{"id":80444,"date":"2022-12-14T16:17:09","date_gmt":"2022-12-14T16:17:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2022\/12\/14\/la-fable-du-patriot-le-retour\/"},"modified":"2022-12-14T16:17:09","modified_gmt":"2022-12-14T16:17:09","slug":"la-fable-du-patriot-le-retour","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2022\/12\/14\/la-fable-du-patriot-le-retour\/","title":{"rendered":"La \u201cfable du \u2018Patriot&rsquo;\u201d, \u2013 le Retour"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_a.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:2em\">La \u00ab\u00a0fable du &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo;\u00a0\u00bb, &ndash; le Retour<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><p>&bull; Pour aider Zelenski \u00e0 stopper et \u00e0 d\u00e9truire les hordes barbares de la Russie, Biden sort le &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo; de la naphtaline, <strong>pour la troisi\u00e8me fois en quarante ans, et en \u00ab\u00a0fait don\u00a0\u00bb aux Ukrainiens pour leur d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne<\/strong>. &bull; Il faut donc savoir que la m\u00eame op\u00e9ration du \u00ab\u00a0retour du &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo;\u00a0\u00bb est r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement ressortie <strong>de d\u00e9cennie en d\u00e9cennie<\/strong>. &bull; Nous sommes au temps de l&rsquo;hyper-acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration des hyper-nouvelles technologies, et l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique <strong>en est l&rsquo;absolu \u00ab\u00a0ma&icirc;tre des microprocesseurs\u00a0\u00bb, comme l&rsquo;autre l&rsquo;est des horloges<\/strong>. &bull; Avec trois textes anciens et \u00e9difiants.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;une des choses les plus remarquables du Syst\u00e8me sous sa forme mythique et cosmique, et notamment dans sa filiale qu&rsquo;est le syst\u00e8me de la communication, c&rsquo;est la durabilit\u00e9 des mythes de choses ultra-modernes et ultra-rapides fabriqu\u00e9s par ce syst\u00e8me de la communication. D&rsquo;une certaine fa\u00e7on, on pourrait dire que Biden est un exemple extr\u00eame, quasiment-humain, d&rsquo;une loi de la modernit\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaniste s&rsquo;appliquant essentiellement aux objets technologiques, essentiellement militaires. Dans tous les cas, le syst\u00e8me sol-air anti-a\u00e9rien Raytheon &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo; est certainement l&rsquo;un de ceux-l\u00e0 ; du coup, des batteries de ce syst\u00e8me vont \u00eatre envoy\u00e9es en Ukraine, pour aider les forces du pr\u00e9sident Zelenski.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Dave De Camp, <a href=\"https:\/\/news.antiwar.com\/2022\/12\/13\/us-poised-to-provide-ukraine-with-patriot-missile-systems\/\">de &lsquo;<em>Antiwar.com<\/em>&lsquo;<\/a>, pr\u00e9sente la nouvelle :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em\">\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Les &Eacute;tats-Unis mettent la derni\u00e8re main aux plans d&rsquo;envoi de syst\u00e8mes de missiles de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne Patriot de Raytheon \u00e0 l&rsquo;Ukraine, et la d\u00e9cision pourrait \u00eatre prise par l&rsquo;administration Biden cette semaine, a rapport\u00e9 Reuters mardi.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>L&rsquo;envoi des Patriot marquerait une escalade significative de l&rsquo;aide militaire am\u00e9ricaine, car ces missiles sont consid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme l&rsquo;un des syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne les plus avanc\u00e9s fabriqu\u00e9s aux &Eacute;tats-Unis. Ces syst\u00e8mes sont g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement rares, car ils font l&rsquo;objet d&rsquo;une forte demande de la part de nombreux alli\u00e9s des &Eacute;tats-Unis.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Le projet d&rsquo;envoyer des Patriots \u00e0 Kiev intervient alors que les frappes de missiles russes frappent les infrastructures ukrainiennes. Le pr\u00e9sident Biden s&rsquo;est entretenu dimanche avec le pr\u00e9sident ukrainien Volodymyr Zelenski et a promis que les &Eacute;tats-Unis fourniraient un soutien accru en mati\u00e8re de d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne<\/em>. &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Il est difficile de consid\u00e9rer avec un s\u00e9rieux tout \u00e0 fait complet et un respect attentif cette nouvelle, le &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo; faisant l&rsquo;objet \u00e0 chaque occasion de sa r\u00e9surrection des m\u00eames consid\u00e9rations s\u00e9rieuses et respectueuses, comme s&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agissait de la \u00ab\u00a0derni\u00e8re merveille de la technologie militaire\u00a0\u00bb, depuis au moins 1991. On se rappelle la fable qui fut mont\u00e9e (on ne parlait pas encore aussi abondamment qu&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui, de <em>narrative <\/em>et de \u00ab\u00a0simulacre&rsquo;) \u00e0 propos du &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo; apr\u00e8s la premi\u00e8re guerre du Golfe. Le pr\u00e9sident Bush p\u00e8re, candidat \u00e0 un deuxi\u00e8me terme de sa pr\u00e9sidence, fit une visite triomphale \u00e0 Raytheon pour saluer les performances du syst\u00e8me. Il s&rsquo;av\u00e9ra tr\u00e8s vite que ces performances \u00e9taient fausses, ou plut\u00f4t compl\u00e8tement fabriqu\u00e9es par une coop\u00e9ration parfaitement int\u00e9gr\u00e9e Pentagone-Raytheon. