s not clear that manned aircraft competition will exist at all,\u00a0\u00bb possibly rendering the question of preserving more than one manufacturer moot. In fact, some industry and Pentagon officials have speculated that if Boeing’s defense-suppression UCAV performs well, more of them could be purchased at the expense of some cuts to the JSF buy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Daniels admitted that UCAVs offer a distinct opportunity for Boeing but that the long-range strike platform will not enter a design phase until near the end of this decade, too far out to help cushion the loss of the JSF program.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Man From Missouri<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
The Missouri and Washington Congressional delegations-representing the largest concentrations of Boeing workers-introduced legislation that would order the Pentagon to give some JSF work to Boeing as an industrial base-saving measure. Missouri Republican Sen. Christopher Bond has called a second production line a national \u00ab\u00a0insurance policy.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Aldridge, however, said that the two teams knew going into the competition that the result would be a winner-take-all, and they structured their teams and assigned work share and risk within them on that basis.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0If Lockheed Martin wishes to use the unique talents of Boeing … they are free to do so,\u00a0\u00bb Aldridge said. \u00ab\u00a0We’re not forcing them to do it.\u00a0\u00bb He later acknowledged it would be \u00ab\u00a0politically astute\u00a0\u00bb of Lockheed Martin to find some work for Boeing on the project. For its part, Lockheed Martin said it would entertain assigning a work share to Boeing if the government asked the company to do so. However, a Lockheed official noted that, with 18 percent of work share already assigned to Northrop Grumman and 12 percent to BAE Systems, \u00ab\u00a0there’s not a lot of room to play around with this.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The Pentagon would oppose any legislation mandating a share to Boeing, Aldridge said. In a letter to concerned members of Congress, he noted that the winner-take-all approach was validated as the most efficient way to conduct the program and that creating additional assembly lines or redundant manufacturing capabilities would add to the cost and delay the project. He emphasized that there will be a rigorous engine competition on the program and that the Pentagon is also seeking ways to expand competition on the radar and other critical avionics.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Boeing is also considered likely to get substantial Air Force orders for 767 widebody transports to serve as tankers and replacement airframes for the E-8 Joint STARS, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and possibly the E-3 AWACS fleets. Roche has suggested leasing the airplanes as a means of speeding up their acquisition, saying the airframes were urgently needed \u00ab\u00a0yesterday.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
F135 engines for the JSF will be made initially by Pratt & Whitney, but General Electric-Rolls Royce will produce a competing power plant called the F136. The two engines will have to be functionally identical in the way they mount on the airplane, in the procedures for their maintenance, and in the software that runs them, so as to reduce engine-unique spare parts and processes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0We want it so that you can take out a Pratt engine and put in a GE engine, and the pilot will never know the difference,\u00a0\u00bb Hudson said. Pratt & GE will compete for JSF engine production in lots, in an arrangement akin to the \u00ab\u00a0great engine war\u00a0\u00bb of the 1980s between the F100 and F110 power plants.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
No Rush<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
In the run-up to the Quadrennial Defense Review, several area study teams noted that the Navy is still without a stealth airplane and, under the JSF schedule, will not get one for another decade. Several panels suggested the JSF be accelerated, for at least the Navy version.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Aldridge said that \u00ab\u00a0we’d love to have this airplane today\u00a0\u00bb but the Pentagon will not rush the program.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0We’re going to make sure we do it right,\u00a0\u00bb he explained, adding that the JSF will follow a \u00ab\u00a0spiral development\u00a0\u00bb plan in which early models will not have \u00ab\u00a0100 percent\u00a0\u00bb of the ultimate capability planned for the type. The JSFs will be improved in block upgrades, and early models will be retrofitted as more advanced avionics, software, and weapons become available.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Hudson, too, acknowledged that the development program has been laid out in a well-paced, \u00ab\u00a0logical\u00a0\u00bb fashion and that tinkering with it would likely not produce airplanes much faster but would certainly raise the cost \u00ab\u00a0and the levels of risk that we associate with this program.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Prior to the JSF go-ahead, the General Accounting Office advised Congress to slow the program, arguing that, while good progress had been made in reducing technological risk, the program was still not a \u00ab\u00a0low risk\u00a0\u00bb venture. The GAO warned that cost overruns and schedule delays could loom in the future if certain of the program’s business, manufacturing, and weapons initiatives don’t pan out. The Pentagon rejected the assertion and insisted that the risks in JSF are well-understood and well within reason.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Lockheed Martin was the \u00ab\u00a0clear winner\u00a0\u00bb of the competition, Roche said, adding that the outcome was not \u00ab\u00a0a squeaker\u00a0\u00bb but also not a shutout, either.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0It became clear, as we went through this process, that the case built more and more strongly\u00a0\u00bb for the airplane that will derive from the X-35 demonstrator, Roche added.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Lockheed Martin JSF leader Tom Burbage said \u00ab\u00a0our biggest gamble\u00a0\u00bb was the lift system in the STOVL version. This machine uses a swivel-down rear exhaust, coupled by a shaft to a vertically mounted \u00ab\u00a0lift fan\u00a0\u00bb behind the cockpit. The two posts of thrust-one of which is cool \u00ab\u00a0fan\u00a0\u00bb air and not engine exhaust-made for a cooler environment around the airplane, as well as more lifting power at lower engine power levels.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The swiveling rear exhaust is a licensed design from the Yakovlev design bureau in Russia, which tried it out on the Yak-141 STOVL fighter.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0It was all or nothing,\u00a0\u00bb Burbage said. \u00ab\u00a0If the propulsion concept didn’t work, we obviously weren’t going to be competitive.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Daniels, the Boeing executive, said the lift fan concept was \u00ab\u00a0probably the single most important feature\u00a0\u00bb of the competition.