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rt.com\/russia\/568197-us-patriot-missiles-ukraine\/\">RT.com le rappelle<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em\">\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Le syst\u00e8me Patriot a \u00e9t\u00e9 largement test\u00e9 pendant la<\/em> [premi\u00e8re]<em> guerre du Golfe, le Pentagone affirmant qu&rsquo;il avait r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 intercepter 45 des 47 missiles Scud irakiens <\/em>[tir\u00e9s contre Israel]<em> pendant les six semaines du conflit. Toutefois, l&rsquo;arm\u00e9e isra\u00e9lienne a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 par la suite qu'\u00a0\u00bbun seul, voire aucun\u00a0\u00bb des Scud avait \u00e9t\u00e9 intercept\u00e9, tandis qu&rsquo;un rapport du New York Times de 2017 a constat\u00e9 que le syst\u00e8me Patriot \u00e9tait inefficace lorsqu&rsquo;il \u00e9tait utilis\u00e9 par l&rsquo;Arabie saoudite contre des missiles Houthi tir\u00e9s depuis le Y\u00e9men.<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Ces pr\u00e9cisions (celles de 1992) sont reprises dans trois textes significatifs que nous avions rassembl\u00e9s en 2003, \u00e0 la suite d&rsquo;une nouvelle campagne affirmant l&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9 du &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo;, cette fois lors de la deuxi\u00e8me \u00ab\u00a0guerre du Golfe&rsquo;, contre l&rsquo;Irak \u00e0 nouveau, en mars-avril 2003. Les USA firent \u00e0 nouveau une grande offensive de promotion du &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo;, qui s&rsquo;\u00e9tait distingu\u00e9 notamment durant cette campagne par le destruction de deux avions alli\u00e9s (un US et un UK). Ils engag\u00e8rent Isra\u00ebl dans cette campagne, malgr\u00e9 que ce pays avait eu \u00e0 souffrir des d\u00e9ficiences compl\u00e8tes du &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo; en 1991 ; Isra\u00ebl eut quelques compensations&#8230;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Nous \u00e9crivions cela dans une publication d&rsquo;avril 2003 sur ce site, donc quelques jours apr\u00e8s la fin des hostilit\u00e9s au cours desquelles le &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo; s&rsquo;illustra \u00e0 nouveau par ses errements et son inefficacit\u00e9 presque achev\u00e9e en une sorte de perfection. Qu&rsquo;on parvienne aujourd&rsquo;hui \u00e0 le sortir de sa naphtaline de mensonges, pour le pr\u00e9senter comme un avantage d\u00e9cisif contre les missiles russes qui s&rsquo;abattent sur le Zelensktan constitue sans aucun doute une tr\u00e8s grande performance dans le domaine de la repr\u00e9sentation du simulacre. Nous \u00e9crivions donc le <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/dune-guerre-lautre-la-fable-du-patriot\">23 avril 2003<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em\">\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Le &lsquo;Patriot&rsquo; est un missile \u00e0 la fois classique et mythique, &ndash; parce qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un classique des revers catastrophiques de la technologie et d&rsquo;un mythe du montage virtualiste pour faire croire \u00e0 ses qualit\u00e9s imparables de syst\u00e8me de technologie avanc\u00e9e. On a vu par ailleurs une r\u00e9cente analyse sur les \u00ab\u00a0performances\u00a0\u00bb du missile dans la guerre qui vient de se terminer <\/em>[Irak, mars-avril 2003]<em>, &ndash; performances qui pourraient \u00eatre jug\u00e9es comme catastrophiques malgr\u00e9 les assurances du contraire qui ont accompagn\u00e9 le d\u00e9veloppement et le d\u00e9ploiement de la version modernis\u00e9e, dite PAC-3<\/em>. &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Cela est \u00e9crit il y a quasiment vingt ans et le &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo; est tout de m\u00eame, aujourd&rsquo;hui, quasiment vingt ans apr\u00e8s, l&rsquo;objet d&rsquo;un coup de t\u00e9l\u00e9phone empress\u00e9 de Biden \u00e0 Zelenski qui r\u00e9clame \u00e0 hauts cris des syst\u00e8mes de d\u00e9fense antia\u00e9riens. Le texte que nous citons \u00e9tait accompagn\u00e9 de trois textes illustrant ce que nous nommions (d\u00e9j\u00e0) &laquo; <em>La fable du &lsquo;Patriot&rsquo;<\/em> &raquo;. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une sorte de \u00ab\u00a0la Fable-III, Le Retour\u00a0\u00bb, concernant toujours le m\u00eame machin, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 comme l&rsquo;avant-garde de l&rsquo;ancienne Vieille-Garde de la d\u00e9fense anti-a\u00e9rienne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Comme le remarquent certains, la d\u00e9cision US de livrer des &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo; \u00e0 l&rsquo;Ukraine, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e comme exceptionnelle, est une mesure de d\u00e9sespoir (des communicants de la Maison-Blanche) pour r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 un appel d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9e (de Zelenski), mais une bonne nouvelle pour les actionnaires de Raytheon, ce qui est tout de m\u00eame important. Tout cela a peu de rapport avec la conduite de la guerre en Ukraine et l&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9 de la d\u00e9fense contre les missiles ; on y ajoute bien entendu l&rsquo;\u00e9nigme haletante de savoir si des servants de nationalit\u00e9 US vont s&rsquo;occuper des &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo;, ce qui p\u00e9renniserait la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 \u00e9vidente de la pr\u00e9sence US en Ukraine, en guerre contre la Russie.  Mais il est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que l&rsquo;on va former des vrais-Ukrainiens au maniement de la merveille, ce qui en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral prend \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s une ann\u00e9e&#8230; Puisque nous sommes dans le simulacre !<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Pour le reste, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire une certaine vision historique du &lsquo;<em>Patriot<\/em>&lsquo;, et aussi, dans le cas pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 ici, la fa\u00e7on dont tel ou tel (Isra\u00ebl dans ce cas), pr\u00eate main-forte au complexe militaro-industriel pour donner une belle image d&rsquo;un syst\u00e8me compl\u00e8tement disqualifi\u00e9 (par le m\u00eame Isra\u00ebl, dans le chef du ministre de la d\u00e9fense Arens en 1992 parlant directement au pr\u00e9sident Bush p\u00e8re ; Arens qui fut le dernier homme politique isra\u00e9lien \u00e0 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article\/israel-pourrait-il-changer-dallie-privilegie\">d\u00e9fendre honn\u00eatement<\/a> les int\u00e9r\u00eats souverains d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl face aux USA). On peut estimer que les Isra\u00e9liens font aujourd&rsquo;hui la m\u00eame chose avec le F-35 (JSF) qu&rsquo;ils ont maintenant depuis quatre ans en formation op\u00e9rationnelle, et qu&rsquo;ils n&rsquo;utilisent quasiment jamais dans leurs incursions diverses, au contraire de toutes leurs habitudes d&rsquo;utiliser aussit\u00f4t op\u00e9rationnellement un nouveau mat\u00e9riel. On comprend leur prudence, sugg\u00e9r\u00e9e par le Pentagone&#8230;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Nous pr\u00e9sentions ainsi les trois textes ci-dessous, que l&rsquo;on retrouve en anglais, mais en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral un anglais plus facile \u00e0 comprendre que la langue shakespearienne qui a depuis longtemps disparu, au c\u00f4t\u00e9 de celle de Dante et de celle de Moli\u00e8re. Les textes \u00e9taient ainsi pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em\">\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>&bull; Un article d&rsquo;Aviation Week &#038; Space Technology datant du 12 avril 1992, qui repr\u00e9sente la premi\u00e8re publication de r\u00e9putation \u00ab\u00a0s\u00e9rieuse\u00a0\u00bb \u00e0 exposer les doutes graves sur les capacit\u00e9s du Patriot. (Par \u00ab\u00a0s\u00e9rieuse\u00a0\u00bb, nous n&rsquo;entendons pas n\u00e9cessairement comp\u00e9tente, mais plut\u00f4t comme une source reconnue par l&rsquo;establishment. On peut ne pas \u00eatre s\u00e9rieux et \u00eatre comp\u00e9tent, et vice-versa. On peut aussi \u00eatre s\u00e9rieux et comp\u00e9tent \u00e0 la fois.)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>&bull; Ce <\/em>[<em>r\u00e9cent<\/em>]<em> article de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.wsws.org\/articles\/2003\/feb2003\/cbc-f07.shtml\">WSWS.org (du 7 f\u00e9vrier 2003)<\/a> expose la recension d&rsquo;un document t\u00e9l\u00e9vis\u00e9 portant notamment sur le cas du Patriot. Nombre d&rsquo;int\u00e9ressantes pr\u00e9cisions sont apport\u00e9es, on y trouve la position extr\u00eamement critique des Isra\u00e9liens. On comprend combien la guerre du Golfe-I a \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9e, au travers de r\u00e9sultats d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment amplifi\u00e9s, comme argument massif d&rsquo;exportation du Patriot. Effectivement, les ventes de Patriot furent consid\u00e9rables apr\u00e8s 1990-91, essentiellement aupr\u00e8s de pays arabes.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>&bull; Le troisi\u00e8me article, de Defense News, paru \u00e9galement le 7 f\u00e9vrier, est assez curieux. Il expose l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de la position isra\u00e9lienne, en cours de n\u00e9gociation avec les Am\u00e9ricains, dont l&rsquo;un des effets serait d&rsquo;abandonner toutes les critiques isra\u00e9liennes contre le Patriot et de proclamer que le missile, notamment dans sa version PAC-3, marche superbement. C&rsquo;est un des cas les plus \u00e9vidents de d\u00e9marche virtualiste dans le domaine de l&rsquo;\u00e9valuation des performances des syst\u00e8mes d&rsquo;armes que nous connaissions. Litt\u00e9ralement, les Isra\u00e9liens disent, \u00e0 la demande des Am\u00e9ricains et parce qu&rsquo;ils ne peuvent pas leur refuser de tels services en ce moment : oui, nous allons dire d\u00e9sormais que le Patriot marche bien, alors que nous avions dit le contraire jusqu&rsquo;ici. Les Isra\u00e9liens semblent m\u00eame pr\u00eats \u00e0 en acheter (c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire qu&rsquo;ils seraient oblig\u00e9s par les Am\u00e9ricains \u00e0 utiliser une partie de l&rsquo;aide US dans cet achat). La r\u00e9alit\u00e9 est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e de fa\u00e7on d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e, sans aucune dissimulation, comme un \u00e9l\u00e9ment compl\u00e8tement accessoire (ce pourquoi nous parlons de virtualisme). Les performances du PAC-3 en mars-avril 2003 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 une douche froide \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard et des indications r\u00e9centes disent que les isra\u00e9liens ach\u00e8teront bien des Patriot, peut-\u00eatre moins que pr\u00e9vu, et les entreposeront sans intention de les mettre en service actif.