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Advantage: Lift Fan<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Boeing’s proposal called for \u00ab\u00a0direct lift,\u00a0\u00bb meaning the engine was providing all the raw power to raise the airplane. This meant it had to run hotter, which probably cost Boeing points in life-cycle costs; the Boeing proposal would have burned up engines more quickly, Daniels allowed. The Lockheed Martin proposal also provided more lifting power, despite the added weight of the lift fan, 60 percent more than with the engine alone.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0We had thin margins on some parameters, where Lockheed had very strong margins on those same parameters,\u00a0\u00bb Daniels said. As requirements to carry more ordnance were added, Boeing’s margin shrank.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0We’re basically using an engine where we’re diverting the thrust to get us direct lift,\u00a0\u00bb Daniels said in a press conference. \u00ab\u00a0With the fan system, they’ve effectively created what is like another engine in the aircraft. So they’re getting much more efficiency.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0In the non-STOVL versions, the lift fan is replaced by a fuel tank.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
The Pentagon told Boeing that the company had scored slightly better on prior performance and management but had not scored as well as Lockheed on airplane capabilities, Daniels reported. Aircraft unit costs were about the same, he added.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Burbage said the \u00ab\u00a0challenge now is to make sure we’ve got the life-cycle cost dimension\u00a0\u00bb under control. Although most of the technologies going into the JSF were tested either in the factory or on the X-plane demonstrators, long-term reliability and maintainability haven’t been proven \u00ab\u00a0because these were very abbreviated flight [test] programs,\u00a0\u00bb he said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Former JSF program director Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Michael A. Hough said the two JSF concept demonstrators–Lockheed’s was the X-35 and Boeing’s the X-32–turned in phenomenal performances and rarely missed a flight-test hop because of system glitches and missed none due to engine failure. To achieve such a thing with experimental aircraft was \u00ab\u00a0unprecedented,\u00a0\u00bb Hough said, and validated the new computer-aided design systems employed in their construction.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Lockheed used two aircraft to demonstrate the capabilities of all three versions. The Air Force model was designated the X-35A and flew more than 27 hours on 27 flights in just 30 days. The same airplane, redesignated X-35B, was the STOVL model with the lift fan installed; it flew 21.5 hours over 39 flights in 45 days. The X-35C was the carrier version, which had heavier landing gear and Navy-specific equipment and wings. It racked up 58 hours over 73 flights in 85 days. The flight test schedule was \u00ab\u00a0aggressive,\u00a0\u00bb Burbage noted.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
There is no plan to use the demonstrators for any further testing. Hudson said there would be a certain amount of risk in doing so, since they were designed for a brief round of use and not extended flying. Moreover, although the X-35 strongly resembles the proposed airplane-which may be called the F-35 or F-24–it was not a prototype. Hudson has had \u00ab\u00a0lots of requests\u00a0\u00bb from museums around the world for the demonstrator aircraft.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Burbage said Lockheed will achieve a maximum production rate on the JSF at approximately 17 a month in 2011. The Fort Worth plant built F-16s at a \u00ab\u00a0considerably higher\u00a0\u00bb rate during the late 1980s, but the JSF figure does not count foreign sales. Burbage said the facility can accommodate more than 17 per month but declined to give a figure.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Born in Crisis<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
The JSF program grew out of a defense financial crisis in the early 1990s. USAF needed a cheap, lightweight fighter to replace the F-16, the Navy wanted a stealthy medium bomber, and the Marines wanted a new jump jet to replace the AV-8B Harrier. As a cost-saving measure, the three programs were merged, to the catcalls of both those in the military and industry. It was considered almost impossible to build an airplane that could satisfy such divergent requirements without being a jack of all trades, master of none.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Burbage said he himself had doubts it could be done.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0Back in those days, I’m not sure we had the tools to do it,\u00a0\u00bb he said. \u00ab\u00a0Even as recently as three or four years ago, … the industry really didn’t have the capacity to design a family of airplanes where no user paid any penalty for what the other guy needed.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
However, \u00ab\u00a0today, with our 3-D, solid engineering modeling tools, and just the pure processing power of the computers, you can in fact create these collaborative engineering environments,\u00a0\u00bb in which the talents of geographically dispersed companies can work together on a design, create templates, and wind up with parts that mate perfectly, Burbage said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
He also said the services demonstrated great discipline in holding their requirements to those that were absolutely needed. That made the joint solution possible.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\u00ab\u00a0Once the airplane gets off the ground and raises the landing gear, they all do the same thing,\u00a0\u00bb said Burbage. \u00ab\u00a0They’re all multirole combat aircraft. … The challenge really is to … accommodate all the different basing requirements without penalizing one guy for the other.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
John A. Tirpak<\/h4><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Tristes anniversaires et brutal r\u00e9veil • Articles du 23 avril 2021. • En consultants des articles de 2002 sur les grandes nouvelles de 2001 pour les USA (JSF et Afghanistan), et en comparant leur contenu aux nouvelles de 2021, on mesure le gouffre qui a englouti la puissance des États-Unis. • Ce que confirme l’un… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[831,7770,5763,3236,3143,20875,13646,2651,4390,2969,2985,3318,3961,250,4005,7954,4849,4457,3068,14513,20876,2671,2860],"class_list":["post-79735","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-a","tag-abandon","tag-adam","tag-afghanistan","tag-air","tag-correll","tag-domination","tag-du","tag-et","tag-f-35","tag-fin","tag-force","tag-john","tag-jsf","tag-magazine","tag-pause","tag-retrait","tag-smith","tag-strategique","tag-t","tag-tirpak","tag-us","tag-victoire"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79735","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=79735"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79735\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=79735"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=79735"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=79735"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}