<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Ces r\u00e9sum\u00e9s devraient donc dispenser ceux qui souffrent trop devant quelques lignes en anglais, &ndash; il leur sera hautement pardonn\u00e9, &ndash; et permettra aux autres d&rsquo;avoir un certain nombre de d\u00e9tails sur ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne \u00e9tonnant de missiles sol-air le plus performant du monde, vieux de pr\u00e8s d&rsquo;un demi-si\u00e8cle, \u00e0 la gloire des capacit\u00e9s de rapidit\u00e9 de progression, de renouvellement, de cr\u00e9ativit\u00e9, de l&rsquo;industrie d&rsquo;armement des USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h4><em>dedefensa.org<\/em><\/h4>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>_______________________<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">Army Scales Back Assessments Of Patriot&rsquo;s Success in Gulf War<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong>By David F. Bond, Aviation Week &#038; Space Technology, 12 April 1992<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The U. S. Army has moderated its assessment of Patriot performance against Scud ballistic missiles during the war against Iraq, but outside experts and partisans kept debate on the subject as lively as ever last week.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Maj. Gen. Jay M. Garner, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, force development, said the Army new believes more than 40% of Patriot air defense missile engagements in Israel and more than 70% of the engagements in Saudi Arabia destroyed or disabled the target warhead or diverted its impact outside the defended area.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>As recently as February, in estimates developed for an evaluation of future Patriot improvements, the Army claimed more than 50% success in Israel and more than 80% success in Saudi Arabia. The new estimates, submitted Apr. 7 at a House Government Operations subcommittee hearing, followed a search for new data in Israel and Saudi Arabia and an assessment of how confident the Army could be in the data available to it.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The Army assigned high confidence te, some data collected by Patriot operators-track amplification printouts made during some engagements, for example, and a digital data recording system added at the battalion level in Riyadh. Television coverage of engagements and verbal reports were rated low in confidence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Representatives of the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office, who reviewed the Army&rsquo;s earlier estimates ai the request of the subcommittee, said the service has improved its analyses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>But both experts-Steven A. Hildreth of CRS and Richard Davis of GAO-said it still is net clear how much confidence can be placed in the new Army assessments. Hildreth said he still thinks available data show only one definite Scud kill in engagements over Israel. He added, however, that the Army \u00a0\u00bbis moving in the right direction.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Chairman John Conyers, Jr. (D.Mich.), continued to urge declassification of Army data and an independent evaluation of its analyses. He said the subcommittee staff found that Army analysts did net account for Scud warheads that were duds or missed their targets, and that classified infrared film shot by the Israeli military shows large miss distances in some engagements the Army scores as warhead kills.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\u00a0\u00bbIronically, the more information we have, the less successful the Patriot seems,\u00a0\u00bb Conyers said. Garner said Patriot remains \u00a0\u00bba terrific success story\u00a0\u00bb despite reduced estimates of success.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Reuven Pedatzur, an Israeli journalist and lecturer at Tel Aviv University, said Patriot has \u00a0\u00bba promising future\u00a0\u00bb as a ballistic missile intercepter, but said no more than one or two Patriots hit Scud warheads over Israel. In a letter submitted by Garner, Brig. Gen. Itzchak Gat, the Israel Defense Forces chief of engineering and logistics, said Patriot&rsquo;s contribution was \u00a0\u00bbmeaningful.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Professer Theodore A. Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the leading challenger of the Army&rsquo;s Patriot assessments, said the success rate could net be higher than 15%-25% and might be as low as zero. He said the Army may never have data good enough to support an overall assessment of the system&rsquo;s performance during the war.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Postol has analyzed unclassified data on ground damage and videotapes of Patriot engagements broadcast on television. He showed the subcommittee videotapes of what he said were engagements in which interceptors missed their targets by hundreds of meters.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Peter D. Zimmerman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies agreed that a number of Patriot missiles missed their targets, flew into the ground or blew up. However, he said Postol&rsquo;s video analyses are \u00a0\u00bbintrinsically flawed\u00a0\u00bb because they are based on broadcast videotape, which records 30 frames per second, instead of the 250 frames used in precision systems that record flight tests.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Commercial systems cannot follow high-speed events, Zimmerman said. Playing high and low-speed tapes of a single intercept test, Zimmerman showed that a direct hit on a warhead could be seen clearly at 250 frames per second but appeared to be a miss when taped at 30 frames per second.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Postol agreed that hits could appear to be misses at broadcast-tape speeds. He added, however, that this phenomenon would net account for the large miss distances apparent in the tapes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The broadcast tapes provide \u00a0\u00bbvery important information,\u00a0\u00bb Postol said. \u00a0\u00bbThere is very little evidence to believe that Patriot had anything but a very low intercept rate.\u00a0\u00bb Zimmerman and Charles A. Zraket of Harvard University&rsquo;s Kennedy School of Government argued, however, that even a 10% success rate would be impressive. A rate of 40%-50% would be \u00a0\u00bbterrifie,\u00a0\u00bb Zraket said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Hildreth of CRS dismissed Postol&rsquo;s challenge. \u00a0\u00bbIf I have problems with the Army&rsquo;s [data], I have mountains of problems with his,\u00a0\u00bb he said. \u00a0\u00bbI think his case is worthless.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong><em>___________________________<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">TV documentary: US lied about Gulf War missile \u00ab\u00a0hits\u00a0\u00bb<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong>By Henry Michaels, WSWS.org, 7 February 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>On Wednesday [5 February] evening, the same day that US Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN Security Council, a Canadian television program provided a timely reminder of the lengths to which the US government, assisted by a servile media, went to deceive American and world public opinion during the 1991 Gulf War.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In a report entitled \u00ab\u00a0The Best Defence,\u00a0\u00bb the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation&rsquo;s documentary program, The Fifth Estate traced one set of lies told by the previous Bush administration and the Pentagon during the 1991 conflict. It replayed footage of both President George Bush the elder and Desert Storm commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf declaring that the US military&rsquo;s Patriot missiles had achieved a 100 percent success rate in destroying Iraqi Scud missiles headed for Saudi Arabia and Israel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The claims were a crucial part of Washington&rsquo;s propaganda effort to create the impression of high-technology precision weaponry that would ensure a rapid victory with few US casualties, while causing limited Iraqi civilian deaths. Billions of dollars were at stake for Raytheon, the company that manufactured the Patriots, and, by extension, the entire military industry upon which the US economy depends heavily.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In briefings that were featured by every American TV network and most media outlets around the globe, Schwarzkopf and other Gulf War commanders displayed video footage and aerial photographs boasting not only that every Scud had been intercepted, but that mobile Scud launchers had been blown to pieces with unerring accuracy by guided missiles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Accompanied by the media corps, the first President Bush traveled to where the Patriot missiles were manufactured, the Raytheon plant in Lexington, Massachusetts, to publicly congratulate the assembled employees. \u00ab\u00a0It is thanks to the patriots here that the Patriot has achieved such success,\u00a0\u00bb he stated.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>It is now clear from The Fifth Estate program that when he made that boast, Bush knew it to be a lie. Just before his appearance at the Raytheon factory, he received an urgent visit from Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, who warned him that Israel was about to enter the war against Iraq because the Patriot missiles had proven completely ineffective.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Interviewed by The Fifth Estate, Arens said he told Bush that, at best, the Patriots had intercepted 20 percent of the Scuds, a figure that soon turned out to be generous. Bush was desperate to forestall the Israeli threat, which could have inflamed the Middle East. He called in Pentagon officials, including Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, who insisted that the US military had reliable evidence of its \u00ab\u00a0100 percent\u00a0\u00bb hit rate.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>But by the time the 40-day war ended, 39 Iraqi Scuds had struck Israeli territory, killing two people and wounding hundreds, despite constant fire from US-operated Patriot batteries near Tel Aviv. American soldiers also became victims of the Patriot cover-up. In the most serious incident, 28 were killed when a Scud missile hit a barracks in Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Conducting their own investigations, the Israelis quickly established that the Patriot missiles had probably failed to knock out a single Scud. Closer examination of Schwarzkopf&rsquo;s presentations established that the mobile Scud launchers he showed being bombed were, in fact, fuel or water tankers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The Fifth Estate claimed that Bush may not have been aware of the Patriot&rsquo;s failure. Arens himself stated that Bush appeared to be stunned by his comments. Yet, if Bush appeared surprised, he quickly gained his composure. On his much-publicized visit to the Raytheon, he did not depart from his prepared script, hailing the performance of US military technology.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_c.deepgreen\" style=\"color:rgb(117, 113, 77); font-size:1.25em\">Decade Long Cover-Up<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Throughout the 1990s, the Pentagon, the Bush and Clinton administrations and the mass media contrived to prevent the story of the Patriot debacle becoming widely known to the American people. They buried a 1992 report by a House of Representatives Operations of Government subcommittee. After hearing expert testimony, the committee concluded:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\u00ab\u00a0The Patriot missile system was not the spectacular success in the Persian Gulf War that the American public was led to believe. There is little evidence to prove that the Patriot hit more than a few Scud missiles launched by Iraq during the Gulf War, and there are some doubts about even these engagements. The public and the Congress were misled by definitive statements of success issued by administration and Raytheon representatives during and after the war.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>While the committee, chaired by Michigan Democrat John Conyers, was careful to clear Bush and Schwarzkopf of any personal culpability, its own report showed that the Patriot&rsquo;s utter failure must have been known at the highest official levels.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>By the time the committee convened, the Army&rsquo;s official assessments of the Patriot&rsquo;s success rate in the Gulf War had fallen from 100 percent to 25 percent. Generals admitted relying on intelligence reports of ground damage that were unverified, contradictory, erroneous and misleading.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>When properly examined, the media&rsquo;s video recordings of supposed Patriot \u00ab\u00a0hits\u00a0\u00bb showed clearly that the Patriots were not hitting the Iraqi warheads&mdash;in some cases they were missing by hundreds of meters. One expert witness, Dr. Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, concluded from his analysis of video tapes of roughly 25 Patriot intercept attempts that most missed by \u00ab\u00a0hundreds of meters or more.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Other independent reviews, even using the Army&rsquo;s own methodology and evidence, indicated that Patriots hit no more than 9 percent of the Scud warheads engaged. Many of the targets turned out to be debris from the poorly designed Scuds as they broke up in flight. It became apparent that at least 45 percent of the 158 Patriots launched in the war were aimed against debris or false targets.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In addition, it emerged that the Army had relied on Raytheon to conduct its postwar analysis of the Patriot&rsquo;s performance, paying the company $520,000 for its services.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Nonetheless, the official cover-up extended through the 1990s, enabling the Clinton administration and Raytheon to sell or deploy hundreds of Patriot missiles around the world. Having paid $117 million for two batteries of Patriots in September 1990, a month after Iraq&rsquo;s invasion of Kuwait, Israel later ordered a third battery, for delivery in March 1994.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>President Bill Clinton personally arranged the sale of two Patriot batteries to Turkey when visiting that country in 1994. Other substantial customers included Taiwan and South Korea. Last month, Bahrain joined the list, in preparation for the planned US invasion of Iraq.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>These sales continued even after serious problems developed with the second and third generations of Patriots, known as PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles. In March 2000, the US Army announced that it had replaced hundreds of PAC-2s in southwest Asia and Korea, due to breakdowns in \u00ab\u00a0hot\u00a0\u00bb missiles that had been powered up and ready to fire for months on end.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Last June, the Pentagon&rsquo;s Ballistic Missile Defense Agency reported that the PAC-3, manufactured by Lockheed-Martin, had failed in three out of four tests in intercepting dummy ballistic missiles at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Yet before the end of the year, the Defense Acquisition Board formally approved the production of 208 PAC-3 missiles for 2003 and 2004. Last December this order was accelerated because of the impending war, adding $120 million to the price tag. A Pentagon official told CNN the military was \u00ab\u00a0increasing production of the PAC-3 missile because of things that may happen.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_c.deepgreen\" style=\"color:rgb(117, 113, 77); font-size:1.25em\">New Lies<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Once more, the media hype is being cranked up, with Pentagon officials insisting that the new missiles are far superior to the old Patriots. Whereas Patriots exploded near an incoming threat, officials declared that the PAC-3&rsquo;s improved sensors and newer radar would allow it to \u00ab\u00a0categorically destroy a Scud missile in flight.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>As in 1991, these claims are made for the most cynical, politically motivated reasons. Because of the breadth of popular opposition to the planned war, the myth of US invincibility and high-tech accuracy is even more needed than it was a decade ago. Israel&rsquo;s government, now headed by Ariel Sharon, must also be restrained again. In addition to supplying Israel with batteries of PAC-2s and PAC-3, Washington has spent $2 billion jointly developing with Israel another anti-missile system, the Arrow, which is designed to intercept targets at higher altitudes, 50 kilometers above the ground.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Not the least consideration in the ongoing Patriot debacle is the protection of the gigantic profits of military supplier companies such as Raytheon and Lockheed-Martin. Over the past two decades, Raytheon, which specializes in anti-missile and aerospace systems, has become a global giant, boasting 77,500 employees worldwide and $16.9 billion in 2001 revenues.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Far more is at stake than simply the Patriot and Arrow contracts. The Patriot revelations throw into doubt the Bush administration&rsquo;s entire multibillion-dollar missile defense shield program. Having exposed the flaws in the Patriot, scientists such as the MIT&rsquo;s Theodore Postol have condemned the program as futile. Responding last December to the White House&rsquo;s latest announcement of a plan to deploy interceptor missiles in Alaska, Postol said the system could be \u00ab\u00a0paralyzed by the simplest methods you can imagine.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Drawing on the inherent problems revealed by the Patriot project, Postol explained that the interceptor missiles could be easily and cheaply tricked by releasing decoys or wrapping warheads in radar-absorbing materials.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>The Fifth Estate stopped well short of accusing Washington of deliberate deception. It raised nothing about the corporate and economic interests driving the renewed war campaign. Nevertheless, intentionally or otherwise, it gave a glimpse of the hypocrisy, corruption and fraud that dominate the political and military establishment now headed by George W. Bush.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong><em>_______________________<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepgreen\" style=\"color:#75714d; font-size:1.65em; font-variant:small-caps\">Israelis Resolve To Bury Past, Add Patriot Improvements<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p><strong>By Barbara Opall-Rome, Defense News, 7 february 2003<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Twelve years ago, when U.S. forces were leading a decisive, allied effort to rid Kuwait and the region of Iraqi aggression, proclamations by then-U.S. President George H. Bush of the invincibility of the U.S.-built Patriot defensive system prompted outrage and resentment here among Israeli leaders and the public at large.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>From Israel&rsquo;s perspective, Patriot batteries deployed here by U.S. troops were hardly the panacea to the ballistic missile threat from Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. On the contrary, official Israeli Ministry of Defense (MoD) data shows the system scoring one intercept out of 39 Scuds launched during that five-and-a-half week reign of terror in early 1991.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Today, as U.S. President George W. Bush prepares a rematch with Baghdad, changing attitudes, technological advances and new concepts of operations are converging in a renewed appreciation for the Patriot. Although Israeli officials still bristle at claims by the U.S. Army and Patriot prime contractor Raytheon Co. of a 40 percent success rate here during the earlier war, ail are willing to focus on a future in which the Patriot system plays a critical role as the lower tier of Israel&rsquo;s two-tiered national missile defense system.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\u00ab\u00a0Claims in the beginning were incredibly high, and therefore the disappointments were quite big. Our records show the Patriot may have hit one missile, and that was at the end of the war,\u00a0\u00bb said Uzi Rubin, then-director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Retired Brig. Gen. Arie Fishbein, then-commander of Israel&rsquo;s first Patriot battalion, said hardware and software improvements have earned the Patriot renewed respect and appreciation in Israel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\u00ab\u00a0Even back then, I preferred to think of the Patriot&rsquo;s performance as a partial success rather than a partial failure. The fact is, it made contact several times with incoming missiles, even though those 600-kilometer surface-to-surface threats exceeded its original design,\u00a0\u00bb said Fishbein, today a senior consultant for Wales Ltd., a weapon systems analysis and engineering firm here.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\u00ab\u00a0The problem is, when you fire a missile, you expect an interception. Instead, the defending Patriots often deflected the missiles from their original flight path,\u00a0\u00bb Fishbein said. \u00ab\u00a0That worked well in Saudi Arabia, where you had critical installations to defend with a lot of desert in between. But here in Israel, when we managed to deflect a missile headed for Tel Aviv to a suburb not so far away, the end result was the same. Population centers got hit.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In an official statement to Defense News, the spokesman&rsquo;s office of the Israel Defense Forces noted a number of technological improvements and modifications to Patriots originally deployed here in 1991. \u00ab\u00a0The technological changes singe 1991 allow for greater effectiveness of the missiles, and the Israel Air Force bas full confidence in the system,\u00a0\u00bb according to the statement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>More importantly, said Arieh Herzog, Rubin&rsquo;s successor at the helm of the Israel Missile Defense Organization, the two nations are cooperating in the technical, operational and conceptual: sphere to ensure Patriot missile batteries are integrated fully into a single, multilayered, national missile defense network. In a Feb. 3 interview, Herzog said Israel plans to establish a national command and control center to coordinate and manage operations of the U.S.-Israeli Arrow anti-missile system as well as the Patriot.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>According to Herzog, the command center will operate all radar and launchers associated with Arrow &mdash; the upper-tier centerpiece of Israel&rsquo;s national missile defense system &mdash; and Patriot, which Israel will use for defense at altitudes or ranges up to 50,000 feet.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Israel presently bas two of its three planned Arrow batteries fully deployed and on high alert, along with another three Israeliowned Patriot batteries tasked to defend against aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and so-called leakers, those incoming missiles that may have penetrated Israel&rsquo;s upper-layer Arrow defenses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>In parallel, Israel&rsquo;s MoD announced Feb. 10 its receipt of two upgraded Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) batteries on loan for two years from Germany.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Additionally, three batteries of the U.S. Army&rsquo;s latest, upgraded versions of the PAC-2 Guided Enhanced Missile (GEM) Plus remain here for Israel&rsquo;s use in the run-up to a possible U.S.-led attack on Iraq. The Patriot batteries from U.S. European Command were brought here as part of the bilateral Juniper Cobra exercise that concluded Feb. 4. The exercise aimed at demonstrating the interoperability of the Patriot and Arrow, and reinforced Israel&rsquo;s efforts to institute an integrated system to command and control the two interceptor elements of its national missile defense network, Herzog said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>So confident are Israeli officials in the Patriot&rsquo;s ability against lower-tier missiles, the MoD has begun discussing procurements.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Israeli and U.S. sources said Israel is considering a forcewide upgrade of ground equipment associated with&rsquo; its PAC-2 GEM to bring it up to so-called PAC-3, Configuration 3 levels. Deployed by the U.S. Army in 2000, this configuration improves the radar&rsquo;s ability to detect small targets in cluttered environments and to identify missile warheads from among target debris, a major problem encountered by Israeli operators during the 1991 war.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>U.S. government and industry sources said upgrading Israeli ground equipment to the PAC-3 configuration will render Israel&rsquo;s Patriot launchers capable of firing America&rsquo;s newest PAC-3 hit-to-kill missile interceptor now undergoing operational testing with the U.S. Army. Maj. Gen. Joe G. Taylor Jr., commander of the Army Security Assistance Command, is expected to discuss Israeli plans for future upgrades and purchases during a visit here in mid-February U.S. and Israeli sources said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\u00ab\u00a0We know PAC-3 is the next generation of lower-tier missile defense. The question is not if we&rsquo;ll go in this direction, but when and how many we&rsquo;ll be able to buy,\u00a0\u00bb Brig. Gen. Shimon Sarid, director of the Israel Air Forces Materiel Directorate, said Feb. 6.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Tim Carey, Raytheon vice president, Patriot Business Area, said the Lexington, Mass.-based firm has worked with Israeli defense officials to optimize Israel&rsquo;s deployed Patriot batteries. Also, he said, \u00ab\u00a0We continue the dialogue on a regular basis with the Israel Air Force to keep them apprised of all upgrades and changes instituted by the U.S. government.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Carey said Israel has smoothly established its two-layered missile defense approach. \u00ab\u00a0The Patriot will go after leakers, and this is exactly the kind of construct we were planning for,\u00a0\u00bb Carey said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Dave Hartman, Raytheon Patriot business development management, and a former U.S. Army battalion commander, spent part of&rsquo; the 1991 war in support of Patriot batteries deployed here. He said he saw the Patriot \u00ab\u00a0turn one incoming missile into fireworks.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Nevertheless, Hartman said \u00ab\u00a0Looking at it 12 years in hindsight, there seems to be a lot of confusion in the record. The record is voluminous and very confusing, and let&rsquo;s just say Raytheon is trying not to be in the business anymore of reconstructing the [1991] Gulf War.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La \u00ab\u00a0fable du &lsquo;Patriot&lsquo;\u00a0\u00bb, &ndash; le Retour &bull; Pour aider Zelenski \u00e0 stopper et \u00e0 d\u00e9truire les hordes barbares de la Russie, Biden sort le &lsquo;Patriot&lsquo; de la naphtaline, pour la troisi\u00e8me fois en quarante ans, et en \u00ab\u00a0fait don\u00a0\u00bb aux Ukrainiens pour leur d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne. &bull; Il faut donc savoir que la m\u00eame op\u00e9ration&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[2651,3723,2645,2774,3957,3959,13670,2829],"class_list":["post-80444","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ouverture-libre","tag-du","tag-golfe","tag-guerre","tag-israel","tag-missile","tag-sol-air","tag-ukrisis","tag-zelenski"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/80444","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=80444"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/80444\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=80444"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=80444"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=80444"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}